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Abstract 
 
Throughout our lives we engage in problem solving, which is thought to depend on 
executive functions (EFs) e.g., inhibition, shifting and working memory. Previous work 
has identified the need to consider these abilities in an everyday context. EF skills are 
known to be impaired in Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS). This 
thesis aims to investigate experimental and real-life problem solving in WS and DS, and 
how these groups use EF skills to solve problems, through experimental and 
questionnaire-based cross-syndrome comparisons. 
 
Participants with WS and DS aged 12-24 years (Ns=20) and typically developing (TD) 
controls (N=56; nonverbal matched subset = 20) completed the Tower of London (TOL) 
problem-solving task and a battery of EF tests. In a separate study, parents (WS, DS, TD; 
total N=112) completed the BRIEF (Behavioral Rating Inventory of Executive 
Functioning) and a novel Problem-Solving Questionnaire. 
 
The WS group, but not the DS group, scored more poorly on the TOL than the 
nonverbal-matched controls. In WS, developmental trajectory analysis indicated over-
reliance on planning for TOL performance for low planning scores. For the DS group 
only speed of picture matching was associated with TOL performance, while more rule 
violations were exhibited than for the WS group. Questionnaire scores were poor for the 
WS group in relation to DS and TD groups. Asking for help for the DS group, and 
becoming emotional for the WS group, was related to reaching the solution. In general, 
associations between experimental and everyday measures were scarce. 
 
It was concluded that: while EFs (planning, visuospatial working memory) were 
constraining factors for WS problem solving, alternative strategies were used by the DS 
group to reach the solution; real-life problem solving should be considered in its own 
right; and poor WS problem solving may be related to emotional difficulties.  
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“All life is problem solving” (Karl Popper, 1999) 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate problem-solving abilities in typical 
and atypical development. The first section of this chapter will address the 
rationale and theoretical approach taken. In the second section, relevant 
literature will be reviewed in order to: introduce the atypical populations of 
interest and the topic of problem solving; consider the processes that might 
underlie problem solving and its development; and discuss relevant issues that 
arise in the measurement of such constructs. The chapter will conclude with a 
statement of the specific aims of the research and an outline of the structure and 
content of this thesis.  
1.1 Rationale and approach 
1.1.1 What is problem solving? 
While problem-solving research can be found in the literature review section of 
this chapter, an introductory note is included here to clarify the concept for the 
reading of this thesis. The conceptualisation of problem solving is not 
straightforward. In general usage it implies that there is an out-of-the-ordinary 
aversive situation that requires some kind of action to be resolved. For example, 
one may have a moral dilemma, or a broken-down car engine. In academic usage 
the interpretation tends to be broader, so that every task which we undertake is 
seen as the solving of a problem, for example, how do I attain the goal of 
providing an evening meal? (Anderson, 1993; Davidson & Sternberg, 2003). As 
Anderson (1993) points out, rather than only including activities that feel 
effortful in the category of problem solving, for those who study it, “all higher 
level cognition is problem solving” (p. 39). Conversely, in experimental 
paradigms, the novelty of a posed problem is often emphasised as important, in 
order to facilitate the study of the generation of new solutions. In these problem-
solving tasks, the onus is on the solver to produce the solution (e.g., Klahr & 
Robinson, 1981; Shallice, 1982). In this thesis, a problem is treated as a situation 
in which there is a goal to be reached, and in which the solver must find the way 
to reach it. 
15 
 
 
As such, the central experimental problem-solving task employed in this thesis is 
the Tower of London (TOL; Shallice, 1982). The TOL is often referred to as a 
problem-solving task (e.g., Berg & Byrd, 2002), but is also included in several test 
batteries assessing executive functioning (EF; e.g., the Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated battery, CANTAB; Owen, Downes, Sahakian, 
Polkey, & Robbins, 1990) and in studies aiming to investigate complex EF skills 
(Huizinga, Dolan, & van der Molen, 2006). Thus, the TOL could be argued to 
reflect either problem solving or complex EF abilities. As EF is thought to underlie 
goal-directed behaviour, the difference between the use of these two terms is 
subtle, if present at all. Here, the TOL is seen as reflecting problem solving 
because the participant must produce the solution themselves (cf. Klahr & 
Robinson, 1981), rather than only following rules for responding to stimuli, as 
might be required in an EF task measuring, for example, inhibition. Thus, in this 
thesis, the TOL is conceptualised as a problem-solving task, which is very likely to 
rely on a collection of related but distinct, lower-level EF processes (inhibition, 
working memory; citations in Section 1.2.3).  
1.1.2 Why study problem solving in neurodevelopmental 
disorders? 
Problem solving is a ubiquitous and crucial part of everyday life, encountered in a 
wide variety of contexts and encompassing a wide range of capacities. Problem 
solving has been well documented in typical adults (e.g., Davidson & Sternberg, 
2003; Robertson, 2001; Simon, 1975; Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell, & Stine, 1999) 
and children (e.g., Bull, Espy, & Senn, 2004; Fagot & Gauvain, 1997; Klahr, 1985; 
Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Welsh, 1991; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003). However, in 
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, while a considerable amount of 
work has addressed specific cognitive abilities (see, for example, Mervis & John, 
2010; Vicari, 2006 for reviews) and some studies have used problem-solving 
tasks as measurements of planning within a wider assessment (e.g., Menghini, 
Addona, Costanzo, & Vicari, 2010), there has been a limited amount of research 
addressing the ability of individuals to bring specific skills together in order to 
solve a problem. The aim of research with these groups must ultimately be to 
16 
 
support the daily lives of individuals with the disorders. Therefore, it is 
imperative to develop our understanding, not only of isolated abilities, but how 
those abilities are used: not only in well-controlled experimental settings, but in 
the real world, where individuals with developmental disorders are attempting to 
solve problems every day. In this thesis, these are the topics that are addressed. 
1.1.3 Neuroconstructivism and neurodevelopmental disorders 
In this thesis the study of genetic disorders is approached from a 
neuroconstructivist perspective. Both Williams syndrome (WS) and Down 
syndrome (DS) are known to be of genetic aetiology (see below). The nativist 
approach to development would lead to the conceptualisation of the resulting 
atypical phenotype as the direct product of some missing components (or 
‘modules’; Fodor, 1983) in a set of abilities that rely solely (or mainly) on the 
disrupted genetic material (see critical discussion in Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). In 
contrast, neuroconstructivism views development as dynamic and interactive, 
with low-level impairments to the young and poorly specialised system making 
themselves felt to different degrees in different domains as the system matures, 
learns and becomes more specialised through ‘progressive modularisation’ 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). One tenet of this approach is that similar-looking 
behaviours can be attained though different cognitive processes (e.g., in the 
domain of face processing; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). Another is that 
researchers should take a developmental approach, examining outcomes across 
development in order to understand how phenotypes are reached, and comparing 
outcomes across neurodevelopmental disorders (Karmiloff-Smith, 2009). Both of 
these methodologies are used in this thesis. 
1.1.4 Using developmental trajectories 
The developmental trajectory approach is one of the central statistical techniques 
employed in this thesis. Stemming from the requirement to take a developmental 
view, it allows task performance to be plotted, for each group, against another 
measure, to ascertain a developmental pathway which can then be compared 
across groups. Here, performance on an outcome task (the TOL) is analysed with 
respect to various predictor measures (chronological age, CA; mental age, MA; 
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executive function (EF) task performance). A trajectory is constructed for each 
group of participants, and compared using a technique derived from analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA). Thomas et al. (2009) presented guidance for its use. 
Comparing trajectories allows the determination of whether the scores on the 
outcome measure differ across groups at a particular point on the trajectory, as 
well as whether the gradients of the lines differ; that is, whether the rate of 
development of the outcome with respect to the predictor is similar to the typical 
group or looks atypical. Some examples of different types of trajectory (Thomas et 
al., 2009) can be seen in Figure 1.1. 
 
 
In the next section of the chapter, the two neurodevelopmental disorders to be 
studied will be introduced, before reviewing research into problem solving 
(studies specifically addressing EF, and TOL problem solving, in WS and DS are 
discussed later in the chapter, after these topics have been introduced). 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Williams syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS) 
1.2.1.1 Prevalence and genetics of WS and DS 
WS is a rare developmental disorder, with a prevalence of 1 in 20, 000 live births 
(Morris & Mervis, 1999; Pober, 2010), although a recent estimate is considerably 
higher, at 1 in 7500 (Strømme, Bjømstad, & Ramstad, 2002). Between 26 and 28 
genes are deleted from chromosome 7q11.23 (Pober, 2010), including the ELN 
gene for elastin (Ewart et al., 1993), which contributes to some of the medical 
Atypical group: 
Poorer score at onset; 
same rate 
Atypical group: Same 
score at onset; slower 
rate 
Atypical group: 
Poorer score at onset; 
slower rate 
Control 
group 
Atypical 
group 
Figure 1.1: Schematic examples of developmental trajectory patterns between groups 
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problems seen in WS (Pober, 2010). While there is much interest in the 
contribution of genetic deletions to the cognitive phenotype in WS, the 
relationship between genotype and phenotype is a complex and multidimensional 
one (Gray, Karmiloff-Smith, Funnell, & Tassabehji, 2006; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 
2012) due to intricate interactions at different levels of description, eventually 
leading to an individual’s dynamic phenotype (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998; 2006). 
 
By contrast, DS, initially described by Down (1866), is a relatively common 
chromosomal genetic disorder occurring in 1 in 650-1000 births (Bittles, Bower, 
Hussain, & Glasson, 2007). The most common form, trisomy 21, involves a de novo 
occurrence of an extra copy of the entire chromosome 21 (Cody & Kamphaus, 
1999). LeJeune, Gautier and Turpin (1959) discovered this extra chromosome. 
Approximately 94% of DS instances occur in this way, with the remaining 6% 
being familial (Pennington, Moon, Edgin, Stedron, & Nadel, 2003). Attempts to 
link the DS phenotype with specific genes are underway, e.g., using mouse models 
(Crnic & Pennington, 2000), although this process is dependent on knowledge of 
which genes, being overexpressed, would affect brain development and which 
would be expressed at the appropriate point in ontology to affect development 
(Pennington et al., 2003). 
1.2.1.2 Cognitive phenotype in WS and DS 
In this section, the cognitive phenotype of individuals with WS and DS is 
reviewed, both to provide a broad introduction to the syndromes and in 
recognition that problem solving is likely to draw on many different abilities. 
 
People with WS have a distinctive facial appearance and mild to moderate 
learning difficulties, alongside several medical irregularities (e.g., Bellugi, Wang, & 
Jernigan, 1994; Donnai & Karmiloff‐Smith, 2000; Jones & Smith, 1975). A friendly 
nature and good grasp of language were initially observed (von Arnim & Engel, 
1964) while more recent studies find individuals with WS to be ‘hypersocial’ 
(Jones et al., 2000), although they often experience anxiety (Stinton & Howlin, 
2012), isolation (Jawaid et al., 2011) and have problems with peer relationships 
19 
 
and social skills (Campos & Sotillo, 2012; Stinton & Howlin, 2012; Stojanovik, 
2006). 
 
The cognitive profile in WS is uneven (Mervis et al., 2000), with generally better 
verbal than visuospatial abilities, although this unevenness has been emphasised 
to different degrees by different researchers. Some report normal face processing 
(Tager-Flusberg, Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, & Joseph, 2003) and language skills, against 
a backdrop of severely impaired visuospatial construction (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, 
Jones, Lai, & St. George, 2000) while others observe relative strengths and 
weaknesses, both between and within domains. For example, difficulties with 
pragmatics, grammar and other areas of language have been found (Brock, 2007; 
Martens, Wilson, & Reutens, 2008) while there is evidence for atypical 
neurocognitive face processing in WS which nonetheless still produces 
behavioural scores in the normal range (Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2004). Also, 
concrete receptive vocabulary is a relative strength in children with WS (Mervis & 
John, 2008) while difficulties with spatial language have been identified (Laing & 
Jarrold, 2007; Phillips, Jarrold, Baddeley, Grant, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2004). In 
children, relational vocabulary was found to be comparable to visuospatial 
construction abilities (Mervis & John, 2008) which is an area of extreme 
weakness for this population, for example on block design tasks (e.g., Farran, 
Jarrold, & Gathercole, 2001; Hoffman, Landau, & Pagani, 2003). These abilities are 
poor, even within the already weak domain of nonverbal skills (Farran & Jarrold, 
2003). Better verbal than visuospatial short-term memory (STM) is generally 
found for this group, in contrast to DS (e.g., Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999): see 
below. 
 
Generally, individuals with WS score between 40 and 90 on the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised, WISC-R (Semel & Rosner, 2003) with full-
scale IQ remaining stable throughout adulthood (Howlin, Elison, Udwin, & 
Stinton, 2010). However, the uneven WS profile means that full-scale IQ scores 
can be misleading (see Farran & Jarrold, 2003 for a discussion of methodological 
issues in WS testing). When studies measure abilities separately, the uneven 
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profile becomes apparent, e.g., Mervis and John (2010) found particular 
weaknesses on spatial IQ scores on the Differential Ability Scales – 2nd edition 
(DAS-II; Elliott, 2007). In addition, Mervis and John (2010) point out the 
challenges of interpreting the results of specific IQ tests, which differ in how the 
samples are normed. A test which does not provide low enough norms for 
standardisation will not be able to capture the performance of individuals with 
WS; the Wechsler IQ tests are included as a case in point. Thus, caution should be 
used when interpreting IQ scores in WS. These uneven levels of proficiency in WS 
are important to take into account when considering how problem solving might 
be approached: problem solving involves the combination of many different skills, 
so some may be relied upon more than others. 
 
Most children with DS have mild, moderate, severe or profound learning 
difficulties, which impacts on cognitive development (Cody & Kamphaus, 1999). 
IQ (i.e., performance in relation to developmentally-appropriate expectations) 
declines over developmental time in childhood, remaining relatively stable in 
adulthood (Carr, 2012). Generally adults with DS have with a low IQ (25-55) 
(Gibson, 1978) although ability levels are by no means homogenous (Cody & 
Kamphaus, 1999). Tsao and Kindelberger (2009) also emphasise the 
heterogeneity of ability levels in children with DS. 
 
Individuals with DS are known to be friendly and to show a liking for social 
stimuli and interaction, much as people with WS do (Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 
2007). Children with DS have early social strengths and are able to maintain 
friendships in childhood but socio-cognitive tasks are more difficult, possibly 
because of EF demands (see Fidler & Nadel, 2007 for a review). The DS cognitive 
profile is uneven and complex, and is reviewed by Vicari (2006). In infancy, 
language learning is impaired, with slow vocabulary acquisition compared to CA, 
but at the same level as MA-matched controls and as infants with WS (Paterson, 
Brown, Gsodl, Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1999). Later in life, language is 
generally weak, although comprehension skills are stronger than production 
skills (Vicari, 2006). Children with DS show poorer grammatical skills than those 
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with WS although both groups demonstrate delayed language overall on a 
parental report measure of language development (Singer Harris, Bellugi, Bates, 
Jones, & Rossen, 1997). However, compared to their poor language abilities, 
visuospatial abilities are a relative strength in DS (Vicari, 2006).  
 
Numerous studies have found evidence of working memory deficits in the verbal 
domain, with stronger visuospatial short-term memory (STM) skills in DS (e.g. 
Laws, 2002) while the opposite pattern is seen in WS (Jarrold et al., 1999; Wang & 
Bellugi, 1994).  Backwards span tasks, purported to recruit the central executive, 
are also poor in DS compared to TD controls and other intellectually impaired 
groups (Vicari, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 1995) and there is evidence for impaired 
explicit memory against a background of stronger implicit memory (Vicari, 
Bellucci, & Carlesimo, 2000). Reaching strategies on an object retrieval problem-
solving task were found to be less efficient in a group of toddlers with DS than a 
CA- and MA-matched group with developmental disabilities and a MA-matched 
typical control group, indicating early problem-solving difficulties in DS (Fidler, 
Philofsky, Hepburn, & Rogers, 2005).  
 
Auditory processing in children with DS is slower than that of both CA- and MA-
matched controls (Lincoln, Courchesne, Kilman, & Galambos, 1985), while 
information processing is slow in DS overall (Gibson, 1991, cited in Cody & 
Kamphaus, 1999). Difficulties with approaching the learning of new skills and 
holding on to existing ones have been identified in children with DS (Wishart, 
1993a). Performance on verbal and spatial long-term memory (LTM) tasks is 
impaired in adolescents with DS compared to MA-matched controls (Pennington 
et al., 2003), as well as in infants compared to CA controls (Mangan, 1992) and 
adults (e.g., Devenny et al., 1992, both cited in Nadel, 2003) which is in line with 
findings of hippocampal abnormality in DS (Nadel, 2003).  
1.2.1.3 Brain structure and function in WS and DS 
Both WS and DS brains show an overall reduction in size compared to CA-
matched controls (Reiss et al., 2000; Weis, 1991). Children with DS (aged 2-8 
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years) have smaller brain volumes compared to children with developmental 
language delay and Fragile X syndrome as well as to controls (Kates, Folley, 
Lanham, Capone, & Kaufmann, 2002). Atypicalities of brain structure and function 
are seen for both syndromes (see, e.g., Jackowski et al., 2009; Nadel, 2003 for 
reviews).  
 
Evidence for frontal (Owen et al., 1990; Stuss & Benson, 1984) and prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) (Ball et al., 2011; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003; Mushiake et al.) 
involvement in goal-directed behaviour (i.e., problem solving) in typically 
developing individuals is ongoing (although see Rowe, Owen, Johnsrude, & 
Passingham, 2001 and section 1.2.3.5). Indeed, cerebral blood flow increased in 
the left PFC during a TOL task (Morris, Ahmed, Syed, & Toone, 1993). Various 
atypicalities of these brain areas have been found in the two syndromes of 
interest. WS brains have more complex cortical folds than is normal (Gaser et al., 
2006; Schmitt et al., 2002), and Fahim (2012) found increased cortical complexity 
in frontal lobes in children with WS, amongst other areas. Chiang et al. (2007) 
noted that the prefrontal and orbitofrontal areas of WS brains, as well as several 
other areas including the amygdala and cerebellum, were not substantially 
reduced in size. However, grey matter in orbitofrontal regions has been reported 
to be both increased and decreased, depending on the technique used in analysis, 
which stems from the problems in comparing WS and typical brains, which are 
different shapes (Eckert et al., 2006). In DS, the frontal lobes show decreased 
growth compared to typical controls in infancy and the PFC is identified as one of 
the main areas of neuropathology in DS, amongst other areas (Fidler & Nadel, 
2007; Nadel, 2003). There is also decreased gyrification in the frontal lobe in 
adults with DS (Lögdbergi & Brun, 1993). Unterrainer and Owen (2006) noted, 
importantly, that the frontal areas of the brain are connected to several other 
areas, and function using those connections, so goal-directed behaviour is 
unlikely to depend only on frontal regions. For example, unusual patterns in the 
way in which the amygdala and PFC converse are thought to underlie the atypical 
social behaviours seen in WS (i.e., fearful reactions to non-social stimuli but not to 
threatening social stimuli) (Meyer-Lindenberg, Hariri, et al., 2005; but see Porter 
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et al., 2007). Other brain areas also show abnormalities in WS and DS, as 
reviewed below. 
 
In children with WS, Fahim et al. (2012) also found increased cortical complexity 
and gyrification index in the parietal lobe, alongside decreased cortical volumes 
and surface area, compared to CA-matched typical controls. Frontal-parietal areas 
are thought to be involved in the visual control of movement, and also show 
atypicalities in WS (Hocking, Bradshaw, & Rinehart, 2008 and references therein). 
Indeed, there are well-recognised atypicalities of the parietal lobe in WS, thought 
to be implicated in visuospatial functioning (Chiang et al., 2007; Eckert et al., 
2006; Weis, 1991). Reiss and colleagues have also found atypicalities in areas 
thought to be implicated in visual processing in WS: reduced grey matter volume 
of the occipital cortex and thalamus (Reiss et al., 2004) and occipital lobe 
asymmetries (Reiss et al., 2000). Chiang et al. (2007) demonstrated reduced 
volumes of some brain areas, including occipital and parietal regions as well as 
the basal ganglia. Connectivity is unusual in the WS brain: notably, reduced flow 
of information to dorsal-stream regions has been found during visuospatial 
construction tasks (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2004) which are known to be 
particularly poor in WS (see above). Other areas that are often found to show 
atypicalities are the hippocampus (involved in spatial cognition amongst other 
functions: see below) and corpus callosum, which connects the hemispheres and 
is thought to play a role in problem solving amongst other skills (see Lögdbergi & 
Brun, 1993 for a review). Small corpus callosum areas and atypical hippocampal 
shapes were noted in WS, compared to typical age-matched controls’ brains 
(Meyer-Lindenberg, Mervis, et al., 2005; Schmitt, Eliez, Warsofsky, Bellugi, & 
Reiss, 2001). 
 
At birth, DS brains are relatively comparable to typical brains, but during infancy 
several abnormalities become evident, including a reduced overall brain size, 
disproportionately smaller brain stem and cerebellum, and delayed myelination 
in some cases (as well as the decreased frontal lobe growth mentioned above) 
(for a review, see Fidler & Nadel, 2007; Nadel, 2003). This emergence of 
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abnormality does not always reflect the characteristics of the group as a whole, 
but rather, the number of individuals within the group who show atypicalities, 
highlighting the heterogeneity of the disorder (Fidler & Nadel, 2007). 
Hippocampal volumes have been found to be reduced in MRI studies (Jernigan, 
Bellugi, Sowell, Doherty, & Hesselink, 1993; Pinter et al., 2001). Above age 35, the 
risk of early onset dementia is higher than in the typical population (Bush & Beail, 
2004). All adults with trisomy 21 present with the brain pathology that is seen in 
Alzheimer’s disease, while only around half go on to develop the associated 
dementia symptoms (Nadel, 2003). In addition to the PFC, notable areas of 
neuropathology in DS are the hippocampus, implicated in spatial cognition, 
memory consolidation and flexible learning, and the cerebellum, with a less 
clearly defined role which potentially includes motor skills and learning 
conditioned responses (Fidler & Nadel, 2007; Nadel, 2003). Motor development is 
slow compared to controls, but milestones are reached in the same order (Vicari, 
2006). 
 
In the next section, the topic of problem solving will be introduced, and the 
processes underlying it will be explored. For an overview of executive functioning 
abilities in WS and DS, see Section 1.2.3.5. 
1.2.2 Problem solving 
1.2.2.1 Introduction to problem solving 
Research into problem solving stretches back to the work of the Gestalt 
psychologists and beyond, when problems that were posed usually required a 
‘eureka’ moment, or insight, into how the problem should be solved (Dunbar, 
1998). An example is the famous pendulum problem (Maier, 1931, cited in 
Eysenck & Keane, 2000) in which a participant is asked to tie together two strings 
hanging from the ceiling which are too far apart to be held at the same time: a 
process known as ‘restructuring’ must occur (prompted by the examiner 
‘accidentally’ moving a string as they walk past) to enable the participant to 
produce the solution through changing the way in which the problem was 
represented (Eysenck & Keane, 2000) and tie one of the objects provided to one 
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string so it can be swung towards the other and caught. Goal-directed behaviour 
has been observed in animal studies, e.g., in crows (Clayton, 2007) as well as in 
infants (e.g., Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997) and related areas, such as tool 
innovation in children (Beck, Apperly, Chappell, Guthrie, & Cutting, 2011). Other 
avenues of research include presenting analogous problems known as isomorphs 
and investigating the relations between them, and studying the problem solving 
of experts, such as chess players (Kahney, 1986b). Some ways of capturing 
processes during problem solving include verbal protocols (‘thinking out loud’) 
(e.g., Newell & Simon, 1972) and analysing the gestures people produce (Garber & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2002). As mentioned above, goal-directed behaviour is thought 
to be mediated by the PFC.  
1.2.2.2 The information-processing approach 
A prominent approach to studying problem solving is known as information 
processing. Perhaps its best-known proponents, Newell and Simon (1972)’s 
seminal theory of problem solving uses ‘production systems’, a cognitive science 
approach to both capture human cognition and develop intelligent machines 
(Schunn & Klahr, 1998). This is based on the existence of a set of condition/action 
(IF/THEN) rules which are stored, in humans, in long-term memory, and interact 
with conditions in the environment, stored in ‘working memory’ to produce 
behavioural responses. A simple example is that the current condition (e.g., it is 
raining) is stored in the ‘working memory’ and compared to the production rules 
for a match. When a match is found, the appropriate action linked to the existing 
condition is activated (e.g., put your hood up) (Kahney, 1986a). These processes 
can be combined in complex ways to model complex task performance and 
cognition as a whole: for an overview of production systems, see Schunn and 
Klahr (1998) and Young (2001). Newell and Simon (1972) identified rules 
(productions) from participants’ problem-solving behaviour and verbal protocols. 
In their problem space theory, the individual who is solving the problem (the 
solver) moves from a start state to a goal state using a series of operators 
(moves). It is based on the idea that the journey from the start of a problem to its 
finish and all the possible moves along the way can be represented abstractly in a 
problem space (as such it is an example of a symbolic approach to cognition). The 
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term ‘problem space’ refers to the solver’s representation of the problem (termed 
‘task environment’ in its objective sense) in which the actual solving will occur 
(Simon & Newell, 1971). Problem solving is conceptualised as the search of a 
problem space (Dunbar, 1998). A problem space can be very large when there are 
many possible combinations and permutations of moves, and it has been 
suggested that humans are only able to represent limited amounts of it at once 
(Dunbar, 1998). Human processing is also thought by production systems 
theorists to be serial (rather than parallel) with a limited short-term memory 
capacity underlying the process, and easy, fast access to unlimited long-term 
memory stores that nevertheless take a large amount of time to store information 
(Simon & Newell, 1971).  
 
Problem solving task performance can be modelled and compared to human data 
to assess the success of the model. Several problem-solving models have been 
based on the production systems (symbolic) approach, e.g., Norman and Shallice 
(1980); the General Problem Solver (GPS; Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1959) and 
Adaptive Character of Thought (ACT; Anderson, 1993, 1996), which is a theory of 
cognition, used to model problem solving (see, e.g., Altmann & Trafton, 2002). 
More recently, symbolic approaches have been extended to form hybrid symbolic-
connectionist computational models (see, e.g., Lebiere & Anderson, 2008). 
Production Systems theorists often consider problem solving on tasks which are 
easily measured and characterised; that is, problems with a finite problem space. 
Two classic examples of such tasks are the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) and the Tower 
of London (TOL). 
1.2.2.2.1 The Tower of Hanoi (TOH) 
The TOH problem was developed by Simon (1975). In the task, participants are 
presented with a number of different-sized discs, stacked on the leftmost of three 
wooden posts (the start state, shown in Figure 1.2), and their task is to move the 
collection of discs to the rightmost post (the goal state), while following certain 
rules, such as only placing smaller discs on top of larger discs and only moving 
one disc at a time. The operators are the moves that can be applied, while the task 
is constrained by the rules. As Klahr and Robinson (1981) and Shallice (1982) 
27 
 
point out, the challenge is in finding the correct and minimum sequence of moves 
to reach the goal state. A schematic diagram of a 3-disc TOH puzzle can be seen in 
Figure 1.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While task difficulty can be varied using different numbers of discs (e.g., Piaget, 
1976) or pegs, there is a particular strategy for solving the TOH puzzle. It is 
known as a goal recursion strategy, in which temporary smaller stacks of discs 
must be produced to allow larger discs to move (here, the small disc needs to be 
stacked on the goal peg temporarily and then the medium and small discs need to 
be stacked on the middle peg so that the larger one can be moved to the rightmost 
peg).  
1.2.2.2.2 The Tower of London (TOL) 
The TOL was developed by Shallice (1982) from the TOH task, so that 
neuropsychological patients could be tested on a task in which the level of 
difficulty could be varied; indeed, they can range from very easy to extremely 
difficult. Three pieces (‘beads’) of different colours are presented on three pegs of 
varying height, which can hold three, two or one pieces, which need to be 
rearranged, one at a time, to match a goal configuration. When Shallice designed 
the task, difficulty was measured by the minimum number of moves required to 
reach the solution, with more difficult problems generally requiring more moves 
to be made between the start state and the goal state. A schematic diagram of a 4-
move problem can be seen in Figure 1.3. 
Start state Goal state 
Figure 1.2: The Tower of Hanoi (TOH): example of a 3-disc problem 
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The TOL, due to its potential for systematically varying the level of difficulty of 
individual problems, is thought to be suitable for children and clinical 
populations. This was one of the main reasons for its selection as the main 
experimental task for this thesis. It was thought to be relatively free of complex 
perceptual demands and appealing for participants, with a range of readily 
observable behaviours and error types which could be expected to provide 
insight into the problem-solving processes being employed, as well as an 
individual’s ability to correctly solve a problem. Thirty years from Shallice’s 
original publication, measures of TOL difficulty and proficiency now vary widely 
in research studies. In order to inform the interpretation of TOL research, the 
next section outlines these variations, before addressing the types of strategies 
that are thought to be employed, within the information-processing framework. 
1.2.2.3 Properties of the TOL task 
The properties of the TOL task allow much variation in the specific problems that 
are administered. While this is a strength of the design, and indeed one of the 
reasons for its development (Shallice, 1982), the task paradigm and the ways in 
which the task may vary also means that there are many different characteristics 
of problems that may vary, rather than a linear increase in difficulty which might 
be seen in, for example, memory span tasks. The TOL, as it exists now, can differ 
along several distinct dimensions: the problem set, or the specific arrangements 
of start and goal positions that participants are asked to make their way between; 
the form of the task, that is, whether it is broadly similar to Shallice’s original 
design or not; and the way in which it is administered, with respect to variations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The Tower of London (TOL): example of a 4-move problem 
Start state Goal state 
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in instructions, procedure and scoring. Each of these dimensions will be 
considered in this section. 
1.2.2.3.1 Problem set (parameters) 
While TOL problems consist of a start and goal state and the requirement to move 
from one to the other in a series of moves, the most intuitive measure of difficulty 
is the number of moves that must be made in order to get from the start to the 
goal. This is known as the minimum number of moves, and was the original 
measure of difficulty employed by Shallice (1982): the more moves needed, the 
more difficult the problem. However this is not always adequate (Berg & Byrd, 
2002; Berg, Byrd, McNamara, & Case, 2010; Kaller, Unterrainer, Rahm, & 
Halsband, 2004) and there are numerous other parameters, some of which are 
reviewed below (for a comprehensive discussion, see Kaller, Rahm, Köstering, & 
Unterrainer, 2011). 
 
The moves made from start to finish are not equal. Take the example in Figure 1.3 
above. The task can be considered in terms of one overarching goal, which can be 
broken down into three subgoals: that is, when each piece is placed in the 
particular position in which it needs to be (its ‘goal position’), we can say that one 
subgoal has been reached (it is also possible to break subgoals down further, for 
example to have a subgoal of removing an obstacle to allow us to move a 
particular piece, but here we will consider subgoals as piece placements). Thus, 
placing a piece in its goal position is known as a ‘goal move’, while any other 
moves are termed intermediate moves. One TOL parameter which affects 
performance is ‘search depth’: the number of intermediate moves that occurs 
before the goal move, to allow a subgoal to be reached (Spitz, Webster, & Borys, 
1982). 
 
Each problem has an optimum path through the problem space, which allows it to 
be solved in the minimum number of moves. Sometimes there will only be one 
path, and sometimes there will be more than one. This affects task difficulty (Berg 
et al., 2010; Kaller et al., 2011). Moreover, sometimes the optimum move is to 
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temporarily move a piece away from its eventual goal position. These are 
variously known as indirect moves, counterintuitive moves, or goal-subgoal 
conflict moves (Bull et al., 2004; Kaller et al., 2011) and are referred to here as 
counterintuitive moves. Preplanning time was found to increase for problems 
with four counterintuitive moves compared to those with no counterintuitive 
moves (Phillips, 1999) although their number was confounded with the number 
of moves to the solution. This is indicative of the way in which the various 
parameters of the problems are not always independent: for example, as the 
number of counterintuitive moves increases, so will the overall minimum moves 
to solution.  
 
The configuration of the goal state can also vary: this can be tower-ending, with 
all the pieces on top of each other on one peg; flat-ending, with each piece on a 
different peg, or partial tower-ending, with two pieces on one peg and one piece 
on another. Flat-ending problems are more difficult to solve than tower-ending 
ones, because there is no ‘ambiguity’ in the order in which the pieces must be 
placed (Klahr & Robinson, 1981). Partial tower-ending problems lie between flat- 
and tower-ending configurations in terms of difficulty (Spitz et al., 1982).  
1.2.2.3.2 Forms of the TOL task 
Berg and Byrd (2002) give an overview of the different ways in which researchers 
have presented the TOL problem, and have classified the different approaches. 
Some tasks, classified as the ‘Shallice TOL’ resemble the original in terms of 
design (for example, three pieces that must be moved on three pegs of decreasing 
height), with the problem space and rules of the task intact, although they may 
look slightly different or provide different problem sets. In contrast, Berg and 
Byrd state that other forms of the TOL change the task demands to such a degree 
that it is difficult to compare across versions: isomorphs of the problem include a 
version of the TOL that uses “pockets” or “socks” (Owen et al., 1990) that the 
pieces are dropped down into, rather than pegs onto which they are threaded. 
This type of TOL task is used in the CANTAB and is known as the Stockings of 
Cambridge (SOC) task. Other variants adapt the number of pieces, number of pegs 
and height of the pegs, which, as this alters the problem space of the task, make it 
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impossible to effectively compare outcomes from isomorphs to outcomes from 
the Shallice TOL (Berg & Byrd, 2002). 
1.2.2.3.3 Procedural variations 
An additional important way in which researchers vary in their administration of 
the TOL is the procedural approach that is taken, such as the instructions given. 
This is likely to affect the way in which the task is completed (Unterrainer, Rahm, 
Leonhart, Ruff, & Halsband, 2003) as well as the EF skills that are relevant. For 
example, Bull et al. (2004) found that inhibition (see Section 1.2.3) was associated 
with TOL but not TOH performance in their study, and attribute this to 
differences in task administration: on the TOL, but not the TOH, children were 
told the minimum number of moves before each trial. As described below, tower-
based tasks can be solved with a period of pre-planning before execution begins, 
or by just ‘jumping in’ and solving the puzzle piece-by-piece, known as a 
perceptual strategy. Bull and colleagues (2004) suggest that information about 
the number of moves on the TOL would encourage children to inhibit the natural 
response to just start moving the pieces. The perceptual strategy, however, has 
also been suggested to invoke inhibition abilities. This is because the tendency to 
make the move which brings one perceptually closer to the goal state must be 
inhibited in favour of the better long-term option (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000).  
1.2.2.3.4 Scoring considerations 
A variety of different scoring systems have also been used in different studies (for 
a discussion, see Berg & Byrd, 2002), including the number correct; the number 
correctly solved in the particular minimum number of moves for that problem 
(known as perfect solutions); the number of extra moves made beyond the 
minimum, as a measure of efficiency; the number of attempts taken to solve a 
problem, when repeated attempts are allowed; planning time (time taken before 
the first move); time taken to solve the remainder of the problem; rule violations; 
and so on. 
 
Baker, Segalowitz, and Ferlisi (2001) compared TOL scores developmentally that 
had arisen from using two alternative scoring methods. One was employed by 
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Krikorian, Bartok, and Gay (1994) and was termed the ‘accuracy scoring method’: 
trials are awarded three, two or one point(s) if completed correctly on the first, 
second or third attempt, respectively. The other was called the ‘time-sensitive 
scoring method’ by Baker and colleagues, and is calculated by subtracting the 
number of attempts from the weighted solution time (used by Anderson, 
Anderson, & Lajoie, 1996). The outcomes using the two scoring systems were 
highly correlated for participants aged seven years (r = 0.86) but had dropped to 
0.47 by adulthood. Baker and colleagues pointed to the importance of the scoring 
method used for interpretation of outcomes and asserted that the different 
scoring systems must be measuring different constructs in adults and children. 
Even when comparing samples of a similar age, using the ‘accuracy scoring 
method’ it seems that group differences could be produced either by differences 
in the number of trials that were solved correctly within three attempts, or in the 
number of attempts needed to solve a trial. It is clear how differences in scoring 
procedures serve to complicate the literature on the TOL task, which highlights 
the importance of using explicit scoring measures for a task as complex and 
widely used as the TOL. Where combinations of measures are used, for 
comparisons across studies the constituent parts of the score should also be 
provided (Berg & Byrd, 2002). In the next section we will consider the way in 
which tower-based problems may be solved. 
1.2.2.4 Strategies: algorithms and heuristics 
The information-processing approach provides several descriptions of the way in 
which people attempt to solve problems. This can be achieved using algorithms or 
heuristics (Unterrainer & Owen, 2006). An algorithm searches all possible 
solutions and will always find the goal, so it is used when there is enough capacity 
for doing so (i.e., by computers) but it is an inefficient method because it is an 
exhaustive search. Because humans do not have the capacity for using algorithms 
they perform selective searches, or heuristics, which are more efficient but not 
always successful in reaching the goal (Unterrainer & Owen, 2006). Some 
heuristics used by humans are termed: trial and error, hill climbing and means-
end analysis (Dunbar, 1998). Trial and error approaches involve choosing the 
next move at random. Hill-climbing (sometimes called a perceptual strategy, or 
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difference-reduction) is a more sophisticated method that involves a comparison 
of one’s current state to one’s goal state, and taking steps, one at a time, to reduce 
the difference between the two. However, this method can be misleading: 
Unterrainer & Owen (2006) call it short-sighted. This can occur when the optimal 
next move temporarily takes the solver away from the overall goal (sometimes 
called a counterintuitive move). Thus, someone using the hill-climbing method 
would run into difficulties in this type of problem (an illustration of this type of 
problem can be seen in Figure 1.3: the first move should be to move the red piece 
to the centre, even though it is already on the left hand peg – its ‘goal peg’). A 
method that can be used in this type of situation is called means-end analysis, or 
subgoaling (confusingly, some authors also use the term means-end analysis 
when describing difference-reduction, e.g., Kahney, 1986b). It was a feature of the 
GPS model, proposed to characterise much of human problem solving by Newell 
and Simon (1972), and involves the setting of subgoals on the way to the goal. If a 
subgoal cannot be reached, a more intermediate one is set up, and flexibly solved, 
until the final goal is reached (Unterrainer & Owen, 2006). Because of working 
memory demands, Polson (cited in Kahney, 1986a) argues that it is not possible 
to plan the whole sequence of moves to solve a problem. Also, because people do 
not have a total understanding of the whole structure of a problem, they may be 
unable to set appropriate subgoals. He suggests that moves are generated as one 
goes along, using working memory and means-end analysis. The model consists of 
an adapted form of means-end analysis and takes into account limited memory 
capacity. 
 
How does the ability to solve problems develop? Some experimental work has 
described children’s problem solving on tower-based problem solving tasks, and 
is reviewed below. 
1.2.2.5 Problem solving in typical development 
Piaget (1976) described children’s solving of the TOH. Several stages of ability 
were identified: children at stage 1 did not plan or organise their actions and 
instead engaged in trial and error, having difficulty with 2-disc problems; for 
children at stage 2, prediction and trying to move from the means to the ends 
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were said to characterise this stage, while they solved the 2-disc problem without 
difficulty and the 3-disc tower with some errors. Behaviour was more directed 
towards the end goal than in stage 1. Stage 3 children (11-12 years) were quickly 
able to complete the 3-disc tower and could use their experience to transfer this 
to problems with more discs. 
 
Klahr and Robinson (1981) adapted Simon ’s Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task so that it 
was suitable for children, aged three and a half to six. Children were asked to 
verbally plan their moves to move a family of monkeys from one tree to another, 
without physically moving any pieces, on tasks varying from 1-7 moves (for the 1-
move problems the experimenter carried out the child’s instructions; thereafter, 
the ‘pure planning’ mode meant that no pieces were moved). Tasks varied by goal 
state: they were tower-ending (all monkeys sitting on top of one another) or flat-
ending (all monkeys in their own tree). In the tower-ending tasks, two thirds of 5-
year-olds and most 6-year-olds could plan four moves, and over half the 6-year-
olds, six moves. Four-year-olds could manage 2-move problems but had difficulty 
with longer solutions. Flat-ending tasks were more difficult than tower-ending 
tasks. 
 
Klahr and Robinson (1981) and Spitz, Webster and Borys (1982) found that 
participants displayed worse performance on tasks where the sequence of 
subgoals required was ambiguous: e.g., flat-ending problems. Klahr (1985) 
investigated young children’s (45 to 70 months) performance on a problem 
solving task that, in the same way, did not give inherent clues about the sequence 
of subgoals required. The Dog-Cat-Mouse (DCM) puzzle involved a box with 
grooves along the top, the three animals and some cheese, a fish and a bone. The 
food was fixed but the animals could move along the grooves to a corner. The aim 
was to match the animals to their preferred food. Generally children could plan 
and carry out a perfect solution from 2-3 moves away. They were sensitive to 
‘partial evaluation’, that is, if one of the animals was in the right spot they were 
reluctant to move it away again in the search for the solution. This sensitivity was 
associated with poorer performance on the tasks. The authors concluded that 
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strategies used were not trial and error because double (backup) moves were 
generally avoided and optimal paths were followed once the goal had been 
identified, also because of the use of the aforementioned partial evaluation.   
 
It has also been found that when 3-year-olds are approaching a problem they will 
make a direct movement to reach a goal, but will break the rules of the game if 
their route to a subgoal is blocked. Even by age 6, counterintuitive moves 
temporarily away from the goal are difficult (Siegler & Alibali, 2005) and this is 
the type of move that is required in the context of Klahr’s sensitivity to partial 
evaluation. In other tasks, problem solving also becomes more efficient with age: 
for example, in route planning, there is more backtracking seen in 4-year-olds 
than in 5-year-olds (Fabricious, 1988, cited in Siegler & Alibali, 2005). 
 
Thus, even early problem solving develops with age, and children find problems 
difficult when the order of the subgoals is ambiguous and when a temporary 
move away from the goal state must be made. This speaks to the strategies 
introduced in Section 1.2.2.4: difficulties with counterintuitive moves are likely to 
indicate a difference-reduction, (hill-climbing) strategy, as if one cannot look 
ahead, one will not be able to plan to remove and then return the piece to make 
the counterintuitive move. However, counterintuitive moves have also been 
found to affect adults’ performance (Phillips, 1999), and indeed perceptual 
strategies have also been suggested to be used by adults (Goel & Grafman, 1995). 
Performance on tower-based problem-solving tasks improves over 
developmental time (Anderson et al., 1996; Huizinga et al., 2006; Lehto, Juujärvi, 
Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003; Luciana & Nelson, 1998).   
 
What drives the development of problem solving? It is recognised in the 
information-processing literature that an individual’s skills do not suddenly 
appear in adulthood, and must somehow be developed over time (e.g., Anderson 
& Lebiere, 2003). Computational models have been proposed which address the 
development of children’s abilities to solve problems on tasks other than the TOL: 
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for example, balance scale problems, in which different combinations of weights 
are added to a balance scale at different distances from the centre and children 
try to predict the outcome (see, e.g., Jansen & van der Maas, 2002; van Rijn, van 
Someren, & van der Maas, 2003). Such models attempt to identify rules which 
describe children’s behaviour (see, e.g., Siegler, 1983 for a discussion of rule-
based theories of cognitive development). ‘Intelligent tutor’ programs have also 
been developed to understand and respond to a student’s problem solving for use 
in algebra lessons (Anderson, 2012). Information-processing accounts of 
developmental improvements on the TOL task are much rarer. However, 
Baughman and Cooper (2007) have attempted to account for such development 
using a Production Systems, rule-based approach, in terms of improvements in an 
aspect of executive functioning (EF) (see Section 1.2.3.4). EF is a somewhat 
separate body of research, although it has been considered in relation to problem-
solving literature more recently. Goal-directed behaviour (i.e., problem solving) is 
thought to rely on executive functions (EFs) (e.g., Banich, 2009), and it is to these 
that we will now turn.  
1.2.3 Executive functioning (EF) 
EF is thought to include such abilities as planning, inhibition (the ability to 
withhold a prepotent response), shifting (the ability to switch between different 
mental sets), working memory (the ability to keep information in mind, and 
sometimes, to manipulate it as well), attention, fluency, monitoring, reasoning 
and goal formation (e.g., Banich, 2009; Best & Miller, 2010; Jurado & Rosselli, 
2007). Today’s EF research has its roots in both neuropsychology and cognitive 
science (cf. Baughman & Cooper, 2007; Shallice, 1982). Tasks that were found to 
be related to the functioning of the frontal lobes have been called ‘executive’, 
‘supervisory’ or ‘control’ tasks, and have taken on their own discipline of 
behavioural EF research (Stuss & Alexander, 2000). EF tests have been found to 
activate several areas of the frontal lobe, including areas of the PFC: see Jurado 
and Rosselli (2007) for a list of studies. 
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1.2.3.1 Issues in EF research 
In this section, pertinent issues in interpreting EF research are reviewed that are 
discussed by various authors (e.g., Banich, 2009; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000). The first concerns the way in which EF is conceptualised. There 
is a lack of agreement regarding whether EFs should be treated as a single entity 
or a collection of related components, known as the unity/diversity problem, 
while alternative approaches have also been taken, e.g., attempting to represent 
EF as separate phases of problem solving (representation, execution and so on) 
(Zelazo, Carter, Reznick, & Frye, 1997). Some accounts of cognitive control 
postulate the existence of one overall construct that governs behaviour (e.g., 
Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; Shallice & Burgess, 1991b’s 
SAS). The central executive in Baddeley’s model of working memory (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1986) is another oft-cited candidate. Conversely, EF is often 
represented as a collection of processes that underlie goal-directed behaviour 
(Lehto et al., 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). This will be the approach adopted within 
this thesis. In a seminal paper, Miyake et al. (2000) measured EFs in typically 
developing adults, using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to identify shared 
constructs, and suggested that there are three related but distinct EF 
components: shifting, inhibition and monitoring/updating (manipulation and 
processing - rather than simple storage - in working memory). Miyake and 
colleagues suggested that the EF components could be related because of 
common demands across tasks: their potential candidates were ‘controlled 
attention’ (Engle et al., 1999a,1999b, cited in Miyake et al., 2000), such as 
maintaining a goal or resisting distractions, or simply inhibition as being 
necessary for all EFs to occur. Low correlations between EFs are also seen in 
typical adults, adolescents and individuals with brain damage, as well as children 
(Lehto et al., 2003), and Godefroy et al. (1999) provide evidence for multiple 
control processes in the brain that subserve EFs, which further supports the 
existence of a collection of moderately related functions (Jurado & Rosselli, 2007).  
 
The second issue in EF research is that so-called ‘frontal’ and ‘executive’ functions 
are often (inappropriately) seen as equivalent. This is because of the ill-defined 
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relation between frontal function in the brain and EFs measured using cognitive 
tasks (Stuss, 1992). With this in mind, EFs will be considered on a cognitive basis, 
but with the understanding that the frontal lobe, at least in typical adults, is the 
main brain area attributed to such functions.  
 
The third consideration is the task impurity problem (Burgess, 1997; Phillips, 
1997, cited in Miyake et al., 2000): by their nature, EF tests are complex, and thus 
depend upon (and therefore measure) many underlying skills. For example, 
inhibition and working memory underlie shifting (Davidson, Amso, Anderson, & 
Diamond, 2006). So, even if many factors are found to contribute to EF, or if EF 
task performance does not correlate with another measure, this could be due to 
differences in lower level skills (e.g., language) on which the task also depends, 
rather than differences in EF per se. Therefore, it is conceivable that different 
clinical groups might fail on the TOL for entirely different reasons: their 
performance might look the same, but the cognitive processes driving that 
performance might differ (Stuss & Alexander, 2000). 
 
Fourth, EF tests have low test-retest reliability, which could be due to the effect of 
repeating a task, meaning that it becomes less novel, and perhaps less executive, 
at retest (Rabbitt, 1997). 
 
Finally, the ecological validity of EF tests has been challenged: empirical tests 
have been argued to have poor representativeness and generalisability with 
respect to everyday functioning (Burgess et al., 2006). Because EF and the PFC is 
dependent on the outputs of several other systems, i.e., can be seen as ‘central’, 
(in line with the unity approach described above) Burgess and colleagues argue 
that measuring EF should be considered as different to measuring a function that 
is more basic and therefore more easily translatable to the real world, such as 
visual perception or auditory processing. They point out that while “models of the 
world” are usually used to bring the real-world requirements into an 
experimental situation (e.g., motion detection), EF tasks like the Wisconsin Card 
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Sorting Test (WCST; D. A. Grant & Berg, 1948) requiring flexible card sorting (see 
Burgess et al., 2006 for a discussion of its history) do not seem to represent the 
outside world in the same way. The WCST “is so unlike everyday situations, that 
knowledge of performance in it is of very little help for assessment since it is of 
uncertain predictive validity (“or generalizability”)” (Burgess et al., 2006 p.199). 
They argue for real-world functioning to be taken into account when developing 
tests of EF. Various responses to the ecological validity problem have been 
developed (Spooner & Pachana, 2006) which are described in Chapters 4 and 6.  
1.2.3.2 Issues in developmental EF research 
Studying EFs developmentally gives the opportunity to assess time-based 
sequences and identify interactions, for example, two EF skills facilitating another 
skill, or a consolidation period in which skills are integrated (Garon et al., 2008, 
cited in Best & Miller, 2010). Some additional issues apply to developmental EF 
research. In a review article, Best and Miller (2010) highlight several relevant 
considerations and challenges which are discussed below. 
 
There is evidence of the same related yet distinct system of EFs in children as in 
adults (Huizinga et al., 2006; Lehto et al., 2003), although the patterns seem to 
differ in childhood (Best & Miller, 2010). This illustrates the importance of 
considering children’s abilities as they are developing, rather than assuming that 
the phenotypic endstate is constant throughout development (Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998).  
 
Another characteristic of developmental EF work, pointed out by Best and Miller 
(2010), is based on the truism that as children get older they become more able. 
Therefore, it seems that tasks must either become more complex, thus involving 
more EFs to provide a challenge (related to the task impurity problem, above), or 
that different tasks must be used at different ages, which makes comparisons 
difficult. Moreover, even when the same task is used, children of different ages 
might fail, or succeed, for different reasons.  
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To summarise, there are several issues that should be considered when engaging 
in EF research generally, and also developmentally. The way in which EFs are 
conceptualised is not clear cut, but a set of associated but separable constructs 
tends to be agreed upon, although this is by no means unanimous. The structure 
of EFs will not necessarily remain constant across developmental time. While EFs 
are thought to be located to the prefrontal cortex (PFC), the mapping is not 
equivocal. In measuring EFs developmentally, we must not only consider the task 
impurity problem but also the relative task demands and how they interact with 
children’s age-related abilities. The ecological validity of EF tasks has not been 
reliably established.  
1.2.3.3 The development of EF 
Very early in development, success on detour reaching (around a barrier to grasp 
an object) and A-not-B tasks (being able to update the reached-for location when 
a previously reached-for object is visibly moved) demonstrate emerging goal-
directed behaviour (Davidson et al., 2006). Rapid improvements in inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility are seen in 3-5 year olds (Davidson et al., 2006). Changes in 
EF have been linked to changes in the brain. For example, the localisation of 
inhibition circuits in the brain increases over developmental time, and the PFC 
undergoes protracted development, not reaching maturity until late in 
adolescence (O’Hare & Sowell, 2008, cited in Best & Miller, 2010). There are 
several types of inhibition task, including simple (stopping a response), complex 
(stopping a response and making a different response, also involving working 
memory) (Garon et al., 2008, cited in Best & Miller, 2010), and conflict tasks 
(Carlson & Moses, 2001), the latter of which demand an opposing response, such 
as saying ‘day’ to a picture of the moon, in Diamond’s day-night task (Best & 
Miller, 2010). Children improve at complex inhibition tasks rapidly over the first 
few years of life (Best & Miller, 2010). There is some evidence of later 
improvements, generally on computerised tasks, such as a Go-NoGo task, in which 
participants respond to several types of stimuli, but must withhold their response 
to one type, e.g., a red one (Best & Miller, 2010). They note that inhibition 
improves most in the first few years of childhood, with shifting and working 
memory showing a more protracted course of development.  
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Working memory (cf. Baddeley’s working memory model, Baddeley, 1983) 
comprises verbal and visuospatial subsystems: the phonological loop and the 
visuospatial sketchpad respectively. It can also be divided into simple (storage) 
and complex (storage plus processing) tasks, which also recruit the central 
executive control system (Gathercole et al., 2004, cited in Best & Miller, 2010). 
Working memory capabilities increase throughout childhood (e.g., Huizinga et al., 
2006; see below). 
 
Some simple shifting tasks can be completed by 3-4 year olds (Hughes, 1998, 
cited in Best & Miller, 2010) such as the Dimensional Change Card Sorting task 
(DCCS; Zelazo, 2006), a simplified version of the WCST. Based on DCCS 
performance, Zelazo et al. (2003) proposed a theory of children’s early EF 
development in which children silently form plans in the shape of rules, which 
govern their internal and external behaviour on a task; rule systems can become 
more complex with age and are reflected on more, which account for increases in 
EF over developmental time. There is also evidence for increased shifting abilities 
with age (Huizinga et al., 2006; Luciana & Nelson, 1998).  
 
Best and Miller (2010) discuss some proposed developmental sequences in the 
literature, as outlined below. Anderson et al. (2002) suggested that attentional 
control (inhibition), information processing (processing speed), cognitive 
flexibility (switching), and then goal setting develop in that order; Romine and 
Reynolds (2005; cited in Best & Miller, 2010) suggest a developmental sequence 
of inhibition of perseveration, followed by set maintenance, design fluency, 
planning, and then verbal fluency; while Carlson (2005; also cited in Best & Miller, 
2010) in assessing the probability of passing EF tasks at different ages, suggested 
that inhibition matures at the earliest time point, then working memory, followed 
by those tasks that involve both of these skills. Stuss (1992) conceptualised three 
levels of operations: sensory-perceptual, executive functioning, and self-
reflectiveness. He reviewed biological and psychological data about the 
development of these abilities and noted parallels between them and the model 
42 
 
proposed: e.g., brain areas serving functions at the lowest level in the model 
developing before those in the EF levels.  
 
In the next section, studies are reviewed in which EF skills have been measured 
alongside tower-based problem-solving performance, bringing us closer to 
understanding the abilities which might underlie problem solving.  
1.2.3.4 Which EF abilities are important for TOL performance? 
Numerous studies have examined contributions of EF tasks to performance on 
tower-based tasks, but as differences in the task contributions between the TOL 
and TOH have been found, both in children and adults (Bull et al., 2004; Welsh et 
al., 1999; Zook, Davalos, DeLosh, & Davis, 2004), research regarding the TOL will 
be the primary focus here. The TOL is a complex task involving the integration of 
different processes (e.g., Berg et al., 2010; Koppenol-Gonzalez, Bouwmeester, & 
Boonstra, 2010). In typical adults, evidence regarding the reliance of TOL 
performance on working memory is somewhat mixed, with visuospatial memory 
emphasised by some authors, verbal rehearsal by others, and one study finding  
no evidence (see Unterrainer & Owen, 2006 for a review). Welsh et al. (1999) 
suggested that working memory and inhibition were important for TOL 
performance, while Unterrainer et al. (2004) found that nonverbal fluid 
intelligence predicts TOL performance in adults, and that a ‘planning’ factor was 
the only construct explaining performance. The role of planning was challenged 
by Phillips (1999); Phillips, Wynn, McPherson, and Gilhooly (2001). 
 
The ways in which EFs relate to TOL performance in typical children will now be 
addressed. Some studies investigate this in one age group (e.g., Bull et al., 2004) 
while others take a developmental approach, administering several tasks to 
children over a range of ages (e.g., Huizinga et al., 2006). Across studies, results 
have been used to identify the factor structure of EF and to examine patterns of 
age-related EF development.  The studies reviewed here have included tower-
based problem-solving tasks in their task battery, often as a ‘complex’ EF task, 
with attempts made to relate lower-level EF tasks (e.g. inhibition) to more 
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complex tasks. Thus, from a problem-solving point of view, they provide insights 
into performance with increasing age, and into the relationship with EF skills.  
 
Anderson et al. (1996) found significant relationships between the TOL and a 
range of tests of EF measuring mental flexibility and planning, abstract thought 
and organisational ability, in a sample of children aged 7-13 years. There were 
notable increases in performance on the TOL between 7- and 9-year-olds, and at 
around 11 years. Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, and Pulkkinen (2003) administered a 
battery of EF tasks to 108 children aged 8-13 years, split into five age groups. Age 
improvements were found on 9 of the 14 tasks, including the SOC, and the 
Working Memory and Shifting factors were related to CA. Shifting, inhibition, 
auditory attention (which also involved shifting), word fluency, a maze task and 
spatial working memory were correlated with TOL performance measures. They 
identified three EF factors (Working Memory, Inhibition and Shifting), and 
moderate correlations between EF tasks, as well as significant correlations 
between factors after controlling for chronological age (CA), supporting the 
conceptualisation of related but distinct EFs seen earlier (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000).  
 
Several authors have proposed that inhibition has a role to play in TOL 
performance, with some suggesting that it is important for age-related 
improvements. Asato, Sweeney and Luna (2006) administered SOC problems 
with 2, 3, 4 and 5 moves, to TD individuals aged between 8 and 30 years, split into 
groups of 8-13, 14-17 and 18-30 (children, adolescents and adults). They 
measured inhibition, spatial working memory and information-processing speed 
using occulomotor (eye-movement) tasks. Performance on each task improved 
with age. There was a significant positive correlation between better inhibition 
scores and better SOC performance (making fewer moves, as well as timing-
related measures) on the more difficult problems, while only modest correlations 
were observed for the working memory measure. The authors emphasise the role 
of inhibition in SOC performance, and suggest that the ability to inhibit responses 
is relevant to its development. Huizinga, Dolan and van der Molen (2006) gave 
groups of TD participants aged 7, 11, 15 and 21 years various tests to measure 
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working memory, inhibition and shifting abilities as well as the WCST and TOL. 
Performance increased with age on all tasks. Of their TOL measures, the number 
of additional moves and planning time reached adult levels at 15 years of age. The 
proportion of perfect solutions continued to increase between each age group up 
to the young adults. Stroop performance, measuring inhibition, predicted the 
percentage of perfect solutions in adults, while this analysis was inconclusive for 
the children, but the use of different strategies in children and adults was 
suggested. Baughman and Cooper (2007) modelled young children’s TOL 
performance (including rule breaks) for 3-4 and 5-6 year old children, and 
suggested that the emerging ability to inhibit a perceptual strategy is an 
important factor in accounting for development. Luciana and Nelson (1998) 
presented the CANTAB test battery to TD children aged 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 years as well 
as to teenagers and adults. They varied the number of moves required to 
complete a problem (2, 3, 4 or 5). While all groups made some excess moves, 4-
year-olds made more in 3-move problems than the other groups, while the 
remaining groups of children made more in 4- and 5-move problems than the 
adults did. The proportion of participants who solved problems in their minimum 
number of moves appeared to generally decrease with the number of moves for 
all the younger age groups, while the 4-year-olds appeared to have more difficulty 
earlier (at 3 moves) than the older children. Luciana and Nelson found age-
related improvements on executive tasks, but did not correlate performance 
between tasks. However, they noted that working memory performance 
paralleled SOC performance for 4-year-olds, suggesting that working memory 
abilities influenced children’s problem-solving strategies on this task.  
 
For some studies, interpretation of which EFs are related to TOL performance is 
bound up with the properties of the task (described in Section 1.2.2.3): that is, 
different types of TOL problems are thought to rely on different EF skills. For 
example, Kaller, Rahm, Spreer, Mader, and Unterrainer (2008) measured TOL 
performance (on a variant of the TOL in which all pegs were the same height) in 
4-5 year-old children. All of their TOL problems were 3-move problems, but they 
varied in their other parameters: that is, whether or not they contained the 
requirement to make an intermediate move (i.e., search depth), as well as the goal 
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hierarchy. They also administered tasks measuring inhibition (Go-NoGo) and 
working memory (forwards verbal and visuospatial span tasks). While inhibition 
response time to ‘Go’ trials and verbal (not visuospatial) STM predicted overall 
TOL accuracy, only CA accounted for the difference in accuracy on problems with 
different search depths. Kaller and colleagues interpreted this as an age-related 
increase in the ability to search ahead when solving these problems. They refined 
Luciana and Nelson (1998)’s suggestion that their 4-year-olds found 3-move 
problems challenging in terms of their limitations with using working memory, as 
difficulties with planning ahead for that intermediate move, as Luciana and 
Nelson’s 3-move problems all required an intermediate move. Bull, Epsy and Senn 
(2004) gave groups of 4-year-old children either a TOH or a TOL task in which 
problems varied from 1 to 7 moves, and required 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 moves involving 
conflict between goals and subgoals, which they call counterintuitive (it should be 
noted that some of these counterintuitive moves temporarily blocked another 
ball’s move to the goal rather than moving in the direction away from the goal 
peg; nevertheless they all involve a conflict between the goal and the subgoal). 
Shifting and Inhibition were also measured (from ‘The Shape School’ executive 
functioning task; Espy, 1997) involving naming shapes, inhibiting naming shapes 
with sad faces, then shifting between naming shapes by their colour or shape, 
depending on whether or not they wore a hat. Short term memory (STM) was 
measured by children’s maximum forwards digit span. TOL performance was 
correlated with CA, shifting accuracy, and inhibition time, although when the 
baseline speed of shape naming was controlled for, the correlation between 
inhibition time and TOL performance ceased to be significant. As the number of 
counterintuitive moves in a problem increased, 4-year-old children’s ability to 
shift between tasks and inhibition responses increasingly contributed to the 
variance in performance in the TOL. This increased contribution became 
significant at two counterintuitive moves. This study suggests that for 4-year-
olds, shifting and inhibition (but not working memory) become more important 
for performance as the number of counterintuitive moves in a problem increases.  
 
Some characteristics of the studies should be taken into consideration when 
examining contributions of EF skills to problem solving. The particular tasks 
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which are administered alongside the TOL are important for interpretation. For 
example, both Bull et al. (2004) and Kaller et al. (2008), while not finding a 
contribution of working memory performance to the TOL task, noted that they 
have only included measures of STM, as opposed to executive working memory, 
which may be more relevant in a task like the TOL. Also, variations in scoring and 
administration procedures in the TOL should prompt caution when interpreting 
outcomes or comparing across studies (Berg & Byrd, 2002). For example, Kaller 
and colleagues’ (2008) study uses the Ward and Allport (1997) variant of the 
TOL. This version is substantially different from the ‘Shallice TOL’ because being 
able to place any piece on any of the pegs (unrestricted by height) means that the 
problem space is altered, as well as the cognitive demands on the individual, as 
they do not need to remember the rules (Berg & Byrd, 2002). In addition, some 
studies have required participants to plan their moves before they start, and/or 
only allowed problem success when the minimum number of moves is produced 
perfectly (e.g., Klahr & Robinson, 1981; Luciana & Nelson, 1998). Knowing how 
many moves are required beforehand is likely to increase the amount of planning 
that is engaged in (Berg & Byrd, 2002) so being restricted to that number would 
presumably have an even stronger effect. 
 
From these studies, we can see that a) EF can be divided into several related 
factors in typical children (as well as in adults: see Section 1.2.3.5) and b) that 
several EF skills, and perhaps inhibition in particular, are related to TOL 
performance in children. EF abilities are impaired in ADHD and autism 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) as well as other clinical groups, such as Parkinson’s 
disease and schizophrenia (Unterrainer & Owen, 2006) and including WS and DS 
(see below), and executive (but not TOH) impairments were also seen in adults 
with general intellectual disabilities (Danielsson, Henry, Rönnberg, & Nilsson, 
2010).  While the contribution of EFs to TOL performance has been explored in 
TD, we do not yet know how those EF skills might be used to solve problems in 
neurodevelopmental disorders. In the next section, what is known about EF and 
problem solving in WS and DS is reviewed. Children with learning difficulties 
have been found to be impaired on a TOH task, performing at the level of younger 
children, and also using different strategies (Spitz et al., 1982). Therefore, it is 
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likely that individuals with WS and DS will also show impairments in problem 
solving. It should be noted that although relative strengths and weaknesses in EF 
profiles are investigated and discussed, this is always within the framework of 
overall diminished EF abilities for their age, demonstrated, whether explicitly 
acknowledged or not, through any study in which performance of an atypical 
group is poorer than or equivalent to a matched TD group with a lower mean CA, 
e.g., a mental-age (MA) matched group.  
 
1.2.3.5 Executive functioning and TOL performance in WS and DS 
1.2.3.5.1 Williams syndrome 
In WS, working memory abilities, and EF abilities more generally, are significantly 
below the level that would be expected for chronological age (CA) (Osório et al., 
2012; Sampaio, Sousa, Férnandez, Henriques, & Gonçalves, 2008). The uneven 
cognitive profile in WS (Mervis et al., 2000) is generally reflected in the group’s 
relatively better performance on verbal short-term memory (STM) tasks 
compared to spatial STM tasks (e.g., Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1998; Wang & 
Bellugi, 1994), while verbal working memory has been found to be below the 
level expected for receptive vocabulary, and spatial working memory at or below 
the level expected for nonverbal reasoning ability, dependent on the type of 
memory measured (Rhodes, Riby, Fraser, & Campbell, 2011). Visual-spatial (but 
not visual-object) STM and long-term memory (LTM) is also impaired in WS 
compared to MA (Vicari, Bellucci, & Carlesimo, 2005; Vicari & Carlesimo, 2006).  
 
There is evidence that the better verbal than spatial abilities seen in WS also 
extend to inhibition (while acknowledging that the verbal/spatial distinction is a 
broad one; see Section 1.2.1.2 and Brock (2007) for an outline of language 
abilities in WS; also, e.g., Pezzini, Vicari, Volterra, Milani, and Ossella (1999) for 
evidence of strengths and weaknesses within both cognitive and linguistic 
domains). Atkinson et al. (2003) compared the inhibition abilities of children with 
WS aged 4:7 to 14:7 years to a control group aged 4:1 to 13:5 years on a task in 
which they were asked first to point to a target when it appeared on the screen 
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(pointing task) and subsequently to point to the other side of the screen as the 
target when it appeared (counterpointing task). The children with WS performed 
more poorly on the counterpointing task relative to the pointing task than did the 
controls, indicating difficulties with spatial inhibition. On a detour box task 
requiring inhibition of a previously learnt strategy to retrieve a toy, and a day-
night task requiring  saying ‘day’ to a card depicting the night sky and ‘night’ to a 
picture of the sun during the day, larger groups of participants showed delayed 
performance on the detour box task: while an improvement in performance is 
typically seen at approximately 3 years of age, for the WS group it improved at a 
verbal (BPVS) mental age (MA) of about 7 years. Verbal inhibition, as measured 
on the day-night task, was similar to or above the level expected for their BPVS 
scores. In contrast, Tager-Flusberg, Sullivan, and Boshart (1997), in a study 
investigating the relationship between EF and theory of mind, found that a group 
of children with WS performed at an equivalent level on a motor and verbal 
inhibition task. However, the sensitivity of the measures was poor, with 
participants awarded either a pass or fail for each task, based on a cut-off score. 
Of those who could complete both tasks, 10 out of 12 children with WS either 
passed both or failed both inhibition tests. Unfortunately a typical control group 
was not included in the study, although the WS group did not score differently 
from a group of children with Prader-Willi syndrome.  
 
In some studies, individuals with WS completed a battery of tests which included 
a TOL task as a measure of planning. Menghini et al. (2010) compared a WS group 
ranging from 10 to 34 years of age to a TD group matched on mental age 
measured by the Leiter-R (Roid & Miller, 2002). This is a nonverbal test, thought 
to assess fluid intelligence. They found that auditory sustained attention, but not 
selective attention, was poorer in the WS group, while this pattern applied to 
selective but not to sustained attention, in the visual-spatial domain. In memory 
tasks, while non-word repetition was as good in the WS group as in the control 
group, (and was also found by Grant et al., 1997 to be comparable to nonverbal 
MA) digit and block memory tests (in which both forwards and backwards 
conditions were measured) were poorer in the WS group than for the controls, 
with the same pattern of poorer backward than forwards memory in both groups. 
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Categorising objects was poorer in the WS than the TD group, while a test of 
verbal fluency, included as the verbal counterpart to the visual-spatial 
categorisation test, did not reveal group differences. Impairments were seen on 
visual-spatial, but not verbal, shifting tasks. For measures of inhibition, verbal 
inhibition on the Opposite World test from the Test of Everyday Attention for 
Children (TEA-Ch; Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & Nimmo-Smith, 1999) took 
longer in the WS group than for the controls, while the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) 
did not show group differences in interference scores based on RT (although 
there was a trend towards more errors in the WS group for the incongruent 
condition). In a Go-NoGo test assessing visuospatial inhibition, the participants 
with WS made more errors as a group, but did not take longer than the TD group. 
In a TOL test, the WS group took more repeated attempts to solve problems and 
solved fewer items correctly, but did not take longer than the TD group on 
correctly solved problems. The authors draw on the parallels between inhibition 
and TOL tasks in that similar speeds between groups but more errors in the WS 
group were seen in both areas (with the exception of the Opposite World test), 
emphasising the role that impulsivity might play in the way in which participants 
with WS solve problems on the TOL. They also point out that these two abilities 
(planning and inhibition), along with working memory, show impairments across 
modality, while the shifting, categorisation and attention tasks were more 
modality-dependent. 
 
Rhodes, Riby, Park, Fraser, and Campbell (2010) administered the computerised 
CANTAB EF test battery (Sahakian & Owen, 1992) to a group of individuals with 
WS (mean CA: 18 years 1 month; mean BPVS raw score: 92.95), chronological age 
matched controls (CM group; mean CA: 17 years 5 months; mean BPVS raw score: 
126.79) and verbal age matched controls (VM group; mean CA: 9 years 3 months; 
mean BPVS raw score: 92.26). Compared to VM and CM groups, WS performance 
was impaired on a set-shifting task and on several working memory tasks: one 
designed to tap executive aspects of working memory, involving ‘searching’ an 
array of boxes for blue tokens and avoiding returning to the same box; one 
measuring a memory span; and another requiring the matching of a visual 
stimulus with and without a variable delay. The Stockings of Cambridge (SOC) 
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task was also administered, which is both similar to the TOL task in some ways 
and different in others (Berg & Byrd, 2002; Berg et al., 2010). Problems varied by 
the minimum number of moves required to reach the solution (2, 3, 4 or 5). The 
WS group solved significantly fewer problems in the minimum number of moves 
than CM and VM groups. Also, while the groups made comparable numbers of 
moves for problems with two moves, the WS group made more moves than both 
the other groups on problems with three moves, and more than the CM group for 
4- and 5-move problems. Performance levels on different tasks were associated in 
the TD group, but not for the WS group. 
 
In summary, there is evidence that individuals with WS experience difficulties 
with EFs relative to what would be expected for their MA, as well as some 
evidence for greater impairments in visuospatial than verbal modalities.  
1.2.3.5.2 Down syndrome 
Working memory abilities have been widely studied in DS. Broadly, the opposite 
pattern to that seen in WS has been observed, with better visuospatial than verbal 
STM (e.g., Jarrold & Baddeley, 1997). Several studies have administered a range of 
EF tasks to individuals with DS, matching groups on various measures of overall 
MA, verbal ability and logical thinking. Pennington et al. (2003) compared 
prefrontal skills, as well as general functioning measures and hippocampus 
measures, between adolescents with DS and a control group of TD children 
matched on scores on the Differential Ability Scale (DAS; Elliott, 1990). No 
significant differences between groups were found on the SOC task from the 
CANTAB battery, or indeed for any of the other prefrontal tasks: the spatial 
working memory test from the CANTAB, the NEPSY verbal and design fluency 
tasks, Stopping (inhibition) task and Counting Span (verbal working memory) 
task. In contrast, the DS group performed more poorly than MA controls on 
measures of hippocampal function. Although they acknowledge complexities in 
the design and interpretation, they suggest hippocampal, rather than prefrontal 
(pertaining to EF tasks) dysfunction in DS. Rowe, Lavender, and Turk (2006) 
administered several EF tests to a DS group (aged 23-40 years) and a BPVS-
matched group with other learning disabilities (aged 19-55 years). With the 
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exception of measures of verbal fluency and verbal STM (digit span), the tasks 
were nonverbal: measuring sustained attention, motor perseveration/inhibition, 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices  (RCPM; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1990), 
spatial STM, TOL and set-shifting, as well as a measure of motor speed. The two 
groups did not differ reliably on the spatial span task performance while for the 
other tasks the DS group scored more poorly than the learning disabled group, 
with shifting, sustained attention and RCPM differences showing the strongest 
discrepancies. The motor speed test also revealed slower responding in the DS 
group. 
 
Lanfranchi, Jerman, Dal Pont, Alberti, and Vianello (2010) compared EF in 15 
adolescents with DS between the ages of 11:0 and 18:5 (mean age = 15:2), with 
that of a TD control group with a mean CA of 5:9 (4:6 to 6:10). Participants were 
individually matched with TD controls on MA, the mean of which was also 5:9 
(4:6 to 6:10) for the DS group. MA was measured using the Logical Operations 
test (Vianello & Marin, 1997), assessing seriation, numeration and classification 
abilities, which was chosen for its relatively reduced susceptibility to extraneous 
influences (i.e., verbal, cultural or visuospatial). Adolescents with DS performed 
significantly more poorly than the MA-matched TD group on the majority of the 
EF tasks. In a verbal and a visuospatial working memory task demanding dual-
task processing, the DS group was less able to remember the first item in a list or 
starting position of a character as well as to tap the table when a particular event 
occurred (hearing the word ‘ball’ in the verbal task and a frog jumping onto a red 
square in the visuospatial task) than the TD group. They were poorer at a day-
night task than controls although they were just as able to correctly say ‘day’ or 
‘night’ when the words were arbitrarily associated with an abstract image, 
indicating difficulties with inhibition of prepotent responses relative to MA. Set 
shifting was poorer than that of controls, in a task requiring participants to say 
‘Yes’ and ‘No’ to different coloured cards: firstly Yes to red cards and No to black 
and subsequently Yes when a card was the same colour as the previous card and 
No when the colour had changed. While both groups were equally able to 
correctly respond to the first part of the task, the number of correct responses 
declined in the part of the task that followed the rule change for the DS group 
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such that the number of correct responses was lower for DS than TD participants. 
On the Modified Card Sorting test (MCST; Nelson, 1976) measuring the ability to 
shift between concepts, the number of perseverative errors in sorting did not 
differ between the groups while the DS group was able to identify and follow 
fewer rules than the TD group. In a TOL task with a standard start state and 12 
problems of increasing difficulty, the number of correctly solved problems was 
significantly lower for the DS group (M = 3.8) than for the TD group (M = 9.67). 
Participants were given three attempts to solve each problem. The number of 
problems solved in the first attempt, perhaps unsurprisingly, was also lower in 
the DS group (M = 2.67) than the TD group (M = 5.67). Group differences were not 
apparent on tests of verbal fluency while in a test of sustained attention, the Self-
ordered pointing test (Temple, Carney, & Mullarkey, 1996), the DS group made 
more errors than the TD group. The authors noted that the most severe 
impairments in DS relative to MA were in verbal working memory, in shifting on 
the MCST and in the TOL. Verbal fluency was the only task that did not reveal DS 
impairments for their overall cognitive level. They also correlated CA with EF task 
performance, and found only two significant relationships: between CA and 
verbal working memory and between CA and TOL performance solely for the TD 
group.  
 
Thus, the outcome of EF profile comparisons appears to partly depend on the 
group matching measure that is selected: in Lanfranchi and colleagues’ study all 
tasks elicited impairments in the performance of the DS group with the exception 
of verbal fluency compared to a logical thinking matched group, while spatial STM 
ability was comparable to that of a verbal-matched group in Rowe and colleagues’ 
study. Furthermore, in Pennington et al.’s study, no EF task deficits were found in 
the DS group in relation to overall MA. The modality of the task is also potentially 
important for interpreting outcomes, given the uneven EF profile in DS; however 
this rather mixed picture of EF abilities in DS does provide some evidence of EF 
impairments in relation to overall cognitive ability. 
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1.2.3.5.3 Williams syndrome and Down syndrome 
Some authors have investigated EF in both WS and DS (more specific details 
regarding TOL performance, e.g., timing and rule violations, are included in 
Chapter 3). 
 
Jarrold et al. (1999) administered forwards versions of block and digit span tasks 
to individuals with each of the disorders. The WS group were better at digit than 
Corsi (block) span performance, while the DS group did not show this difference. 
Digit span was better in WS than DS, while Corsi performance was comparable 
between the two groups. The WS and DS groups did not differ in nonverbal MA, 
measured by a block design task of visuospatial construction, which is known to 
be a marked weakness in WS. When controlling for MA, WS Corsi performance 
was worse than DS performance, while the DS group showed a trend for scoring 
more poorly than the WS group on a digit span task. Other studies have also 
suggested differential patterns of STM performance in WS and DS (Jarrold et al., 
1999; Vicari & Carlesimo, 2006; Wang & Bellugi, 1994).  
 
Vicari et al. (2000) included the TOL as an implicit memory test in an 
investigation into implicit and explicit memory. No significant effect of group was 
found between participants with DS (mean CA: 21 years; mean MA: 6.5 years) and 
TD children (mean CA; 5.09 years; mean MA: 6.3 years) matched for overall MA, 
on a TOL score based on the number of attempts required in order to reach a 
solution in the minimum number of moves (scores consisted of giving 3 points for 
problems solved in the first attempt, 2 for the second attempt and 1 for the third 
attempt). Both groups’ performance improved to a similar extent after a one hour 
break, suggesting implicit memory abilities in DS that are comparable to those 
found in typical development. In a similar experiment with children with WS 
(Vicari, Bellucci, & Carlesimo, 2001), only the typical group improved, leading to a 
conclusion that procedural learning is impaired in WS, but not in DS. Although 
these two studies did not directly compare WS and DS groups, a main effect of 
Group, indicating lower TOL scores than typical controls, was found in the WS 
study but not in the DS study. 
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While most studies administering an EF task battery either consider WS or DS, 
two studies to date have included both a WS and a DS group; one which compares 
each group to controls (Carney, Brown, & Henry, 2013) and another which makes 
direct comparisons between atypical groups (Costanzo et al., 2013). Carney et al. 
(2013) investigated executive functioning in both WS and DS. They administered 
tasks designed to assess executive-loaded working memory, inhibition, fluency 
and set-shifting in both the verbal and visuospatial domains to individuals with 
WS and DS aged 8:1-18:11 and 10:4-18:11 years respectively, as well as a group 
of TD controls aged 5:0-8:0 years. There were 24 WS, 25 DS and 26 TD 
participants. Rather than comparing performance to a control group matched on 
a particular measure, they controlled for CA and MA using dummy-coded 
regression. Each atypical group was compared separately to the TD group, so 
direct comparisons between atypical groups were not made. IQ was measured 
using the Stanford-Binet Abbreviated Battery (Roid, 2003). Although this IQ test 
gives separate verbal and nonverbal IQs, it was the combined MA score which 
was used in the comparison to the TD group. The executive-loaded working 
memory tasks involved both processing and storage. In the verbal task 
participants were presented orally with a sentence and asked to decide whether it 
was true, and also recall the last word of one syllable in that sentence. In the 
visuospatial task participants judged which image out of three was the odd one 
out and then recalled its location on a blank board. Both tasks increased in 
difficulty by varying the number of sentences or arrays of three images that were 
shown, before the participant was asked to recall the relevant information. Both 
the WS and DS groups scored more poorly than the TD group on the visuospatial 
version of this task. The DS group also showed poorer performance than the TD 
group on the verbal version of the task, while the WS group did not. In the verbal 
inhibition task, in an initial ‘copy’ block, the experimenter said either ‘doll’ or ‘car’ 
and the participant repeated the word for 20 trials. This was followed by an 
‘inhibit’ block whereby the participant was asked to produce the alternative word 
in response to the experimenter (i.e. ‘car’ if the experimenter said ‘doll’). The task 
returned to another ‘copy’ and then another ‘inhibit’ block. Performance was 
measured in terms of time taken and errors made across the four blocks. The 
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visuospatial version involved reproducing actions (pointed finger or clenched 
fist) instead of saying words. The WS group took longer to respond in the 
visuospatial inhibition task, and made more errors in the verbal task, than the TD 
group. There were no significant differences between DS and TD groups on either 
of the inhibition tasks. In the verbal fluency task, participants were asked to 
generate as many items belonging to a category (food/drink and animals) as they 
could in one minute, and the number of items produced as well as number of 
repetitions was scored. In the visuospatial fluency task participants produced as 
many unique designs as possible in one minute by joining dots (in a black dot 
condition, and another condition in which they had to connect only white dots). 
Again, the score was in terms of the number of designs and the number of 
repetitions of designs. The WS group was able to generate fewer unique designs 
in the visuospatial task than the TD group, while verbal fluency scores did not 
differ significantly. The DS group did not show significant differences compared 
to the TD group in either of the fluency tasks. In the set-shifting tasks, participants 
were required to switch between the categories as in the verbal fluency task, or 
between connecting empty or filled dots as in the visuospatial fluency task. 
Performance was measured by the switching cost (correct response cost and 
repetition cost) in relation to the fluency task score. Both the WS and DS groups 
had a greater verbal switching cost for repetitions than the TD group, than 
expected by verbal fluency score. Neither group exhibited more of a cost than the 
TD group in the visuospatial condition. The authors concluded that modality (the 
verbal/visuospatial nature of the task) has different effects in different EF 
domains, and that the verbal or visuospatial strengths that purportedly mark out 
WS and DS profiles affect the way in which people with WS and DS respond 
differently, depending on which EF ability is being measured. However, it should 
be noted that given the overall MA measure that was used to control for MA in the 
analyses, the results are difficult to interpret because of the very different 
cognitive profiles of these two distinct developmental disorders. Carney and 
colleagues asserted that because there are WS impairments in both modalities of 
the inhibition task, relative verbal strengths are not evident. The authors 
acknowledged that there may be different underlying reasons for poorer 
performance in the different modalities, as one relies upon error rate and the 
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other on longer response time. Might the longer response time for the 
visuospatial task reflect the very uneven profile that the results overall seem to go 
against? Perhaps the relative verbal strengths in WS point to a more typical WS 
verbal system, such that copying a spoken word is relatively automatic and 
prepotent. If, in contrast, the motor/spatial system in WS is more atypical, 
perhaps the prepotent instinct to copy is less marked for this group. The longer 
response time might then reflect a deliberate thinking-through of each action. 
Moreover, if someone with WS is aware that they are likely to have difficulty with 
a task involving actions, this might affect the way they respond, eliciting more 
deliberate control than perhaps a verbal task to which they might feel more 
confident (and more impulsive) about responding to. Alternatively it may be that, 
as these results suggest, inhibition is a particularly pervasive deficit in WS which 
thus extends across modality, and the difficulties are reflected in different ways 
for another reason. 
 
Costanzo et al. (2013) directly compared WS and DS groups (aged 10.7 to 34.9 
and 8.6 to 21.2 years) and typical controls (aged 6.1 to 8.4 years) on several 
measures of EF. Controls were matched on MA as measured by the Leiter 
International Performance Scale-Revised, brief version (Roid & Miller, 2002), 
which measures nonverbal abilities (Glenn & Cunningham, 2005) although they 
had higher IQ levels than the WS or DS groups. Measures taken were auditory and 
visual sustained and selective attention, verbal STM and working memory 
(forward and backward digit span tests), visuospatial STM and working memory 
(forward and backward Corsi block span tests), planning (on the TOL), verbal and 
visual categorization, verbal and visuospatial shifting, and verbal and visuospatial 
inhibition. On the TOL, better scores were awarded for completing problems in 
fewer numbers of attempts. The score was lower for the WS than DS or TD 
groups, while the time taken was longer in the DS group than either of the other 
groups. Results for the other tasks indicated, relative to controls, impairments in 
the WS group on the visual selective attention, verbal sustained attention, 
backward digit, forwards and backwards block tasks, visual-spatial 
categorisation, and equivalent performance on visual-spatial attention, forward 
digit test, non-word repetition, verbal fluency/categorisation, verbal shifting, 
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visual-spatial shifting, and Stroop (inhibition) tasks. For the DS group, 
impairments relative to controls were seen on visual selective attention, verbal 
sustained attention, forwards and backwards digit span, non-word repetition, 
forwards and backwards block span, visuospatial categorisation, verbal and 
visuospatial shifting, and Stroop (inhibition) performance, with equivalent 
performance to controls on visual-spatial attention and verbal 
fluency/categorisation. The DS group performed more poorly than the WS group 
on both verbal memory tasks and nonword repetition, on the Stroop task, and on 
one verbal and one visuospatial shifting measure (with the remaining 
visuospatial shifting measure showing equivalent WS/DS performance). No group 
differences were seen for visuospatial inhibition. 
 
In summary, there is evidence of a range of EF impairments in WS and DS groups 
relative to MA-matched controls. Modality-specific profiles between the disorders 
are reflected more clearly in some domains (e.g., working memory), than in 
others, and mixed patterns of results seem to be partly elicited by variations in 
choice of matching measures and EF tasks.   
 
Thus, while EF has been closely studied in WS and DS, investigations into the 
relative ways in which the two groups use EFs to solve problems have not been 
previously undertaken, and is thus one focus of this thesis. Indeed, investigations 
of this type are limited to Rhodes et al. (2010)’s assessment of associations 
between EF tasks in a WS group, from which no significant relationships emerged. 
Given the different WS and DS profiles of EF skills, we can expect them to take 
different approaches to problem solving (more detailed predictions are included 
in Chapter 2).  
 
1.2.4 Problem solving outside the laboratory 
Up until this point in the chapter, we have considered problem solving, and EF 
tasks, for which data are collected in an experimental situation. Of course, the vast 
majority of problem solving occurs in everyday life rather than the laboratory. 
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Making the metaphorical leap to the outside world invokes several overlapping 
issues simultaneously: that of well-defined versus ill-defined problems; routine 
versus novel tasks; and symbolic versus situated action (SA) approaches to 
cognition. These will be addressed in turn, but should not be considered to be 
independent of one another. 
 
1.2.4.1 Novel problems and routine tasks  
Some tasks are so well-practised that we seem to be able to complete them 
without paying attention to them, while arguably a task which is novel to the 
solver will require more effort to solve. Newell (1980) saw routine problems as 
those which are so well rehearsed that we no longer need to apply effortful 
control to solving them (Anderson, 1993). This distinction is also addressed by 
Norman and Shallice (1986; 1980); Shallice (1982, 1988) (cited in Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991b) in a model of cognition that builds on the Production Systems 
approach. Within this model, schemas (also called productions or routine 
programs) control a highly specialised action such as drinking from a cup, and are 
triggered by particular stimuli. As many different schemas can be triggered 
simultaneously, the selection of which schema to run is an important 
consideration. ‘Contention scheduling’ routinely selects from potential schemas 
based on whichever has the strongest trigger. In some situations, i.e., non-routine 
problems, however, more deliberate control is needed, and this is where the 
‘Supervisory Attention System’ (SAS) is utilised, described as dealing with 
planning and biasing contention scheduling (for more detail, see Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991b). While behaviour under contention scheduling is fast, rigid and 
routine, behaviour under the SAS is flexible and slow. The TOL was developed in 
order to measure the functioning of the SAS: i.e., when tasks were novel. There 
are reports in the neuropsychological literature of patients with damage to the 
frontal lobes who can pass IQ tests in the laboratory, but are nevertheless unable 
to manage their everyday lives (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985; Milner, 1964; Stuss 
and Benson, 1986, cited in Shallice & Burgess, 1991b). Shallice and Burgess 
(1991b) suggest that their model’s two levels of control can account for this 
(although by their own admission, not uniquely so). In their model, if the SAS is 
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not functioning correctly, difficulties with planning would occur on novel tasks, 
while routine tasks would not be affected (Shallice, 1982). Shallice and Burgess 
(1991) describe evidence that Tower of London performance, but not other types 
of performance, was impaired for patients with damage to the frontal lobe, 
notably in a study by Owen and colleagues in which short-term memory 
performance did not significantly differ from that of the control group. Patients’ 
slower responses during the task also led to the conclusion that the TOL was 
indexing (poor) planning ability for this group. 
 
However, Shallice and Burgess (1991b) also described three patients for whom 
performance on cognitive tasks in a laboratory setting, including the TOL, were 
considered normal, who nonetheless experienced difficulties in everyday life as 
well as on scheduling tasks. This leads us to the subject of problem solving 
outside, as well as inside, the laboratory. 
 
1.2.4.2 Well-defined and ill-defined problems 
The TOH and TOL are both examples of well-defined problems, in which the 
solver is provided with a starting point (initial state), a goal to work towards (goal 
state) and sometimes, a means of reaching the goal (legal operators and operator 
restrictions; that is, actions that can be taken to solve the problem and constraints 
on how those operators are used) (Kahney, 1986a). The solver need only work 
within the clearly defined boundaries of the situation in order to solve the 
problem: all of the information needed to solve the problem is provided within 
the problem, such as what the solution will look like and what should be done to 
reach it (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). Well-defined problems have the 
obvious advantage of being suitable for study in experimental settings, and in 
allowing observation of behaviour under controlled circumstances.  
 
In contrast, many problems are ill defined, in that at the beginning of the problem 
we may not know exactly what the goal looks like or what needs to be done 
before the problem will be solved (Pretz et al., 2003); for example, when buying a 
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birthday present for a friend, several factors such as what will be suitable and 
how much it will cost need to be taken into account. The value of investigating 
problem solving in an ill-defined environmental arena is clear, as this is where 
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders will require support to function 
effectively in their everyday lives: this approach has great ecological validity.  
 
Although there are clear differences between well-defined and ill-defined 
problems, they could be argued to share some requirements, such as the need to 
keep focused on the goal or perhaps generate subgoals on the way to completion. 
Some researchers have downplayed the difference between well- and ill-defined 
problems, suggesting that people will go about solving them in similar ways 
(Dunbar, 1998). The distinction between well- and ill-defined problems seems to 
some extent to map onto the distinction between problem-solving performance in 
experimental and in everyday settings. While this is arguably not absolute (some 
experimental tasks could be ill defined; some everyday problems could be well 
defined) it seems that in the main, the problems that we solve in our everyday 
lives are the least well defined. Thus, studying problem solving in everyday 
settings requires the study of ill-defined problems. 
1.2.4.3 Symbolic and situated action (SA) approaches 
The information-processing approach (leading to tower-based task development) 
is part of a symbolic, cognitive science approach to human cognition, concerned 
with the mind and brain processes that occur within the individual (Norman, 
1993). An example of a set of if/then rules used in a model for solving the TOL can 
be seen in Baughman & Cooper (2007). One difficulty with symbolic approaches is 
their perceived inadequacy for accounting for problem solving in the real world: 
the sheer amount of information available in all its complexity and chaos 
(Norman, 1993). The opposing theoretical standpoint known as situated action 
(SA) is advocated from the view that real-life cognition can only appropriately be 
studied in its real-life context, taking into account the interaction between the 
environment, culture, cognition and action (Norman, 1993). SA approaches 
advocate that there is no merit in separating different aspects, such as the 
individual from the context. Social interaction and culture play an important role 
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for researchers with this viewpoint (Norman, 1993). However it should be noted 
that some authors have presented models of how symbolic systems, for example 
contention scheduling and the supervisory system, could operate (and fail) in 
everyday life (Cooper, 2002; Cooper & Shallice, 2000). Vera and Simon (1993) 
argue that SA approaches can be subsumed by symbolic approaches; that is, that 
symbolic approaches can explain and encompass what SA proponents claim that 
the approach adds.  
 
Thus, in any consideration of problem solving that extends outside the laboratory, 
we must take into account the relative novelty of the task and how well defined 
(or otherwise) the problem in question is likely to be. This issue also prompts us 
to revisit the ecological validity problem of EF measurement, outlined in section 
1.2.3.5. This subject is explored in Chapter 5, in which the relationships between 
experimental performance and parent-reported measures of everyday 
functioning are assessed. In short, while some studies have assessed the potential 
links between experimental and everyday measures of EF in the typical 
population and in clinical populations such as ADHD (e.g., Toplak, Bucciarelli, Jain, 
& Tannock, 2008) this type of investigation has not been undertaken in WS or DS 
groups. It is also unknown whether problem solving on the TOL is associated with 
real-life problem solving for these populations.  
 
The aims of this thesis are thus to conduct a cross-syndrome comparison of the 
relationship between EF and problem-solving skills, in both experimental and 
applied contexts. This forms the unique contribution of the work, and helps 
delineate the underlying processes behind problem-solving abilities in WS and 
DS, in order to identify the constraining factors for performance. The opportunity 
to assess the relationships between experimental and real-life measures informs 
the generalisability of the experimental findings to individuals’ daily lives. 
 
In Chapter 2, problem solving and EF skills are measured experimentally in WS 
and DS and compared to a typical control group matched on nonverbal MA; the 
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relationships between EF and TOL measures are also compared between WS and 
DS groups and a larger typical group, using a developmental trajectory approach. 
Chapter 3 presents a detailed exploration of TOL performance across the 
nonverbal MA-matched groups, both in terms of the behaviours exhibited during 
solving and how well individual EFs predict problem solving on different types of 
TOL trials. In Chapter 4, parental questionnaire data are reported from TD, DS 
and WS groups, examining both the patterns of performance on an EF 
questionnaire (the BRIEF) and a new questionnaire designed to assess everyday 
problem solving (the PSQ). In Chapter 5, the relationships between the 
experimental and questionnaire data are assessed. Chapter 6, the general 
discussion, forms a summary of the outcomes and conclusions, which are 
discussed in relation to existing literature, implications and potential future 
directions. 
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CHAPTER 2:  EXPERIMENTAL MEASURES OF 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
2.1 Introduction 
Executive functions (EFs) can be considered as a set of related components in 
both children and adults (Lehto et al., 2003; Miyake et al., 2000) including 
planning, monitoring, inhibition, shifting and working memory. EFs are thought to 
facilitate goal-directed behaviour (Best & Miller, 2010). Problem-solving research 
addresses the way in which people organise their behaviour to work towards a 
goal: indeed, a fundamental characteristic of problem solving is the property of 
goal-directedness (e.g., Anderson, 2000, cited in Unterrainer & Owen, 2006). 
Problem solving on the Tower of London (TOL) task can be considered to be 
novel (Shallice, 1982) and complex (Berg et al., 2010). EFs are utilised when 
problems are novel, and require active monitoring and control (Rabbitt, 1997). 
Therefore, we would expect to see problem solvers drawing on EF skills in order 
to solve problems on the TOL task. Several studies to date (reviewed in Chapter 
1) have investigated the relationships between EF tasks and TOL performance in 
typically developing (TD) children and adults. More recently, batteries of EF tasks 
have been used in research with individuals with Williams syndrome (WS) and 
Down syndrome (DS) in order to investigate EF profiles (e.g., Lanfranchi et al., 
2010; Menghini et al., 2010). Most studies have measured EFs in a single disorder, 
rather than comparing performance in WS and DS, although there are some 
exceptions (e.g., Carney et al., 2013). Studies aiming to investigate and compare 
the contribution of EF skills to TOL problem solving in both WS and DS have 
hitherto not been conducted. The main aim of the current chapter is to assess the 
relationship between EFs and TOL performance in WS and DS using a cross-
syndrome comparison.  
2.1.1 Links between executive functioning and TOL performance 
The potential links between EF abilities and TOL problem solving are reviewed in 
Chapter 1. Briefly, for TD children, there seems to be mounting evidence for the 
contribution of inhibition abilities to TOL performance (Asato et al., 2006; 
Baughman & Cooper, 2007; Bull et al., 2004; Kaller et al., 2008). Shifting/cognitive 
64 
 
flexibility is another potential candidate (Anderson et al., 1996; Bull et al., 2004). 
Suggestions that working memory might be important but not adequately tapped 
into (Bull et al., 2004; Kaller et al., 2008) also raise the possibility of executive 
working memory, rather than more passive STM storage, being relied upon. The 
contributions of EF abilities to TOL performance have been suggested to vary 
along with the particular demands of the TOL task: for example, with reference to 
adults solving the TOH puzzle, Miyake et al. (2000) note that without directions as 
to how to go about solving the task, people may employ a perceptual strategy 
(working to increase similarity between the current state and the goal state as 
they go along) which may draw on inhibition skills. In contrast, Klahr and 
Robinson (1981)’s adaptation of the TOH task required children to produce a 
complete verbal plan, in advance, of all the movements that would need to be 
made. In Shallice (1982)’s original TOL participants were also asked to plan their 
moves before making them. This is likely to require more planning ahead, 
although the role of preplanning for efficient TOL performance has been 
challenged (Phillips, 1999; Phillips et al., 2001). The contribution of EF skills to 
problem-solving abilities is under-studied in WS and DS (see Chapter 1) and is 
addressed in this chapter. 
2.1.2 The current study 
2.1.2.1 Selection of EF tasks 
In the current study, several EF tasks were administered along with the TOL, in 
order to investigate which of them might prove important for problem solving in 
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders. Tasks were developed with the 
aim of being sensitive to a wide range of ages and ability levels, and for floor and 
ceiling effects to be avoided; to be physically easy to manage; to be nonverbal in 
the main, because the TOL does not require participants to produce 
verbalisations in order to solve it. The tasks were chosen to reflect existing 
proposed divisions of EF in the literature (inhibition, shifting and working 
memory). A planning task was also included, in order to be able to assess an 
individual’s ability to plan ahead. In response to Bull et al. (2004) and Kaller et al. 
(2008)’s suggestions that their memory tasks were not accounting for 
performance on the TOL because they were measuring STM rather than working 
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memory, both forwards and backwards versions of memory span tasks were 
conducted. 
2.1.2.2 Selection of the TOL paradigm 
With respect to the wide variety of approaches taken to TOL administration 
reviewed in Chapter 1, the selection of an appropriate TOL task and problem set 
was an important consideration in the design of this study. While some standard 
forms of the TOL task exist for which normative data are included and/or 
reliability has been established, there were several reasons for developing a 
unique problem set. Some forms (Anderson et al., 1996; Krikorian et al., 1994) 
use the original set of 12 problems from Shallice (1982)’s study, which have been 
noted to lack a linear increase in difficulty (Anderson et al., 1996) as well as 
having a maximum difficulty level of 5 move problems, and comprising a mixture 
of tower-, flat- and partial tower-ending problems. The latter point also applies to 
the version developed by Culbertson and Zillmer (1998). An additional version, 
(Schnirman, Welsh, & Retzlaff, 1998) developed for college students, did thus not 
guarantee suitability for populations with intellectual disabilities. One study has 
adapted the TOL for individuals with intellectual disabilities (Masson, Dagnan, & 
Evans, 2010) although they also used a problem set which included various types 
of goal configurations.  
 
In the current study, the task was based on the standard design, referred to as the 
“Shallice TOL” by Berg and Byrd (2002) to allow comparisons to existing 
literature which also uses this design. Luciana and Nelson (1998) also noted that 
around half of the four-year-old children in their sample were unable to 
understand the SOC version, which is another reason to use a standard version. 
The task was developed to be appropriate for a wide range of participants, from 
four-year-old TD children and adults with developmental disabilities, to TD 
children 11 years of age. Thus, problems ranged in difficulty from a minimum of 
one move to a maximum of six moves. Huizinga et al. (2006) used problems with 
up to six minimum moves and reported that performance continued to develop 
on the task to at least age 15, which is beyond the age of the oldest TD 
participants in the current study. Masson and colleagues  also used a range of 
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problems from one to six moves, and found the task to be appropriate for their 
learning disabled population. A linear increase in difficulty was desirable, along 
with a threshold procedure, to allow participants to attempt problems which 
were appropriate for their ability level and to maintain participants’ motivation.  
 
Berg and Byrd (2002) give six colour permutations of six unique configurations of 
pieces (e.g. all pieces on top of one another, one on each peg, and four 
arrangements of partial tower configurations) and numbered them with a 
particular notation. This notation was utilised by Kaller et al. (2011) in 
TowerTool 2.0 open source software. Together, the software and the notation 
were employed in the current study to assess the parameters for various 
potential problems that could be selected. Two of the problem set used in the 
study were taken from Kaller et al. (2011)’s suggested set of problems. Newman 
and Pittman (2007) noted that goal hierarchy and the number of optimal solution 
paths available are important parameters to consider when choosing a problem 
set. Only problems with partial tower beginning and ending positions were 
chosen, to control for the goal configuration variable. Other parameters were also 
controlled for (optimal paths to solution) and others systematically varied 
(search depth; counterintuitive moves). See Appendix A for details of the problem 
set. Berg and Byrd (2002) recommended using multiple ways to measure 
performance rather than relying on a single indicator of success, including speed 
as well as accuracy. A variety of measures were thus included in the current study 
to gain an understanding of problem-solving performance: see Section 2.3.1 for 
details. 
2.1.2.3 Aims and predictions 
The aim of this study was to investigate problem-solving abilities in both typical 
and atypical development, and to understand how specific EF skills are used 
when solving problems. Regarding the relative EF profiles in WS and DS, it is 
expected that working memory tasks will reflect the existing verbal and 
visuospatial STM profiles found using span tasks, which is the type of task used to 
assess working memory in the current study: so, we can expect better verbal than 
visuospatial performance in WS, and the opposite pattern in DS. Given that tasks 
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are predominantly nonverbal, we might expect this to be reflected in the EF 
profiles of the two groups – for example, visuospatial inhibition was poor in the 
WS group but not the DS group in Carney and colleagues’ study. However, mixed 
results regarding EF profiles make predictions difficult: when WS, DS and TD 
groups were matched on nonverbal ability by Costanzo and colleagues, there 
were no group differences on visuospatial inhibition. In general, we can expect 
the contribution of EFs to vary with the difficulty of the problem that is presented, 
cf. e.g., Bull et al. (2004). There is evidence for inhibition contributing to TOL 
scores in young children, and improvements on the TOL with age, so this is also 
expected for the TD group. Based on Bull and colleagues’ and Kaller and 
colleagues’ suggestions that working memory might be more called upon than 
simply STM, this predicts that backwards memory tasks would be related more 
strongly to TOL performance than forwards memory tasks. There are some 
suggestions of shifting being related to the TOL (e.g., Bull et al., 2004), so we 
might also expect to see this pattern in the current study. If individuals are calling 
on planning ability to help them solve TOL problems, planning score should be 
related to TOL score. In the atypical groups, given the different EF profiles, we can 
expect each group to demonstrate different contributions of EF skills to TOL 
problem solving.  
 
Comparing performance across typical and atypical groups should yield an 
understanding of the relative EF skills of each group: that is, whether the DS and 
WS groups’ EF is impaired, and whether the EF profile of impairments differs 
between the groups. Comparing patterns of relationships between EF and TOL 
performance across syndromes can identify any syndrome-general or syndrome-
specific patterns of associations. This is an important area of investigation for 
several reasons: if we know which skills people draw on when approaching a 
problem, this would help to point the way towards appropriate interventions. 
Identification of differences in the relative contributions of EF skills between 
typical and atypical groups might highlight potential compensatory strategies. 
Understanding how compensatory strategies might be utilised by individuals with 
neurodevelopmental disorders would further inform how intervention studies 
could be approached. Finally, including a battery of EF tests for both disorders 
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allows us to add to the existing, somewhat limited, literature investigating EF 
skills in these two populations.  
2.2 Method 
This study comprised the administration of several experimental tasks. A 
consideration of the participants and overarching design and procedure will be 
followed by details of the materials and procedure for each individual task.  
2.2.1 Participants 
In total, 96 participants took part in the study, comprising 20 individuals with WS, 
20 with DS and 56 TD children. For the WS group, only individuals who had 
received a positive phenotypic diagnosis and genetic confirmation of the disorder, 
in the form of a fluorescence in situ hybridisation (FISH) test, were tested. 
Exclusion criteria for the TD group were: known premature birth, special 
educational needs or medical conditions which may have affected their ability to 
complete the tasks. One participant was found to have a recent diagnosis of colour 
blindness and was excluded. One participant with WS was unable to understand 
several tasks and was also excluded. Of the 56 TD participants, a subset of 20 was 
individually matched by a measure of nonverbal ability, the Raven’s Progressive 
Coloured Matrices (RCPM; Raven, 2004) to the DS and WS groups. One individual 
from each group was matched individually to one participant from each of the 
other groups, resulting in three individually-matched groups consisting of 20 
‘trios’ of RCPM-matched participants. For the vast majority of trios the RCPM 
score differed by no more than 3 points in total (across all three participants), 
while one trio differed by 4 points and another by 10 points. RCPM score was 
equivalent across the three matched groups (F<1). Receptive vocabulary was also 
measured using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale, third edition (BPVS-III; 
Dunn et al., 2009) which differed significantly across the three matched groups 
(F(2,57) = 16.789, p < .001, partial η2 = .371), with Tukey post-hoc tests revealing 
better scores in the WS than the DS or TD groups (p < .001 for both) and 
equivalent scores between the DS and TD groups (p = 1.0), reflecting the expected 
elevated receptive vocabulary scores for a WS group. Participant demographics 
are displayed in Table 2.1. 
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Males: 
Females 
Total N 
CA 
Range 
(years: 
months) 
CA 
(months) 
RCPM Raw 
Score 
BPVS Raw 
Score 
Mean (SD) 
DS 11:9 20 
12:7 – 
24:2 
207.25 
(41.49) 
17.05 
(5.52) 
83.75 
(24.90) 
WS 11:9 20 
12:4 – 
24:3 
212.65 
(43.15) 
17.75 
(3.77) 
117.35 
(22.22) 
TD 28:28 56 
4:4 –  
11:5 
94.20 
(24.97) 
25.79 
(7.47) 
106.98 
(24.44) 
TD 
Matched 
11:9 20 
4:4 –  
10:2 
69.85 
(16.00) 
17.65 
(4.25) 
83.85 
(15.07) 
Table 2.1: Participant demographics (experimental work) 
 
2.2.2 Ethical considerations 
The project was granted ethical approval and informed written consent was 
obtained from all participants’ parent or guardian. All participants gave their 
verbal assent to take part, and in addition all participants of 12 years and above 
gave their written consent after an explanation of the study. Care was taken to 
inform participants of the anonymous nature of the video recordings. 
Participation was voluntary, breaks were given as necessary during testing 
sessions, and participants were free to terminate a session if they needed to. A 
range of motivation tools was used, including positive praise and encouragement 
and a sticker added to a participant’s named card on completion of each task. All 
participants were offered a sheet of stickers as a reward for taking part in the 
study. When visiting the university, travel expenses were reimbursed. No prior 
incentives were given for participation. 
2.2.2.1 Recruitment 
The TD children were recruited through and tested at their primary school in 
London. The participants with WS were recruited through the Williams Syndrome 
Foundation: parents who had previously agreed to be contacted were sent an 
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invitation for their son or daughter to take part. The experimenter generally 
visited the participants with WS at their homes to conduct the research: one 
accompanied participant visited the university. The participants with DS were 
recruited from existing links with families from within the research group. The 
experimenter visited participants at their homes or at their schools. 
2.2.3 Overall design and procedure 
For each task, the independent variable of Group had three levels (WS; DS; TD). 
All participants completed the Tower of London, five executive function tasks 
measuring shifting, planning, inhibition, verbal working memory and visuospatial 
working memory, as well as the BPVS and RCPM mental age measures. Testing 
took a total of approximately two hours for each participant, with breaks, with 
durations varying dependant on individuals’ pace and ability. Several factors 
were taken into account to determine the number of sessions necessary, including 
the rare nature of WS and thus the long distances necessary to travel, the limited 
attentional capacities of young children and individuals with neurodevelopmental 
disorders and the practical aspects of conducting testing sessions within normal 
school hours. Thus, testing took place over one (for participants with WS), two 
(for participants with DS) or three (for TD participants) separate sessions. For all 
sessions breaks were included as needed. The order of tasks was 
counterbalanced.  
 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room or separate area and 
completed the tasks seated at a table with the experimenter. Each task was 
explained separately and participants were praised throughout for their efforts 
and achievements. Where possible, tests were concluded by requiring the 
participant to answer a part of the task with which they had experienced success. 
Verbal encouragement and praise was given as appropriate, at intervals 
throughout all of the tasks. 
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2.2.4 Task-specific outlines 
2.2.4.1 Mental Age (MA) measures 
Tasks were administered in accordance with the published instructions.  
2.2.4.1.1 BPVS 
The BPVS-III (Dunn et al., 2009) is standardised for ages 3 to 16 years. 
Participants are repeatedly shown four coloured pictures on a page and asked to 
choose the picture that goes best with an auditorily presented word, spoken by 
the experimenter; in this way an index of receptive vocabulary was ascertained, 
in the form of the raw score. The task took between 10 and 20 minutes to 
complete.  
2.2.4.1.2 RCPM 
The RCPM (Raven, 2004) is standardised for ages 4 to 11 years. Participants are 
shown 36 patterns with a section missing and asked to select the correct piece, 
from a choice of six, to complete the pattern. All items are administered for each 
participant. The task took approximately 5-10 minutes to complete. 
2.2.4.2 The Tower of London (TOL) 
2.2.4.3 Design 
Following a demonstration trial and two practice trials, participants completed 
several experimental TOL trials. Four 2-move trials were presented first, 
provided that the participant was able to complete the two 2-move practice trials. 
Trials proceeded with two of each of 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-move problems until the end 
of the problem set or until a participant completed both of the trials of one length 
incorrectly. If fewer than half of the 2-move trials were completed correctly, four 
1-move trials were also administered. Thus, while there was a total of 16 
experimental trials, in practice a maximum of 12 experimental trials was 
completed (all of the 2-6 move problems). The full problem set is displayed in 
Appendix A. The principal dependent variable was the TOL Score (see Section 
2.3.2) while several other dependent variables were collected from the video 
recording of the task (see Section 2.3.1). 
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2.2.4.3.1 Apparatus and materials 
The TOL apparatus is represented in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The apparatus comprised a wooden board and additional pieces, as shown in 
Figure 2.1, with approximate measurements as follows: a base of 24cm by 8cm by 
1.7cm, with three wooden upright pegs spaced equally along the board at 6cm 
intervals. The pegs were approximately 2cm in diameter and were of varying 
heights: the left hand peg protruded 7.5cm above the base, the central peg 5cm 
and the right hand peg 2.5cm above the base. Three ring-shaped pieces (red, 
white, black) were provided, measuring 4.2cm at their widest point and 2.4cm 
high, which fitted comfortably onto the pegs, such that the left, centre and right 
pegs would hold three, two and one pieces respectively. The card with the goal 
state printed on it was rested on a blank stand so it could be viewed easily by the 
participant, and was stood between the stand and a transparent plastic cylinder 
attached to the table horizontally to keep it in place. Goal states were in the form 
of a schematic diagram of the game board (as in Figure 2.1), printed onto card and 
laminated. When not in use (between trials) pieces were placed on a piece of card 
the same colour as the wooden board. The task was recorded on a Sanyo Xacti SD 
card video recorder (VPC-65EX and VPC – HD2EX) supported by a tripod.  
 
2.2.4.3.2 Procedure 
Participants were seated at a table with the apparatus placed at a comfortable 
distance. The video recorder was switched on and the experimenter introduced 
the task. Participants were shown the three pegs and their different sizes were 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of Tower of 
London (TOL) apparatus 
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pointed out. Participants were told that three pieces would fit on the big peg, two 
on the middle and only one on the small peg. They were asked to identify the 
colours of the pieces, and then shown a goal state picture and asked to show the 
experimenter where each piece was on the goal state, in order to establish that all 
participants could distinguish and identify the different coloured pieces. At the 
start of each trial the card was turned over so that the goal state was visible. A 1-
move demonstration trial began the task procedure. During the demonstration 
trial the participant was instructed that they would be moving the pieces so that 
they matched the picture. The rules were explained and demonstrated: that only 
one piece could be moved at a time, that the pieces needed to stay on the pegs and 
could not be placed, for example, on the table, and that no more pieces could be 
balanced on top of a peg if it was already full. Participants were informed that 
they needed to try and solve the problems in as few moves as possible.  Then the 
experimenter completed the 1-move demonstration trial, pointing out the move 
(e.g., “I just need to move this one here”) so that the solution was correct. The 
experimenter then asked the participant whether the game board matched the 
picture, allowing her to ascertain that the participant could judge that the two 
arrangements of pieces were the same or give further explanations if necessary. 
Two 2-move practice trials followed the demonstration, to allow participants to 
move the pieces in accordance with the rules and make their pieces match the 
goal state. If a rule was violated during a practice trial, the experimenter praised 
the participant’s effort and showed them where the rule had been broken, and 
restarted the practice trial from the beginning. Practice trials were repeated until 
the experimenter was satisfied that the participant had understood the task. 
 
Experimental trials proceeded in a sequential fashion. At the beginning of each 
trial the experimenter set up the pieces in the starting configuration and placed 
the goal state facing away from the participant. She said, “Ready? Off you go”, and 
turned the goal state over so that it was visible to the participant. The goal state 
remained visible throughout the trial. Participants moved the pieces until they 
were satisfied that they had matched the picture. The number of moves made was 
recorded during the trial by the experimenter. Where a rule was violated, the 
experimenter stopped the participant, reminded them of the rule and pointed it 
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out (e.g., “stop there – you’ve got the red and the white pieces moving together 
there [holding up the pieces]. Keep going, but remember that it’s just one piece at 
a time”). The experimenter then returned the pieces to the positions that they 
occupied immediately prior to the rule violation, and the participant was asked to 
continue. A trial ended when a participant said that they had finished. 
Alternatively, the experimenter ended the trial when the participant had made 
more than 20 moves and was still unable to solve the trial (“that’s a bit of a tricky 
one, isn’t it? You’ve had a really good go. Let’s go on to the next one”) or a 
participant ended the trial by reporting that they were unable to complete it. 
Trials proceeded according to the threshold procedure described above. A trial 
was judged to be correctly completed when the goal state was matched in 20 
moves or fewer. Participants were not permitted to restart trials: occasionally the 
experimenter restarted a trial where it had not been possible to correctly replace 
the pieces after a rule violation. The task took between 10 and approximately 30 
minutes to administer, depending on the participant’s individual pace and ability. 
2.2.4.4 Executive function tasks 
2.2.4.4.1 Inhibition Task 
In this task, participants were repeatedly presented with an image on a computer 
screen and asked to respond by pressing one of two pictures that were attached 
to the keyboard.  
Design and procedure 
A repeated-measures design was employed such that all participants completed 
both a ‘same’ condition and an ‘opposite’ condition. The same condition was 
always administered first, and the two conditions were separated by the planning 
task (see below). Two versions of each condition were created such that half the 
participants completed the same condition with images of grass and snow, while 
the other half were given leaves and stones. Each participant subsequently 
completed their opposite condition using the other set of pictures. The dependent 
variables were accuracy and reaction time (RT) to each condition as well as the 
proportional percentage difference in the number of correctly solved trials and 
the proportional difference in the average time taken to complete correct trials, 
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between the two conditions. Each condition consisted of 16 experimental trials 
and took around 2-3 minutes to complete. A schematic representation of the task 
can be found in Figure 2.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Same condition 
The task began with a welcome screen displaying the word ‘Hello’ in the centre of 
the screen. The experimenter consecutively displayed the two images for the 
condition, explaining that the participant would see the picture of (grass/leaves) 
or the picture of (snow/stones). The experimenter pointed out the pictures on the 
keyboard as well, naming and pointing to them. Participants were told that they 
should press the picture on the keyboard that was the same as the one on the 
screen. In a practice phase, four trials followed in which participants 
demonstrated their understanding; three out of four were required to be matched 
correctly before continuing on to the experimental phase. If this did not occur, the 
practice trials would be repeated and further explanation given. 
 
Participants were then introduced to a sound that would play when they 
responded correctly, and told to keep going if they made a mistake. Speed and 
accuracy were both emphasised and a final reminder given of the rule (i.e., 
pressing the picture that is the same). Participants were asked to hold their hands 
just above the pictures so that they were ready to press them. Each image was 
Figure 2.2: Schematic representation of inhibition task. Half of the participants 
saw Leaves/Snow images in the Same condition and Grass/Snow in the Opposite 
condition while the other half saw the reverse pattern. 
 
Same condition Opposite condition 
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displayed until a response was made. A correct response produced the short 
‘twinkly’ sound from the computer and the image was followed by a blank white 
mask and an 850 msec pause before the next image was presented. An incorrect 
response produced no sound and no change to the image. When incorrect, the 
experimenter reminded the participant of the relevant rule. When a subsequent 
correct response was made, the task proceeded as for a correct answer. The task 
ended with a ‘well done’ screen, with a large star in the centre of the screen, a 
smiley face and balloons, irrespective of performance.  
Opposite condition 
The Opposite condition proceeded in exactly the same way as the Same condition, 
with participants instructed to press the picture that was different from the one 
on the screen. Sometimes the term ‘different’ was not understood and substituted 
expressions were used, e.g. the one that’s not the same, or the other picture, with 
practice trial blocks being repeated until the participant had understood. 
Apparatus and materials 
Images of grass, snow, leaves or stones, measuring 15cm by 10cm, were 
presented in the centre of an Acer Aspire 5810TZ widescreen laptop measuring 
15.6 inches using Superlab 2.0 software. Two laminated pictures of the two 
relevant images were attached to the computer keyboard, each measuring 4.2cm 
by 3cm with a small white border. They covered keys (A S D Z X) for the left-hand 
image, and keys (K L ; , .) for the right-hand image. The pictures of grass and 
leaves were always attached to the left-hand side and the snow and stones to the 
right, according to the relevant version. 
2.2.4.4.2 Planning task 
Design and procedure 
The planning task was designed to require participants to plan several steps 
ahead. Like Fagot and Gauvain (1997)’s and Carlson, Moses, and Claxton (2004)’s 
delivery tasks requiring items to be placed in reverse order, the planning task 
here was also designed to tap into this type of ability. Participants loaded small 
wooden ‘boxes of milk’ onto a milk van for delivery to houses. To succeed with the 
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task, milk boxes needed to be loaded in reverse order. The trials increased in 
difficulty by increasing the number of houses that required milk. The dependent 
variable was the number of correct trials. The task consisted of three phases in 
total. Testing was terminated when two consecutive trials were completed 
incorrectly within any one phase. 
Phase one  
Participants were comfortably seated at the table. The experimenter showed the 
participant the board and explained that they were going to pretend that they had 
a job in a town, helping to deliver some milk. The houses were placed in a row in 
front of the participant and they were asked to identify the colours, (either by 
saying the colour names or pointing to the colour name said by the experimenter) 
in order to check that they were able to distinguish them. All of the boxes of milk 
were then placed in the centre of the road, and it was pointed out that the boxes 
of milk were different colours as well, and explained that the boxes should go to 
the house of the same colour. To check understanding, the experimenter 
demonstrated that the red box would go to the red house, and asked the 
participant where the blue box would go. Where any difficulty with naming or 
identifying colours was shown, these colours were also selected for the box-house 
matching to check that participants were able to match the boxes to the houses. 
All participants were able to do this (even if they did not know the names of the 
colours), with the exception of one who was excluded from the study (see Section 
2.3.4.2). The houses were then lined up to one side of the road.  
 
The van was shown to the participant and placed in the centre of the road, and the 
plastic tube inserted into the top, while the experimenter explained that its 
purpose was to facilitate the placing of items onto the van. The starting point 
(flag) and arrows on the road were pointed out to the participant and it was made 
clear that, “as the arrows only go this way round, it’s a one way street, so the van 
can only drive this way around”.  
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A demonstration trial followed in which one (red) house was placed on the board. 
The experimenter showed the participant how the milk boxes were placed onto 
the van (by threading the box onto the tube) and demonstrated this while the van 
was in the centre of the road, at the loading bay. Then the van was driven around 
the track and the experimenter said, “I can give the red box to the red house”, and 
did so. The van was driven back to the starting point and the participant was 
informed that “that one’s finished”. Another demonstration trial followed, with 
the experimenter explaining that, e.g., “when the van gets to a house, it can only 
deliver the box that’s at the top [pointing to the top of the tube]. So when you’re 
putting things on the van, you need to be careful about the order that you put 
them on the van”. The experimenter loaded the two boxes of milk onto the van, 
placed it in the start position and began driving. “Can you see that I’ve made it so 
that the orange one is at the top, so that it can go to the orange house? And then 
[driving to next house] I can give the green one to the green house”. A 2-house 
practice trial followed in which the participant loaded the milk onto the van for 
the experimenter to drive around the track. It was repeated with further support 
and explanation until successfully achieved.  
 
The experimental trials then began. The participant’s task was to load the boxes 
of milk onto the van for the experimenter to drive around the track. Visual 
feedback was clear throughout the task as the participant could easily see when 
they had loaded the correct or incorrect colour. The van was driven clockwise 
around the track, stopping at each house and delivering it if correct, with a “here’s 
this one… well done…” etc. If the van reached a house with a non-matching 
(incorrect) colour at the top, the experimenter pointed out the mistake and 
placed the box on the loading bay. The participant was reassured, but reminded of 
the rule (to remember that it is the one at the top that can be delivered to the 
same coloured house). After each trial, all of the milk boxes were returned to the 
centre of the road and all the houses to the side. The experimenter then set up the 
next set of houses, adding them to the board in a clockwise order. When loading 
boxes of milk onto the van, sometimes a participant would remove some items 
from the van and replace them with alternatives. This was only allowed before 
delivery of the milk to the houses had commenced. There was one experimental 
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trial of delivery length (number of houses) of two, three, four and five houses. A 
maximum number of replacements was set at twice the number of houses to be 
delivered to. If this maximum number was exceeded (for example if a participant 
continually removed and replaced items) the trial was terminated and scored as 
incorrect. This occurred very rarely; most participants presented a set of items to 
be delivered. 
Phase two 
In phase two, participants were informed that they were going to look at a 
different town where things happen differently. The phase one board was 
removed and replaced with the phase two board to reinforce the idea that it was 
different (in fact the phase two board only differed in the placement of 
background trees; see Figure 2.5). Participants were informed that the milkman 
in this town still delivers milk, but that sometimes there was a birthday party at 
one of the houses. Laminated cardboard balloons were attached to four of the 
houses (red, green, yellow and black), and the corresponding four boxes of milk 
were removed from the participant’s view. It was explained that when there was 
a party, there were balloons outside the house, and the milkman would be 
delivering a birthday cake. Four birthday cakes made from felt and sponge (see 
Figure 2.4) were shown to the participant. Great care was taken to construct the 
cakes so that they would hold their shape, but would become squashed when a 
wooden block was placed on top of them. The participant was asked to identify 
the colours of the cakes as for phase one, and told that the cakes go to the house 
that is the same colour, and asked which house the yellow cake would go to in 
order to check understanding. All participants were able to pass this check. 
Participants were told, “we have cakes and milk to deliver now. But, watch what 
happens when I try to put milk on top of a cake”. A cake was put onto the van, and 
a box of milk dropped on top so that it squashed the cake. The participant was 
asked what had happened. If they did not respond the experimenter said, “it’s got 
squashed, hasn’t it?”. All participants were able to appreciate this. The 
experimenter continued, “No one wants a squashed birthday cake! So when you 
put the things on to the van you need to make sure that the milk is at the bottom, 
and the cakes are at the top [pointing to relevant part of post] so that the cakes 
80 
 
don’t get squashed”. Participants were told that the van would now be driven 
around the road twice: once to deliver the cake, and again to deliver the milk. A 2-
house demonstration and practice trial followed to illustrate the changes to the 
procedure. The trials then proceeded as for phase one, with a 6- and 7-house trial 
also included. If on the very rare occasion that a box of milk was loaded on top of 
a cake (thereby squashing it) the participant usually noticed and corrected this 
themselves. If they did not, they were told, “oops! Don’t squash the cake!” This 
was recorded and the pieces removed. The participant was allowed to begin the 
trial again with a reminder not to squash the cakes.  The items were delivered by 
the experimenter, commenting “round we go for cakes… and round we go for 
milk…” etc.  
Phase three  
This phase proceeded as for phase two, except that the new town was presented 
with a tree across the road (see Figure 2.5). The participant was told that there 
had been a thunderstorm and asked if they could see what had happened. It was 
explained that as the tree was across the road, the van could not drive past it and 
would have to turn back when it got to the tree: “so the van goes around this way 
for cakes, but has to go back the other way to deliver the milk”. Additional arrows 
were added to the road, with the experimenter explaining that although it was a 
one way street, the arrows were a reminder that the van would be driving in both 
directions.  
Apparatus and materials 
The planning task was presented on a table top and is displayed in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Planning task apparatus 
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An A3 matt-laminated board was attached to the table surface, featuring a circular 
road of 24.5cm diameter at its widest point, with a ‘loading bay’ in the centre and 
a flag at the top identifying where the van should start driving from. Houses were 
coloured and plastic-covered wooden blocks measuring approximately 6cm by 
9cm by 3cm, and a small van measuring 6.5cm by 4cm by 3cm was placed in the 
centre. A fixed plastic tube protruded 23.5cm above the top of the van. Boxes of 
milk were small coloured wooden cubes of 3cm with a hole drilled through the 
centre of approximately 1cm, so that they could be comfortably threaded onto the 
tube. Pictures of milk bottles were affixed to two opposite faces of each cube. 
There were eight houses of various colours (red, blue, brown, black, yellow, 
green, purple, orange) and eight milk boxes of the same colours. Additional 
apparatus comprised four cardboard balloons and four birthday cakes made from 
felt and sponge, and two additional game boards for phases two and three. Figure 
2.4 displays an example of a house with balloon attached, cake and milk box, 
while Figure 2.5 displays the phase two and three game boards.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Apparatus for planning task: house with balloon, cake and milk box 
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Figure 2.5: Game boards for phases two and three of the planning task 
 
2.2.4.4.3 Shifting 
Design and procedure 
This task draws on elements of the dimensional change card sorting task (DCCS; 
see Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995; Kirkham, Cruess, & Diamond, 2003; Zelazo, 2006) 
and Wisconsin Card Sorting Task paradigm (WCST), while gradually increasing in 
difficulty in stages, as does the set shifting task from the Cambridge 
Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB; e.g. Sahakian & Owen, 
1992). Participants were required to sort items by one dimension (shape or 
colour), and then make a shift and sort them by another dimension. Repeated 
shifts between dimensions were required. The dependent variable was the 
number of shifts that were successfully made. 
 
The task was divided into three phases. Each phase needed to be passed in order 
for the next phase to be attempted. To pass a phase and progress to the next one, 
at least one shift needed to be made. To make a shift it was necessary to pass two 
consecutive blocks within a phase (i.e., with different sorting criteria). To pass a 
block, four consecutive trials needed to be completed correctly. The experimenter 
recorded the outcome of each trial as it occurred (correct or incorrect) to keep 
track of the score. Each block ended with a ‘well done’ screen (identical to the one 
 
Phase Two Phase Three 
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displayed for the inhibition task) regardless of performance, the experimenter 
praised the participant’s efforts, and the task was either ended or continued 
dependent on performance. The task took between approximately 10 and 25 
minutes to administer, depending on performance. 
Introduction and practice phase 
The task began with a welcome screen with the word ‘Hello’ in the centre. 
Participants were shown a green triangle at the top of the screen, followed by two 
shapes appearing simultaneously at the bottom of the screen: a yellow triangle 
and a green circle. Participants were first shown the shape at the top, and then the 
two shapes at the bottom. It was explained that to play the game participants 
would need to determine which of the bottom two shapes the top shape belonged 
with. They were instructed that they could select a shape by tapping the screen. 
The participants were then played the ‘twinkly’ correct feedback sound, and 
reassured not to worry about any mistakes. They were then shown the first game 
(“this is the colour/shape game”). If a participant was first introduced to the 
colour game, they were subsequently introduced to the shape game, and the 
shape game was then the sorting criterion for the first block of their experimental 
trials. The reverse occurred when the shape game was the first to be introduced. 
Half of the participants completed each of these conditions.  
 
They were asked to identify the green/yellow items (or the circle/triangle 
depending on the game) and told, “so, in the (colour/shape) game, the green 
(circles) ones go here and the yellow ones (triangles) go here”. They practised the 
colour/shape game: four practice trials were given in which three were required 
to be correct to progress (see Figure 2.6). The practice trial block was repeated 
with extra explanation and support if this was not passed at first, until 
understanding was demonstrated. Then the alternate game (shape/colour) was 
introduced and practised in the same way. Examples of practice trial stimuli are 
displayed in Figure 2.6. 
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Phase one 
The first block of experimental trials in phase 1 then began: the experimenter 
informed participants that to start with they were going to keep on playing the 
shape/colour game (whichever game they had been introduced to second). They 
were asked to identify where the different types of images would need to go as a 
reminder. At the start of each block the experimenter introduced the sorting 
criterion: “now this time we’re going to play the shape/colour game! Where are 
the green ones/yellow ones/triangle/circles (as appropriate) going to go?”. 
During a block, if incorrect responses were given the experimenter would remind 
the participant of the game, e.g., “Oops! Remember it’s the shape game”. 
Throughout the task, incorrect answers did not elicit a response from the 
computer: the participant was given the opportunity to self-correct (and thus gain 
the correct feedback sound) before the next trial appeared.  
 
Four blocks of eight experimental trials were presented, either requiring sorting 
by colour (‘the colour game’) or shape (‘the shape game’). The shape to be sorted 
(at the top) was of the form of one of the two displays in Figure 2.7, presented in a 
fixed pseudorandom order of trials, and the shapes at the bottom were always a 
yellow triangle and a green circle. In this way it was always possible to match the 
stimulus to either of the shapes at the bottom; the top shape always corresponded 
to one of the bottom shapes by one of the dimensions. The answers which were 
correct or incorrect varied with the current sorting criterion (colour or shape). 
Examples of stimuli in phase 1 and 2 are displayed in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.6: Initial practice trials in phase 1 for shape (left 
hand side) and colour (right hand side) criteria of the 
shifting task 
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Phase two 
Phase two was identical to phase one with the exception of the new requirement 
to use the feedback (a ‘twinkly’ sound for correct responses only) provided by the 
computer to discover and follow the rule; now sorting criteria were not told to 
the participant. The first trial in each block was not counted towards the four 
consecutive correct trials necessary to pass, because one (‘elimination’) trial was 
needed in order to determine the rule. Participants were informed that they 
would be doing the same as before except that they would not be told the rule and 
needed to listen to the sounds in order to work out which game they were 
playing. They were informed that “sometimes the computer will change the game 
that it’s playing, so you need to keep on listening and see if you can figure it out”. 
At the start of the phase they were asked where the images would need to go, as a 
reminder (e.g., “if it’s the shape game, you’re going to put triangles…? And 
circles…? If it’s the colour game, you’re going to put green ones…? And yellow 
ones…?”). In this phase the four blocks with different sorting criteria were 
presented (the rule still changed every eight trials) but there was no pause or 
input between blocks. Encouragement was given throughout. If a participant 
seemed to be getting many trials incorrect the experimenter encouraged them to 
try to work out the game (e.g., “is it the colour game or the shape game?”).  
Phase three 
Phase three proceeded as for phase two, but another dimension (number) was 
introduced. The top shape now corresponded to the bottom shapes on all three 
dimensions (see right hand side of Figure 2.8 below). Four blocks of 12 trials 
were presented, for which the rule (colour, shape or number) had to be 
Figure 2.7: Experimental stimuli in phases 1 and 2 of the 
shifting task 
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discovered and followed. For participants who reached phase 3, the ‘number 
game’ was introduced and four practice trials administered (see Figure 2.8 for an 
example). Participants were given instructions regarding listening to sounds and 
working out the game in the same way as for phase two. Because the shape at the 
top of the screen corresponded to the ones at the bottom of the screen in three 
ways (shape, colour and number), the first trial in each block was carefully 
selected so that after the first (‘elimination’) trial, it was possible to discover the 
rule on the next trial. Thus, four consecutive correct trials, not including trial 1, 
constituted passing a block, as for phase two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Apparatus and materials 
The task was presented on a touch screen computer (Toshiba Portégé M780-112) 
with a 12.1-inch screen. Example stimuli are displayed in Figure 2.6, Figure 2.7 
and Figure 2.8 above. 
 
2.2.4.4.4 Working memory 
Verbal and visuospatial working memory tasks were administered, involving 
repeating sequences of digits or tapping sequences of blocks, respectively. Each 
task had a forwards version and a backwards version, and the scores were in the 
form of a span measure: the longest list length that could be successfully 
remembered. The backwards tasks were administered immediately after the 
forwards tasks (in line with Wechsler & Naglieri, 2006). 
Figure 2.8: Example stimuli from phase 3 of the shifting 
task: training (left hand side) and experimental (right hand 
side) 
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Visuospatial working memory 
Design and procedure 
The task was based on the spatial span task from the Wechsler nonverbal scale of 
ability (WNV; Wechsler & Naglieri, 2006), with a modified procedure, outlined 
below. Children were shown the board and told that in this game they were going 
to be tapping some blocks. The experimenter explained that they would tap a 
block and the participant should tap the same one. Practice trials for 1 item then 
ensued. The participant was then told that this time the experimenter would tap 
more than one, and that they should try to tap the same ones, in the same order. 
Two 2-item practice trials then followed, with repetitions, further explanations 
and demonstrations of the correct responses where appropriate until the 
participant understood the task. The experimental phase consisted of two trials of 
each length, from 2 up to 9 items long. Testing continued until both trials of a 
particular sequence length were reproduced incorrectly.  
 
In the backwards version of the task, participants were told that the game they 
would be playing was now different. Practice trials began with 1-item trials and 
then participants were told that this time when the experimenter tapped more 
than one, they should try to tap the same ones, but backwards. Practice trials of 2 
items in length followed, then experimental trials of 2 items in length, increasing 
to 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 until the participant incorrectly reproduced both trials of 
the same length. Pickering and Gathercole (2001) noted that children may need 
special direction on how to reverse three items. In a departure from Wechsler and 
Naglieri (2006)’s procedure, where any participants were correctly able to 
reverse a sequence of two but not three items, additional demonstration and 
practice trials were given in reversing three items, followed by experimental 
trials of three items, to allow participants to demonstrate whether or not they 
were able to reverse three items once they had been instructed in how to do this 
(cf. Pickering and Gathercole (2001)’s instructions: the last one, then the middle 
and then the first). Five out of the 20 TD participants in the matched group 
demonstrated the need for this support version; as did 10 of the participants with 
WS and 11 of the participants with DS. Also, where a participant reproduced a 3-
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item trial sequence in the same order as the experimenter, this was pointed out 
and the trial repeated with a reminder that the order should be reversed.  The 
task then continued as before until both items of the same length were completed 
incorrectly, or until the end of the trials. 
Apparatus and materials 
The spatial span board, provided with the WNV battery, consisted of a white 
plastic board with ten blue cubes protruding from the base (see Figure 2.9). 
Printed on the experimenter’s side of the cubes were the numbers 1-10 for 
identification. 
 
 
 
 
 
Forwards verbal working memory 
Design and procedure 
The Digit Recall sub-test from the Working Memory Test Battery for Children 
(WMTB-C; Pickering & Gathercole, 2001) was used. Two participants responded 
in a modified way as they were unable to produce an audible response (see the 
Apparatus and materials section below). The task was administered in 
accordance with the instruction manual, with a modified structure (in order to 
maintain consistency with the visuospatial working memory tasks) which is 
outlined below. Participants were told that the experimenter would be saying 
some numbers and that they should listen to the numbers and say the same ones 
back; to copy what the experimenter was saying. There were two practice trials of 
one number followed by two practice trials of two numbers. Practice trials were 
Figure 2.9: Visuospatial memory task 
apparatus 
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repeated with further explanations until the task was understood, with answers 
to practice trials given if necessary. 
 
The experimental trials involved the experimenter first informing the participant 
of the number of numbers that she would say, in line with the WMTB-C test 
instructions. Numbers were said aloud at a rate of approximately 1 number per 
second and participants asked to repeat the list of numbers. Participants were 
given encouragement during the task and told when the number of numbers to be 
repeated would change. Two trials of each length were administered, with the 
task being terminated when both trials of the same length were reproduced 
incorrectly. These trials were the first two trials of each block from the WMTB-C 
trial set. As for this task, trials up to a list length of 9 digits were included in the 
set: that is, the maximum number of trials administered was 16 (two each of 2-, 3-
, 4-, 5-, 6-, 7-, 8- and 9-item trials). If a participant asked for the string to be 
repeated, this was done but no credit was given for the trial. Occasionally the trial 
was repeated correctly but with additional items produced, and these were 
scored as incorrect.   
Apparatus and materials 
For the majority of participants the forwards condition did not require any 
apparatus or materials. For two of the participants with DS who had difficulty 
producing numbers verbally, number cards from 1 to 9 were produced by the 
experimenter for the participants to point to in lieu of vocally producing the 
numbers. 
Backwards verbal working memory 
Design and procedure 
The backwards version of the verbal working memory task was modified from 
the Backward Digit Recall sub-test from the WMTB-C, in the same way as the 
forwards version. One participant with DS was unable to understand the 
instructions and so did not provide data for this task. Where necessary, counting 
forwards and then backwards using the number stimulus page was practised with 
the participant to ensure understanding. Practice trials followed in which two 
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number cards were shown to the participant with the experimenter saying the 
numbers forwards and asking the participant to say them backwards, and then 
two more practice trials in which the participant watched the experimenter point 
to two blank cards in order and say a number for each, and was asked to repeat 
the numbers backwards. The experimental trials then proceeded in the same way 
as for the forwards verbal working memory task, with participants asked to 
repeat items in reverse, except for the modification that is suggested in the 
WMTB-C manual: that is, after the 2-item experimental trials were completed 
successfully, practice trials were administered for 3 items. As Pickering and 
Gathercole (2001) note, this is because being able to reverse 3 numbers is a skill 
in itself, and a participant may fail on 3 item trials because of a lack of this 
understanding, rather than memory limitations. Reminders about the backwards 
rule were provided as needed. As in the backwards version of the block span task, 
where a participant responded to a trial with the correct numbers in the same 
order as the experimenter, this was pointed out and the participant given further 
attempts at producing the numbers in the reverse order. 
Apparatus and materials 
The stimulus page from the WMTB-C manual (with the numbers 1-9 and forwards 
and backwards arrows) was used to help demonstrate counting backwards for all 
participants, with the exception of the TD children who did not require it (who 
were usually at the older end of the age range). Supplied number cards were used 
for all participants in the demonstration and practice phases. For two of the 
participants with DS who had difficulty producing numbers verbally, number 
cards from 1 to 9 were produced by the experimenter for the participants to point 
to in lieu of vocally producing the numbers.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 TOL coding 
TOL performance was coded from video recordings of the task. A summary table 
of the measures coded are displayed in Table 2.2, along with further descriptions 
of task behaviours relevant to the analysis. Some measures (e.g., rule violations, 
type of error) will be discussed in Chapter 3, in which more qualitative aspects of 
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performance are explored. The measures in bold type contribute towards the 
TOL score. 
 
Name Description 
Move  
(or peg-to-peg 
move) 
The movement of a piece to another peg by the 
participant. To be classed as a move, the piece must 
leave the original peg and at least touch the top of 
the new peg 
Incomplete move 
(1 move point) 
A piece is lifted off its current peg, then held above 
the pegs and returned to its original position 
Backup move pair 
(2 move points) 
Where two moves are made (whether the piece is let 
go of or not) and the piece is returned to the peg that 
it has just left 
Hover  
(half a move point) 
Approaching a peg with a piece then hovering above 
it without physically placing it onto the peg 
Rule violation  
(1 move point) 
Lifting two pieces off the pegs at once, placing a piece 
elsewhere than on a peg (e.g., on the table), or 
balancing a new piece on top of a peg that is already 
full. Rule violations that are immediately self-
corrected are not counted 
Verbalisation 
A binary judgement for each trial of whether a 
relevant verbalisation is made to help solve the trial, 
for example saying ‘the red goes there…then the 
black there…’ 
Planning time 
The time elapsing between the turning over of the 
goal state (goal presentation) and when the 
participant makes the first move of the trial 
Total trial time 
The time elapsing from the goal presentation (when 
the goal state card has been turned over and the 
bottom edge reaches the surface) to the placement of 
the last piece that constitutes the final move 
Execution time Total trial time – planning time 
Time per move Execution time / number of moves made 
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Reason for ending 
trial 
Whether the trial is reported as finished by the 
participant, whether more than 20 moves are made 
and the trial is ended by the experimenter or whether 
the participant ends the trial because they are unable 
to solve it. 
Error type: perceptual 
Trials reported as finished where the configuration of 
the pieces does not match the goal state 
Table 2.2: Descriptions of TOL coding measures and behaviours 
 
Recordings for a random 10% of participants were also second-coded. Inter-rater 
reliability was coded for the number of moves made (up to 20), incomplete 
moves, backup moves, whether a trial was completed correctly in 20 moves or 
not, rule violations, hovers, verbalisations and the reason for ending the trial, and 
disagreements settled by discussion. Spearman’s correlation coefficient was used 
to calculate inter-rater consistency, and the lowest correlation coefficient was r = 
.847 (p < .001) (for verbalisations), indicating a high level of agreement for each 
variable, as an r value of .7 is deemed acceptable (Multon, 2010). In addition, the 
percentage agreement (percentage of identical coding judgements) was above 
90% for each measure coded. 
2.3.2 TOL scoring 
Each participant was awarded a TOL Score. The efficiency of problem solving can 
be measured by the number of moves in which an item is solved, with no extra 
moves constituting the most efficient solving. The task comprised items of 
varying levels of difficulty, administered using a threshold procedure (see Method 
section, 2.2.4.2). The nature of the threshold procedure means that some 
participants completed more trials than others. The scoring system was devised 
to take into account both accuracy (i.e., the number of trials that were correctly 
completed) and efficiency (i.e., the number, if any, of additional moves that were 
made). Scores constituted a total number of points, with fewer points 
corresponding to better performance; in this way, problems solved in their 
minimum number of moves earned zero points (making the best possible score 
zero) and problems solved correctly but not in their minimum number of moves 
scored the number of additional moves made (with incomplete moves earning 
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half a point; see Table 2.2). If 20 moves were made on an item without it being 
solved, the item was classed as incorrect (a ‘too many moves’ error). Therefore, 
these problems earned 20 points. Correspondingly, 20 penalty points were 
awarded for any incorrectly solved item, or any item in the task that had not been 
reached, because of the threshold procedure (this allowed for the number of 
correct items, as well as item efficiency, to be taken into account). This is because 
later problems were assumed to be more difficult than earlier problems, due to 
their increasing numbers of minimum moves as well as other difficulty-related 
parameters (see Appendix A for the full problem set). As there were four 2-move 
problems in the set and two of each of the 3,4,5 and 6-move problems, 2-move 
problem scores are half-weighted in the scoring. The score comprised the sum of 
the scores for each of the 16 trials. If more than half of the 2-move problems were 
incorrect, four 1-move problems were administered. The highest (i.e., poorest) 
possible score was therefore 240, assuming incorrect answers to all of the 2-move 
problems (and thus penalty points assigned for all later problems) followed by 
incorrect answers to all of the 1-move problems. In reality, the poorest score 
achieved was 200 (correct answers in one move to all 1-move problems). As no 
participant who completed 1-move problems made any additional moves, no 
portion of the scores come from these items. A scoring example is given in Table 
2.3 below. 
Performance TOL Score 
2-move problems: three correct in 2 moves, one 
incorrect 
(0 + 0 + 0 + 20/2) 
points (half-weighted) 
3-move problems: one correct in 3 moves, one 
incorrect 
(0 + 20 points) 
4-move problems: one correct in 5 moves, one in 6 
moves 
(1 + 2 points) 
5-move problems: one correct in 10 moves, one 
incorrect 
(5 + 20 points) 
6-move problems: both incorrect (20 + 20 points) 
Total: 98 points 
Table 2.3: Example of TOL scoring 
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In order to illustrate the TOL score distribution, histograms of the score for each 
group are presented in Figure 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.10: Frequency distribution of TOL score across matched groups 
 
From examining Figure 2.10 the distribution of TOL scores appears to be broadly 
similar across the matched groups, with some unevenness between typical and 
atypical groups in the number of individuals scoring very well (less than 40) and 
those scoring towards the middle of the range (between 80 and 120).  
 
Scores were also examined more closely by considering the two constituent 
measures: the trials correct score, which was the number of trials correct, half-
weighted for the 2-move problems in the same way as for the TOL score; and the 
additional moves to correct trials, which was the average number of additional 
moves made on correctly completed trials, calculated for each participant. 
2.3.3 Analyses and parametric assumptions 
Participants completed a number of experimental tasks. Outcomes will initially be 
reported for the three RCPM-matched groups. Subsequently, the relationship 
between EF tasks and TOL score will be explored for each task for all participants. 
ANOVA analyses for group comparisons were examined using Tukey pairwise 
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comparison tests when sample sizes were approximately equal and Games-
Howell tests when they were unequal. The assumption of normality and 
homogeneity of variance for parametric analyses were checked prior to each 
analysis, using Kolomorov-Smirnov and Levene tests as appropriate. For group 
comparisons, where the normality assumption was not met, nonparametric tests 
were run, and reported if results were different from parametric equivalents. 
When the homogeneity of variance assumption was not met, the more robust 
Welch’s F test is reported for between-group analyses. For trajectory analyses, 
where N was greater than 30 the assumptions of central limit theorem were 
adopted to allow an assumption of normality. Where Ns were below 30 and 
where necessary, the data were transformed to achieve normality. As reaction 
time (RT) data, having no maximum limit, are particularly vulnerable to the 
influence of outliers, analyses involving RT data were subject to the statistical 
identification of outliers, using a cut-off of two standard deviations from the 
mean. Such analyses are thus reported with and without the inclusion of outliers. 
Otherwise, accuracy data were included unless invalidated (e.g., by a lack of 
understanding of the task: details are given by task), as these are not as 
vulnerable to outliers as RT data and are likely to be valid given the wide 
variation in scores often seen in developmentally disordered groups. The one 
exception to this rule was for the proportional change in accuracy on the 
inhibition task where participants showing unusual patterns of behaviour were 
excluded: see footnote 2 on page 108. Where a score of zero was obtained on a 
task, the participant had demonstrated understanding of the task, without 
obtaining a score on experimental trials, and so the score was included. 
2.3.4 Matched group comparisons 
2.3.4.1 TOL Score 
From the entire data set, data from five trials (1 TD, 1 DS, 3 WS) were excluded 
due to experimenter error, and missing values replaced with the accuracy score 
from the participant’s remaining trial of the same number of moves. Four of those 
trials were from participants in the matched groups (1 DS, 3 WS). For the 
participant with WS, one of these excluded trials was a 2-move trial. As two out of 
the three remaining 2-move trials were correct, it was also judged as correct, and 
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replaced with the average of the two correct trials’ scores. On two additional trials 
participants from the two oldest year groups of the TD group were incorrectly 
given a more difficult trial. In both instances the trial was solved correctly. Scores 
are thus included, as any bias would be in a conservative direction. The mean 
scores for each group (N = 20 for each group) are displayed in Figure 2.11. 
 
Figure 2.11: Mean (S.E.) of TOL score across matched groups. Lower scores 
indicate better performance. 
 
ANOVA on the TOL score indicated no significant main effect of Group (F(2,57) = 
2.218, p = .118, partial η2 = .072). In order to compare both accuracy and 
efficiency, which are combined in the TOL score, across groups, ANOVAs were 
also conducted on the TOL trials correct score and the number of additional 
moves to correct trials. Neither measure indicated significant group differences 
(trials correct score: F(2,57) = 1.928, p = .155, partial η2 = .063; additional moves: 
F<1). Means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 2.4. 
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TD Matched DS WS 
Trials correct 
score 
9.40 (2.48) 8.40 (2.70) 7.73 (2.95) 
Additional moves 
(correct trials) 
1.48 (1.06) 1.87 (1.41) 1.53 (1.54) 
Table 2.4: Mean (SD) of trials correct score and additional moves on correct trials 
 
As the TOL task is the central task of the experimental work of this thesis, group 
comparisons were also conducted between each atypical group and the TD group 
for the performance variables above. This reduces the likelihood of not detecting 
differences due to a loss of power which may arise from comparing the three 
groups. Due to the centrality of the TOL task, this approach was only taken for this 
task. 
 
The WS group performed more poorly than the TD group on the TOL score, (t(38) 
= -2.029, p = .050) which was largely due to the difference in the trials correct 
score which approached significance (t(38) = 1.946, p = .059) rather than the 
average additional moves to correct trials (t(38) = -.133, p = .895). None of the 
scores were significantly different between the DS and TD groups (TOL score: 
t(38) = -1.557, p = .128; trials correct score: t(38) = 1.220, p = .230; additional 
moves: t(38) = -.993, p = .327). While the reliable WS versus TD comparison 
would not have survived a Bonferroni correction we note it here because the 
correction is only warranted due to the multi-disorder group design. That is, had 
the study only included one atypical group and a control group, comparisons 
would have been made between those two groups only and would have been 
afforded more power.  
 
A post hoc power analysis for the main effect of Group was computed using 
G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007), using an alpha level of 
98 
 
.05, effect size f of 0.28 (computed in G*Power from the partial η2 = .072 above) 
and total sample size of 60 (three groups of 20). A power level of 0.45 was 
produced, that is, a 45% chance of detecting a violation of the null hypothesis. 
Cohen (1988) identified 80% as a desired level of power, so at 45% this analysis 
can indeed be considered as lacking power. Faul and colleagues (2007), amongst 
others, caution against the use of the sample effect size for post hoc power 
analyses, which cannot be assumed to represent the population effect size 
reliably. Thus, for completeness, a post hoc power analysis was also conducted 
based on detection of a medium effect size (f=0.25; Cohen,1988), which produced 
an observed power of 37%. From another perspective, an a priori power analysis 
for an ANOVA with three groups, an .05 alpha level, 80% power and a medium 
effect size (f=0.25) requires a sample size of 159, while the current sample was 
60, so more participants would have been needed to detect a medium effect. 
2.3.4.2 Planning task 
The number of planning trials completed successfully was calculated for each 
participant. The practice trial required delivery to two houses, and some 
participants passed the practice trial but not the experimental trials, obtaining a 
score of zero. A further two participants (1 WS, 1 DS) were able to demonstrate a 
basic understanding of the task requirements by choosing the correct milk box for 
delivery to 1 house, even though they failed the 2-house practice trial. Their 
scores of zero were thus retained in the data set because they were able to 
understand the task at a basic level. One additional participant (with WS) was not 
given the opportunity to deliver to 1 house and so their data were excluded, so 
the Ns were 20 (TD), 20 (DS) and 19 (WS). Figure 2.12 displays the mean number 
of trials correct per group.  
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Figure 2.12: Trials correct on the planning task by group 
 
ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of Group (F(2,56) = 3.656, p = .032, 
partial η2 = .115), with better performance in the TD group than the DS group (p = 
.026) and no significant differences between the WS group and either of the other 
groups (Tukey tests: TD: p = .227, DS: p = .597). Planning data for the DS group 
did not meet the assumption of normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p = .009) 
which is likely to be due to the high frequency of a score of 1 in this group. A 
Kruskall-Wallis test of planning score across groups did not reach significance 
(χ2(2) = 5.377, p = .068), although post hoc Mann-Whitney tests produced the 
same pattern of results as the parametric tests above. 
2.3.4.3 Shifting task 
Data from three participants were excluded from the analysis (all from the 
matched groups) because they could either not understand or not perform the 
task (2 DS, 1 TD) leaving Ns of 18 (DS), 19 (TD) and 20 (WS). The group means of 
the number of shifts made per participant are displayed in Figure 2.13. 
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Figure 2.13: Number of shifts made on the shifting task by group. Stronger 
performance is reflected in more shifts. 
There was no significant main effect of Group (F(2,54) = 1.358, p = .266, partial η2 
= .048). 
2.3.4.4 Inhibition task 
Accuracy and reaction time (RT) data were collected from this task. 
2.3.4.4.1 Accuracy  
The percentage of correct trials was calculated for each participant. Group means 
for each condition are displayed in Figure 2.14. 
 
Figure 2.14: Percentage accuracy to same and opposite conditions of inhibition task by 
group 
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ANOVA with Group as the between-groups factor and Condition as the within-
groups factor revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(1,57) = 26.537, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .318) with a higher rate of success to Same trials than to 
Opposite trials. There was no main effect of Group or significant Condition by 
Group interaction (p > .05 for both). Percentage accuracy data for the Same 
condition in the WS and DS group were very high, and did not meet the 
assumption of normality, while the homogeneity of variance assumption for this 
measure was also violated. One-sample t-tests against 100% performance 
indicated that these scores were indeed at ceiling (DS: p = .163; WS: p = .056). As 
accuracy was so high to the same condition it will not be considered further in 
relation to TOL score. 
2.3.4.4.2 Reaction time (RT)  
RT data points below 100ms were excluded, indicating either that a button press 
to a previous trial was still held down when a new trial began, or that a decision 
had been made by the participant regarding which button to press before the 
presentation of the stimulus. In the Same condition this affected three trials (2 TD, 
1 DS). The average of the RTs across trials in the Same condition was calculated 
for each participant, and ANOVA on this baseline RT data revealed a marginally 
significant effect of Group (F(2,57) = 2.712, p = .075, partial η2 = .087), with 
marginally longer RTs in the DS group than in the WS group (p = .063), with all 
other pairwise differences being non-significant (p > .05 for all). On excluding 
outliers above or below 2 standard deviations from the mean in each group (one 
participant in each group) the Group effect became significant (F(2,54) = 3.650, p 
= .033, partial η2 = .119). Tukey tests indicated longer RTs in the DS group than 
the WS group (p = .030) with neither atypical group showing different RTs from 
the TD group (DS: p = .726; WS: p = .160). 
 
In the Opposite condition, two trials were excluded due to RTs below 100ms (1 
TD, 1 WS). The average of the RTs across trials was also calculated for each 
participant in the Opposite condition. The group means of RT for each condition 
are displayed in Figure 2.15. 
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Figure 2.15: Reaction time to same and opposite conditions of inhibition task by group 
 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Condition (F(1,57) = 100.986, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .639) with longer RTs to the Opposite condition than to the Same 
condition. There was a marginally significant main effect of Group (F(2,57) = 
2.507, p = .090, partial η2 = .081) with no significant differences between any of 
the groups in pairwise comparisons (p > .05 for all). Condition did not reliably 
interact with Group (F(2,57) = 1.985, p = .147, partial η2 = .065). 
 
In the Opposite condition, one participant in each group was identified as an 
outlier (these were different participants from those identified for the Same 
condition) and thus as being unrepresentative of the participant group, and were 
removed from the analysis. On excluding the outliers for both conditions, the 
main effect of Group became significant (F(2,51) = 3.942, p = .026, partial η2 = 
.134), with Tukey tests indicating that the DS group’s RTs were longer than the 
WS group’s (p = .021) with neither atypical group performing differently to the 
TD group (DS: p = .182; WS: p = .596). 
 
The proportional change in RT between conditions, relative to the baseline 
measure of matching speed (RT to the Same condition) was also calculated for 
each participant, using the following formula: 
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Average RT Opposite   Average RT Same
Average RT Same
       
 
The group means (standard deviations) were as follows: TD 46.78 (25.80); DS 
76.41 (56.87); WS 79.76 (59.06). There was a significant main effect of Group 
(Welch’s F(2,32.624) = 4.096, p = .026, partial η2 = .086) with a marginally 
significant difference between the TD and WS groups (p = .099) and all other 
differences being non-significant (p > .05). 
 
Only one participant in the DS group was classed as an outlier for the RT Change 
variable. Upon excluding this outlier, the Group difference became significant 
(Welch’s F(2,32.341) = 3.535, p = .041, partial η2 = .084). Tukey post hoc tests 
indicated a marginally larger RT change in the WS than the TD group (p = .078) 
with no significant differences between the DS group and either of the other 
groups (TD: p = .284, WS: p = .791). 
 
Thus, the results demonstrate that the WS group were marginally more impaired 
than the TD group when the inhibition of a match was required, with respect to 
RT but not accuracy. 
2.3.4.5 Working memory tasks 
There were four working memory tasks: forwards and backwards block span 
tasks and forwards and backwards digit span tasks. Data were available on all 
four of the tasks from 17 participants from the DS group, 18 from the WS group 
and 10 from the matched TD group (data from three participants with DS were 
unavailable for the backwards block task as they were unable to understand the 
demands of the task; remaining missing data are due to digit span measures only 
being tested for a subset of TD participants, and experimenter error). Mean span 
scores for the three groups on the four tasks are displayed in Figure 2.16.  
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Figure 2.16: Span measures across four working memory tasks by group; fwd = 
forward; bwd = backward. 
 
ANOVA was conducted with Group as the between-groups variable and Direction 
and Modality as the within-groups variables. There was no significant main effect 
of Group (F(2,42) = 2.346, p = .108, partial η2 = .100) but its interactions with 
other independent variables are discussed below. There was a significant main 
effect of Direction (F(1,42) = 83.037, p < .001, partial η2 = .664) with higher scores 
overall to forwards tasks than backwards tasks. Direction did not reliably interact 
with Group (F<1). There was no significant main effect of Modality (F<1) although 
Modality did interact reliably with Group (F(1,42) = 20.414, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.493). The Direction by Modality interaction was also significant (F(1,42) = 5.794, 
p = .021, partial η2 = .121) and these two variables contributed to a marginally 
significant 3-way interaction with Group (F(2,42) = 2.966, p = .062, partial η2 = 
.124).  
 
In examining the interaction between Modality and Group, one-way ANOVAs of 
block and digit spans, collapsed across direction, revealed main effects of Group 
for each (Block: F(2,42) = 10.301, p < .001, partial η2 = .329; Digit: F(2,42) = 6.554, 
p = .003, partial η2 = .238). Games-Howell post hoc tests for the block span 
measures revealed poorer performance in the WS than both the TD group (p < 
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.001) and the DS group (p = .003) with equivalent performance between the latter 
two groups (p = .786). Games-Howell post hoc tests for the digit span measures 
revealed poorer performance in the DS group than in the TD (p = .005) and WS 
group (p = .009) with WS and TD groups performing at a comparable level (p = 
.931). Paired sample t-tests indicated significant differences between digit and 
block spans in the DS (t = -3.922, p = .001) and WS groups (t = 4.765, p = .001), 
but not for the TD group (t = -.452, p = .662). The difference was in opposing 
directions for the two atypical groups, with the WS group obtaining better scores 
on digit span than block span tasks, and the DS group showing the opposite 
pattern, as to be expected.  
 
As there was also a significant interaction between Modality and Direction, and 
the 3-way interaction approached significance, it merited exploration. It is 
explored in relation to group effects in order to be most informative. The main 
effect of Group for the block span was significant in both directions (Forwards: p  
= .002; Backwards p = .008) while for the digit span measure it was only 
significant for the forwards span (Forwards: p = .001; Backwards: p = .093, 
Kruskall-Wallis p = .102). For block span, the WS group scored more poorly than 
both other groups on the forwards task (TD: p = .007; DS: p = .005) but only 
poorer than the TD group on the backwards task (p = .005). For digit span, the DS 
group’s performance was poorer than that of the other two groups on the 
forwards task (TD: p = .003, WS: p = .005). All other pairwise differences for the 
four tasks were non-significant (p > .05 for all); thus, for both backwards tasks the 
atypical groups’ performance did not differ significantly. 
 
The marginally significant 3-way interaction between direction, modality and 
group was also due to consistent effects of modality in each direction in the 
atypical groups, but inconsistent effects of modality in the TD group, when 
comparing forwards and backwards tasks. Paired samples t-tests revealed that 
the TD group performed better on the backwards block span task than the 
backwards digit span task (p = .010) with no such difference between the 
forwards tasks (p = .138). In the DS group, better performance to block tasks than 
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digit tasks was seen in both directions (Forwards: p = .022; Backwards: p = .004) 
while the WS group did better at digit tasks than block tasks for both directions 
(Forwards: p < .001; Backwards: p = .029). 
 
Overall, the expected pattern of block and digit span performance was observed 
in the WS and DS groups, with poorer visuospatial performance in the WS group 
and poorer verbal performance in the DS group, relative to both the other 
modality and to the other groups. These verbal/visuospatial differences between 
the atypical groups were only observed in the forwards direction, while within-
group modality differences were observed for both directions in the atypical 
groups, and only in the backwards direction for the typical group.  
2.3.5 Relationships between EF and TOL tasks 
Thus far, comparisons have been made on various measures at the group level. 
This is informative with regards to the overall differences in performance across 
typical and atypical groups, for each task in turn. The next section considers the 
relationship between TOL performance and both MA measures and EF tasks, now 
for the entire TD group as well as each atypical group. First, correlations of EF 
task performance with TOL score were calculated for each group and 
developmental trajectories constructed and compared using ANCOVA (see 
Section 1.1.4) to assess the way, if any, in which the relationship between the EF 
task and TOL score differs across groups. Subsequently, multiple regression was 
used for the TD group to identify the most important predictors of TOL score.  
2.3.5.1 Correlation matrix 
The TOL score was correlated with each EF measure. This measure was selected 
because it is a more sophisticated measure of performance than the number of 
trials correct. The correlation matrix also includes the accuracy data equivalent of 
the proportional change in RT variable on the inhibition task, thus taking into 
account relative performance between conditions (labelled Inhibition: Accuracy 
Change in Table 2.5). This was calculated using the following formula: 
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In Table 2.5, the R values for group data that are non-normally distributed are 
underlined. Where this occurs and N is less than 30, Spearman’s nonparametric 
correlations were also conducted. Where this outcome differed with regard to the 
presence of significance reported by the Pearson’s correlation, the Spearman’s R 
and p values are included in parentheses.  Significant correlations are presented 
in Table 2.5 against a green background, while marginally significant correlations 
are against a yellow background. The Ns for each group (TD, DS, WS) are reported 
underneath the variable name in the leftmost column of the table. 
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TD DS WS 
 
R (p) 
CA (56, 20, 20) -.591 (<.001) -.341 (.141) -.187 (.429) 
BPVS raw score (56, 20, 20) -.554 (<.001) -.287 (.221) -.486 (.030) 
RCPM raw score (56, 20, 20) -.658 (<.001) -.185 (.435) -.278 (.235) 
Planning score (56, 20, 19) -.473 (<.001) -.251 (.286) -.682 (.001) 
Shifts (54, 18, 20) -.496 (<.001) -.243 (.332) -.331 (.154) 
Inhibition: % Opposite (56, 20, 
20) 
-.182 (.179) -.322 (.166) -.444 (.050) 
Inhibition: Accuracy Change (56, 
20, 20) 
.1852 (.180) -.384 (.094) -.469 (.037) 
Inhibition: RT Same (56, 20, 20) .457 (<.001) .480 (.032) .136 (.567) 
Inhibition: RT Opposite3 
(56, 20, 20) 
.532 (<.001) .098 (.691) -.411 (.080) 
Inhibition: RT change 
(56, 20, 20) 
.045 (.740) -.386 (.092) -.331 (.153) 
Forwards digit span (26, 19, 19) -.531 (.005) -.328 (.170) -.352 (.140) 
Backwards digit span  
(25, 19, 18) 
-.354 (.083) 
(-.496) (.012) 
-.425 (.070) -.447 (.063) 
Forwards block span  
(54, 19, 20) 
-.353 (.009) -.057 (.818) -.172 (.468) 
Backwards block span 
(50, 17, 18) 
-.372 (.008) -.002 (.993) -.475 (.046) 
Table 2.5: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between predictor measures 
and TOL Score for each group. Significant correlations are presented against a green 
background whilst a yellow background indicates a marginally significant correlation. 
Underlined r values indicate non-normal data.  
By examining Table 2.5 it is apparent that many variables were correlated with 
TOL performance for the TD group, as would be expected. While there was only 
one significant relationship with TOL score for the DS group (RT Same on the 
inhibition task), various aspects of the WS group’s profile were associated with 
                                                        
2
 This correlation is after excluding two of the youngest participants who displayed unusual behaviour 
on the task: that is, better accuracy to the Opposite than Same condition. Before excluding them the 
correlation was significant (r = .373, p = .005). 
 
3
 These correlations are after the exclusion of outliers (2 TD, 1 DS, 1 WS). Before exclusion, the WS 
correlation was not significant (r = -.146, p = .538) while the significance for the DS and TD groups 
remained unchanged (DS: r = .121, p = .612; TD: r = .572, p < .001). 
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TOL performance: spatial working memory and planning, vocabulary as 
measured by the BPVS, as well as inhibition. 
 
As Table 2.5 contains 42 separate correlations, a Bonferroni correction for 
multiple comparisons would require a p value cut-off of .00119 for effects to be 
considered significant. If this were to be applied, correlations that would survive 
the correction would be: CA, BPVS, RCPM, Planning and Shifting for the TD group; 
none for the DS group; and only Planning for the WS group. 
 
Correlations between percentage correct and RT in the Opposite condition were 
conducted to investigate the relationship between speed and accuracy in this 
task. Correlations were non-significant for each group (p > .05). However, on 
excluding the four outliers for the RT to the Opposite condition (1 DS, 1 WS, 2 TD; 
note, there is an additional TD outlier for the entire TD group than in the matched 
group analysis above) the TD and DS correlations remained non-significant while 
the WS correlation became significant (r = .590, p = .008), indicating an 
association between better performance on the opposite condition and longer 
response times for this group. 
 
Correlations were also conducted between chronological age (CA) and the other 
variables in order to give an indication of which measures are changing over 
developmental time. The TD group showed significant correlations on every 
measure (p < .05 for all) with the exception of the proportional change in RT (r = 
.052, p = .706). Most of the correlations for the atypical groups were non-
significant (p > .05), while the DS group showed age-related improvements in: 
BPVS; RCPM; Planning; and Accuracy on the opposite condition of the inhibition 
task (p < .05 for all) and in the WS group only BPVS score was related to CA (r = 
.546. p = .013). 
 
Finally, some additional correlations between measures are reported here. 
Processing speed is an important factor in typical cognitive development (Fry & 
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Hale, 2000) and is indexed here by the RT to the Same condition of the inhibition 
task.  In the TD group it was related to planning, shifting, all four memory tasks, 
BPVS, RCPM and CA, with faster RTs associated with better scores or increasing 
age (p < .05 for all). No correlations for the atypical groups reached significance, 
although one correlation approached significance in the DS group (backwards 
digit span: r = -.394, p = .095) and in the WS group (BPVS: r = -.425, p = .062).  
2.3.5.2 Multiple regression: TD group 
As the TD group has a large N, the sample size afforded multiple regression 
analysis to investigate the best way of predicting TOL score using the remaining 
variables. There is not enough evidence to confidently predetermine which 
variables will predict the TOL score most strongly: thus, a backwards stepwise 
regression method was chosen, to allow the selection of best predictors to be 
based on statistics rather than decisions based on theoretical considerations. The 
variables initially entered into the regression analysis were the ones that were 
correlated with the TOL score in the TD group: CA, BPVS, RCPM, RT Opposite, RT 
Same, Planning, Shifting, Forwards Block and Backwards Block spans, with the 
exception of the change in accuracy on the inhibition task (see footnote 2 on page 
108). Digit span task sample sizes were not deemed large enough for inclusion at 
N=25 and N=26. However, for regression analysis multicollinearity should be 
avoided. This is defined (Field, 2013) as correlations between predictor variables 
with an r value greater than .9. The highest correlation was between CA and BPVS 
at .878. This is close enough to .9 to warrant concern. CA had the highest VIF 
value (variance inflation factor, an index of multicollinearity) of all the predictors 
(6.071) so was removed from the analysis. The resulting model with the highest 
R2 value, thus accounting for the most variance in TOL scores, was the first model, 
including all the predictors, with an R2 of .495, accounting for 49.5% of the 
variance. On removing each variable in turn, the value of F did not change 
significantly (p > .05 for all). RT Opposite and RCPM together still accounted for 
46.9% of the variance. Thus, the RCPM and RT opposite variables explain a 
statistically equivalent amount of the variance as all the variables combined, and 
as such, this is the most parsimonious model (F(2,45) = 19.867, p < .001). The 
Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.565, which is within the normal range, indicating 
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that the assumption of independence of errors was adequate (Field, 2013). Upon 
excluding the TD outliers for the RT Same and RT Opposite variables (N now 
being 52), the most parsimonious model now constitutes RCPM score in isolation 
(F(1,43) = 26.922, p < .001) accounting for 38.5% of the variance. 
2.3.5.3 Developmental trajectories 
ANCOVAs were conducted to assess the relationship between the EF or MA and 
TOL measure in each group, with TOL Score as the dependent variable, Group as 
the fixed factor and the predictor (MA or EF measure) as the covariate. An 
interaction term was included in the model (e.g., Group by Planning Score). To 
allow the comparison of the intercepts of the trajectories at the point at which 
they begin to overlap, measures were rescaled where necessary for analysis, by 
subtracting the highest minimum score across groups from each score. While a 
significant main effect of group indicates a significant difference in the intercept 
of the trajectories (that is, of the regression lines for the groups) a significant 
interaction points to unequal trajectory slopes for different groups, i.e., non-
equivalent relationships between the measures for different groups. This section 
includes scatter plots of the raw data and the outcomes of ANCOVAs for variables 
in which at least two groups showed at least a marginally significant correlation 
between the TOL and the EF measure. A summary of outcomes for the remaining 
variables can be found in Appendix B. Ns for the DS and WS groups are identical 
to those in Section 2.3.4. The TD group N was 56 unless stated otherwise. 
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2.3.5.3.1 BPVS score  
The BPVS raw scores and TOL scores are displayed in Figure 2.17. 
 
Figure 2.17: Developmental trajectory of TOL score based on BPVS score 
 
There was a significant association overall between TOL score and BPVS (F(1,90) 
= 20.105, p < .001, partial η2 = .183). Correlations revealed relationships between 
BPVS and TOL score in the TD and WS groups, but not the DS group. ANCOVA 
revealed that at the lowest level of verbal abilities, the TOL scores differed across 
groups (F(2,90) = 9.126, p < .001, partial η2 = .169), with better TD scores than 
that of both atypical groups (DS: p = .014; WS: p < .001) as well as better DS than 
WS performance (p = .045) and the rate of TOL score development with BPVS 
score did not vary by group (F<1). 
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2.3.5.3.2 Planning task 
Planning and TOL scores are displayed in Figure 2.18. 
 
   Figure 2.18: Developmental trajectory of TOL score based on planning task score 
 
Planning data for the DS group did not meet the parametric assumption of 
normality (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: p = .009) which can be attributed to the 
lack of variation of scores in this task in the DS group, with more than half scoring 
1. Transformations did not improve normality to a satisfactory level. Thus, only 
data for the TD and WS groups were entered into the ANCOVA, which revealed an 
overall association between TOL score and planning score (F(1,71) = 31.721, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .309) as well as significantly better TD than WS TOL scores at 
planning scores of zero (F(1,71) = 25.753, p < .001, partial η2 = .266). 
Furthermore, the TD and WS slopes differed significantly (p = .001) indicating 
different rates of development of problem-solving ability with planning: in the WS 
group the slope is much steeper than that for the TD group, suggesting a greater 
improvement in TOL score with each additional planning trial correct; that is, that 
planning ability was a more important constraining factor for the WS group than 
the TD group. 
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2.3.5.3.3 Proportional accuracy change between conditions on the 
inhibition task 
Figure 2.19 displays the scatter plot for the proportional change in accuracy 
between conditions on the inhibition task. 
 
Figure 2.19: Developmental trajectory of TOL score based on proportional accuracy 
change on the inhibition task 
 
As noted in Section 2.3.4.4.1, some of the TD children’s accuracy was better for 
the Opposite than for the Same condition (those data points may be seen in Figure 
2.19 where the scores are greater than zero). This measure was therefore not 
suitable for further analysis. Thus, only the DS and WS groups’ trajectories were 
compared. 
 
While the proportional change in accuracy was related to TOL score overall (p = 
.008), ANCOVA between the WS and DS groups did not reveal a significant 
difference in the change in accuracy at its lowest point, or a difference in the two 
groups’ slopes (F<1 for both). 
2.3.5.3.4 RT to the same condition of the inhibition task 
In the inhibition task, reaction times (RT) to the Same condition showed 
significant relationships with TOL score in the TD and DS groups, but not in the 
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WS group, indicating that TOL performance was constrained by response speed in 
the TD and DS groups only. In Figure 2.20 the data delineating the relationship 
between these measures can be observed. 
 
Figure 2.20: Developmental trajectory of TOL score based on RT to the same 
condition of the inhibition task 
 
ANCOVA revealed that, at the fastest RTs, the three groups differed in their TOL 
score (F(2,90) = 9.824, p < .001, partial η2 = .179) with TD scores better than 
those of the DS group (p = .031) and WS group (p < .001) and with no difference 
between DS and WS groups (p = .210). Overall, RT Same was associated with TOL 
scores (F(1,90) = 9.856, p = .002, partial η2 = .099) and the rate of change of TOL 
score with RT did not differ across groups (F<1). Upon excluding outliers, the 
Group difference between the DS and TD groups lost significance (p = .110) with 
all other effects unchanged. 
2.3.5.3.5 RT to the opposite condition of the inhibition task 
While only the TD group showed a significant correlation between RT to the 
Opposite condition and TOL score, as noted in footnote 3 on page 108, upon 
excluding outliers, the WS correlation became marginally significant (r = -.411, p 
= .080). Interestingly this was in a different direction from the TD group.  
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Figure 2.21: Developmental trajectory of TOL score based on RT to the opposite condition of 
the inhibition task 
 
Figure 2.21 displays the scatter plot data for RT to the Opposite condition and 
TOL score. At the fastest RTs the groups scored significantly differently on the 
TOL (F(2,90) = 18.942, p < .001, partial η2 = .296) with higher (i.e., poorer) scores 
in both the WS and DS groups compared to the TD group (p < .001 for both). 
While RT to the Opposite condition was associated with TOL score overall 
(F(1,90) = 4.981, p = .028, partial η2 = .052), the relationship between the two 
scores was not consistent for all groups (p = .004). In fact, differences in slope 
were apparent between the TD group and both atypical groups (DS: p = .010; WS: 
p = .001). The two atypical groups did not differ in their scores at the fastest RTs 
or in their slopes (p > .05 for both). ANCOVA was also conducted with the outliers 
excluded. Overall, the association between RT Opposite and TOL score became 
non-significant (p = .291) while other effects remained unchanged. 
2.3.5.3.6 Backwards block span 
Data were available for 50 TD participants on this task. In Figure 2.22 a scatter 
plot of backwards block span and TOL score is shown. 
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  Figure 2.22: Scatter plot of backwards block span and TOL score 
 
In the backwards block span task, significant relationships with TOL score were 
seen in the TD and WS groups only. This is unsurprising when examining Figure 
2.22, as the DS scores only range from 2 to 4. In the remaining two groups, while 
both show relationships in the same direction such that better visuospatial 
working memory scores are linked to better TOL scores, the trajectories only 
overlap by one span point, and are thus unsuitable for comparison.  
2.3.5.3.7 Backwards digit span 
 
   Figure 2.23: Scatter plot of backwards digit span and TOL score 
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In the TD group the distribution of backwards digit span was non-normal but the 
sample size was 25, negating the reliance on central limit theorem for an 
assumption of normality. Transformations did not improve normality and so the 
data were unsuitable for trajectory analysis. Figure 2.23 therefore serves to allow 
visualisation of the marginal correlation between the TOL and backwards digit 
span seen in all groups.  
2.4 Discussion 
The main aims of the study were 1) to compare EF performance in WS and DS to a 
control group matched on nonverbal ability, and 2) to investigate the relationship 
between EF (and MA) measures, and TOL problem solving, in WS and DS 
compared to TD individuals. TOL problem solving was found to be equivalent 
between RCPM-matched DS and TD groups but lower in the WS group than in the 
TD group. The patterns of EF performance of the three groups were also different. 
Moreover, different patterns of relationships between the TOL task and its 
predictor variables were also seen across groups, as expected, while some 
similarities were also observed. The nature of those differences and similarities, 
and relative EF profiles, will be discussed in this section. The reader is reminded 
that group comparisons are concerned with the RCPM-matched TD group while 
analysis of relationships between measures involves the entire TD group.  
 
From a broad perspective, patterns of performance can be compared in three 
ways: relative group performance, the presence or otherwise of a relationship 
between a predictor variable and the TOL, and the nature of the development of 
that relationship, indicated by the developmental trajectory approach. The 
correlations between EF/MA measures and the TOL in the typical group serve as 
a benchmark for comparison for the atypical groups: if a measure is (or is not) 
related in typical development, and is not (or is) related in a disordered group, 
the presence or absence of that relationship may point to a discrepancy in the 
processes underlying TOL performance between those two groups. Having two 
atypical groups in the study also allows more information about that pattern of 
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relationships to be known: is the unusual presence or absence of a relationship 
unique to a particular disorder or related to having a learning difficulty?  
 
In the TD group, a predictor variable from every task was related to the TOL 
score, as was chronological age (CA) and both verbal and nonverbal MA. This is 
consistent with previous research yielding age-related increases in TOL score 
(Anderson et al., 1996; Culbertson & Zillmer, 1998; Huizinga et al., 2006; Luciana 
& Nelson, 1998) as well as being broadly consistent with studies finding some EF 
associations with TOL performance in TD children (Asato et al., 2006; Bull et al., 
2004), although see, e.g., Bishop, Aamodt-Leeper, Creswell, McGurk, and Skuse 
(2001) regarding the Tower of Hanoi (TOH). These results vary by EF, and will be 
discussed individually subsequently. 
 
For some predictor variables this relationship was only present in the TD group, 
while some were related in the TD group and in one atypical group, others were 
related in one atypical group alone and just one measure was related in all three 
groups. These will be discussed in turn, with reference to the nature of those 
relationships and to the matched group comparisons. The group comparison and 
developmental trajectory results will be further discussed for each task in turn. 
2.4.1 TOL 
The TOL score was significantly lower in the WS group than in the TD group 
matched for RCPM ability. The TOL score was a combination of accuracy and 
efficiency measures, and when comparing each of these constituent scores 
between the WS and TD groups it was suggestive that this group difference stems 
from lower TOL accuracy in the WS group than the TD group, although this 
difference did not reach significance. TOL performance in DS did not differ from 
that of the TD control group and can be understood to be at an equivalent level to 
performance that might be expected for TD children who exhibit the same level of 
nonverbal ability.  
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The slightly weaker TOL performance of the WS group compared to the TD group 
is consistent with previous studies by Menghini et al. (2010) and Rhodes et al. 
(2010) who found TOL deficits in a WS group compared to a TD control group. 
While scoring methods varied across studies, Menghini and colleagues also 
matched participants using a nonverbal measure of mental age (MA), the Leiter 
International Performance Scale-Revised, brief version (Leiter-R; Roid & Miller, 
2002). Rhodes et al. (2010) used BPVS score as their group-matching measure. In 
the current study, the WS group’s BPVS score was significantly higher, but their 
TOL performance significantly lower, than that of their RCPM-matched control 
group. Taken together, these findings serve to emphasise the elevated abilities on 
measures of concrete vocabulary seen in the WS population and the uneven 
cognitive profile (e.g., Mervis et al., 2000) previously found for this group.  TOL 
performance appears to be not only lower than the WS group’s relatively good 
verbal ability level, but lower than their nonverbal ability, when accuracy and 
efficiency are taken into account. 
 
The current results for DS are consistent with those of Pennington et al. (2003) 
who found no difference in scores of DS and MA-matched controls on the CANTAB 
battery, including the Stockings of Cambridge (SOC) TOL-like task (also used by 
Rhodes et al., 2010 above). This is in contrast to those of Lanfranchi et al. (2010), 
in whose study adolescents with DS performed more poorly on a TOL test than 
controls matched on MA measured by a test of logical operations. However, their 
problem set consisted of 3- to 7-move problems, which is likely to have been 
more challenging than the current problem set of 1-2 to 6 moves. In addition, 
Rowe et al. (2006) found poorer TOL scores in a DS group compared to a BPVS-
matched group of individuals with other learning disabilities, but as the score was 
based on the time needed to complete the items, it is not possible to meaningfully 
compare the scores (this study is further discussed in Chapter 3). A comparison of 
TOL performance in WS and DS was undertaken by Costanzo et al. (2013), 
comparing the atypical groups to a TD group matched on the Leiter-R. On a TOL 
task, a WS group obtained a lower score than a DS and TD group. Similar group 
patterns were also found in earlier studies assessing implicit memory in a DS or 
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WS group (Vicari et al., 2000, 2001). Here, the WS group also scored more poorly 
than the TD group, and the DS group scored at the same level as the TD group. 
2.4.2 Chronological age (CA) 
CA was related to the vast majority of measures for the TD group (without the 
proportional change in RT on the inhibition task), which is in line with 
expectations: EF skills increase with age in TD children (e.g., Best & Miller, 2010; 
Huizinga et al., 2006). While only BPVS score was related to CA in the WS group, 
both MA measures (BPVS, RCPM) as well as planning score and accuracy on the 
Opposite condition of the inhibition task were related to CA in the DS group. BPVS 
is a measure of crystallised intelligence, that is, concrete knowledge of words, so 
can reasonably be expected to increase with CA as individuals learn more words. 
This is consistent with Jarrold, Baddeley, Hewes, and Phillips (2001) who 
observed that, in WS, vocabulary developed faster than visuospatial construction 
skills (or at least it had an earlier onset age at which a score on the test is 
obtained; see Thomas et al., 2009 for a discussion). 
Some data are also available in the existing literature regarding changes in IQ 
over developmental time in DS. IQ has been found to decrease during childhood in 
DS, but to remain largely stable across adulthood from age 21 to 45, when 
individuals affected by dementia are not taken into account (Carr, 2012). BPVS 
scores became more widespread over time, with those who were more able 
increasing in their scores the most (Carr, 2012), although gains were made 
between the ages of 21 and 30 for the group as a whole. It is therefore possible 
that, with age, increasing verbal skills for some of the participants with DS were 
related to increases in other abilities, although the age range in the present study 
is somewhat younger than that tested by Carr (2012), making comparisons 
difficult. 
2.4.3 RCPM and TOL score  
The Ravens test, of which the RCPM is one form, has been suggested to be 
‘central’, because it shares a large amount of variance with performance on other 
tests (Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990). Therefore, it is thought to measure fluid, or 
analytic, intelligence, which does not depend on prior knowledge (Carpenter et 
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al., 1990). The multiple regression analysis for the TD group revealed RCPM and 
RT to the Opposite condition of the inhibition task to be statistically just as able to 
account for TOL performance as a combination of all of the MA and EF measures 
used in the analysis, with RCPM alone coming through as the strongest predictor 
after the exclusion of outliers. Unterrainer et al. (2004) also found that fluid 
intelligence measured on a Raven’s-like test was predictive of TOL performance 
in typical adults. Although in their study this was the sole predictor of 
performance and this was not the case in the present study, taken together, the 
Raven’s tests were predictive of TOL ability in both children in the current study 
and adults in Unterrainer and colleagues’ study.  
 
The absence of a significant correlation between RCPM and TOL in the WS and DS 
groups serves to highlight the atypicality in the patterns of relationships between 
tasks and TOL performance for both of these groups; that is, there were other, 
more important constraining factors for performance. 
Moreover, Carpenter et al. (1990) refer to completing the Raven’s trials as solving 
problems, reflecting the wide applicability of problem-solving abilities, and the 
RCPM is also thought to involve EF skills (e.g., Rowe et al., 2006 included it as an 
EF task). Although it has also been suggested that the Raven’s coloured matrices, 
suitable for children, can be solved perceptually (Hunt, 1974, cited in Carpenter et 
al., 1990), it is surprising that correlations between RCPM and TOL performance 
were not seen in either of the atypical groups. It might be questioned whether the 
RCPM test taps into abilities for individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders 
in the same way as for typical individuals. Adults with DS made different types of 
errors on the Raven’s test compared to TD and learning disabled groups (Gunn & 
Jarrold, 2004). They, and another group with non-specific intellectual disability, 
also demonstrated different eye movement patterns to TD children during the 
task who were matched on mental age, while they did not differ from one another 
(Vakil & Lifshitz-Zehavi, 2012). However in Vakil and colleagues’ study the TD 
group’s Raven’s score was better than the DS and intellectual disability groups’, 
raising the possibility that different strategies (eye movements) facilitate better 
scores. Facon and Nuchadee (2010) found that items on the RCPM were 
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comparable in their difficulty levels for a DS, intellectual disability and control 
group, indicating that this test is suitable for this type of comparison. In this 
study, groups were matched on RCPM score, indicating (unlike Vakil et al.) that 
the same scores appeared to be obtained for the same reasons across groups. Van 
Herwegen, Farran, and Annaz (2011) also matched a group of participants with 
WS to TD children on their RCPM score and a similar outcome to that of Facon 
and Nuchadee (2010) in DS emerged: error profiles in the WS group that were 
very similar to error profiles in typical children. These error profiles also changed 
with age in the same way for both groups, indicating the likelihood that the RCPM 
is measuring the same construct across groups (also see Facon, Magis, Nuchadee, 
& De Boeck, 2011 for further support for the use of the RCPM test to usefully 
compare typical and intellectually impaired groups). Here, RCPM performance 
was above the level expected for chance, indicating that responses were not being 
made at random. 
 
It may be, then, that differences in the task demands between the TOL and RCPM 
rendered the association non-significant for the atypical groups. The TOL requires 
an individual to produce a motor response, and often, to make several steps 
towards the end goal, while the RCPM has limited motor requirements and only 
requires one response (although several internal steps may be taken before that 
response is produced). Indeed, the pattern of poorer performance on block design 
than RCPM performance in WS (e.g., Farran et al., 2001) indicates that, while both 
nonverbal, there are additional requirements to the block design task that make it 
more difficult. Similar processes may apply in the TOL.  
2.4.4 BPVS 
DS and TD matched groups did not differ on BPVS score, in line with Natsopoulo, 
Christou, Koutselini, Raftopoulos, and Karefillidou (2002) who found equivalent 
Raven’s scores in DS and TD groups matched on verbal ability. In contrast, the WS 
group obtained higher scores on the BPVS than the other two RCPM-matched 
groups, which is consistent with the findings of Brock, Jarrold, Farran, Laws, and 
Riby (2007), and in line with the well-recognised discrepancy between verbal and 
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nonverbal abilities in WS (e.g., Mervis et al., 2000; although this may not hold for 
all age groups; see Pezzini et al., 1999).  
 
BPVS scores were related to TOL scores in the TD and WS groups, but not in the 
DS group. The BPVS measures verbal ability, using concrete vocabulary. The 
significant association in TD and WS groups might reflect the use of a verbal 
strategy, while the lack of significant correlation in the DS group suggests a 
dissociation between vocabulary and problem-solving abilities in this group. This 
is in line with Laws and Lawrence (2001) who did not find a link between verbal 
MA and drawing abilities in a DS group (while it was present in TD controls), and 
also with the suggestion by Laws (2002) of individuals with DS being less likely to 
use a verbal strategy than controls. Individuals with WS have also been suggested 
to use verbal mediation during tasks (anecdotally, Atkinson et al., 2003; Bellugi et 
al., 1994). However, given that the BPVS measures the knowledge of individual 
object-word associations, further research would be needed to elucidate whether 
a link between BPVS and TOL score necessarily points to the use of a verbal 
strategy (also see Section 3.3.4.3 for data regarding verbalisations during 
problem solving). 
2.4.5 Planning 
The TOL is largely known as a planning task (e.g., Shallice, 1982; Unterrainer & 
Owen, 2006) and has been found to be related to performance on the Porteus 
Maze Test, also thought to measure nonverbal planning (Krikorian et al., 1994) 
although the role of planning has been challenged in the TOL (Phillips, 1999; 
Phillips et al., 2001). Some versions of the task have required planning ahead, 
either in the task set-up or the instructions (Kaller, Rahm, Bolkenius, & 
Unterrainer, 2009; Klahr & Robinson, 1981) while others note that when not 
given instructions about strategies, people are likely to use a perceptual strategy 
which, rather than planning ahead, involves step-by-step ‘online’ planning (on the 
Tower of Hanoi, TOH; Goel & Grafman, 1995; see chapter 1 for more information 
regarding strategies). 
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In this study, the planning task was designed to require pre-planning, while the 
TOL procedure was deliberately set up to be a problem-solving task not 
necessitating pre-planning. As such, no information regarding the minimum 
number of moves required to solve a problem was given; no time limit was given; 
no instructions requiring people to plan, before executing their plan, were given. 
While self-correction was allowed in both the planning and TOL tasks (to a 
certain extent), the difference in the two tests lay in the requirement in the 
planning task to make all one’s moves before any journey from start (van in 
centre) to goal (all boxes delivered), while in the TOL, moves could be made one 
move at a time, and thus plans could be made ‘on-line’ or updated throughout the 
execution of the task. 
 
The WS and TD matched groups did not differ on planning scores, and 
correlations with TOL score were found for both groups, with better planning 
scores associated with improved TOL performance. At first glance, this pattern of 
results would suggest typical-looking planning processes in WS (in relation to 
MA). However the developmental trajectory approach affords analysis of the 
relationship between the two sets of scores between the groups, revealing 
significantly better TOL scores in the TD than the WS group from the outset of the 
developmental trajectory, as well as differences in the rates of development of 
problem solving with planning score. With each incremental increase in planning 
ability, the accompanying improvement in TOL score was greater for the WS 
group than the TD group, thus enabling them to essentially catch up to the TD 
group in their planning performance over developmental time. Indeed, while as a 
group, planning performance did not differ from that of the RCPM-matched 
control group, problem solving on the TOL was poorer in the WS than the TD 
group. These results together suggest that the planning score was a limiting factor 
for problem solving in WS at the lowest levels of planning ability, but that this 
does not wholly account for poorer TOL scores in relation to the TD group (see 
Section 2.4.6 below).  
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On the planning task, the DS group mean was significantly lower than that of the 
TD group. More than half of the DS group obtained a score of 1 on this task, 
indicating that they could successfully complete the experimental trial with two 
houses, but not three houses. The demonstration involved delivering to one 
house, and the practice trial to two houses. As many participants with DS could 
not deliver to three houses, this might indicate that many of them were unable to 
plan ahead by three steps, or could point to a difficulty with extending the 
strategy from the 1 and 2 house deliveries to trials with more houses. The lack of 
association between the two tasks in the DS group could be due to the low level of 
variance in planning score in this group. Alternatively, difficulties with planning 
might have meant that the DS group used an alternative step-by-step perceptual 
strategy instead of attempting to plan.  
 
Poor DS performance on this task, taken alongside the equivalent TOL 
performance to the matched TD group, indicates that participants with DS were 
able to solve TOL problems to the same level as the TD group without the same 
capability to plan ahead. This is in contrast to the WS group, who were equally 
able to plan but less able to solve TOL problems than the controls. The different 
patterns of performance between planning and TOL scores found for both 
atypical groups (although in different ways) indicate that difficulties with 
planning ahead may be able to be successfully compensated for by individuals 
with DS, while  individuals with WS are reliant on planning ability for problem 
solving at low planning levels.   
 
In the current study, planning for the DS group, and TOL performance for the WS 
group, was the ability that showed the most impairment, being at lower levels 
than that of their MA-matched controls. The other of these two abilities (i.e., 
planning in the WS group; TOL performance in the DS group) was not 
significantly different to that of controls. It should be noted that equivalent 
performance to that of (often younger) MA-matched controls still indicates 
impairment relative to CA expectations; that is, both WS and DS groups showed 
impairment on both planning and TOL performance. 
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The differences seen in the patterns of performance across groups also speak to 
the planning/problem-solving distinction in the literature, suggesting that, at 
least for this particular TOL paradigm, the TOL was not simply a planning task (in 
line with intentions). This highlights the need to consider the particular 
administration of the task when identifying which abilities are important for the 
TOL. Had participants been told the minimum number of moves, or indeed only 
been allowed to make the correct number of moves, planning may have been 
drawn on much more strongly. Telling participants the minimum number of 
moves “focuses participants on the need for careful planning” (Berg & Byrd, 2002, 
p. 596). Planning times are longer when instructions to mentally plan first, and 
information about the number of moves, are given, than when they are not 
(Phillips et al., 2001). Whether this affects TOL performance is subject to debate 
(Phillips et al., 2001; Unterrainer et al., 2003). 
2.4.6 Working memory 
In the current study, forwards memory tasks were unsurprisingly completed 
more successfully than backwards memory tasks. As backwards tasks have 
additional requirements over forwards tasks (often recognised as measuring 
working memory, requiring manipulation of items, rather than simply short-term 
memory) this is consistent with expectations.  
 
The interaction between Modality and Group reflects the pattern of findings 
existing in the literature. Poorer performance on the block span tasks in the WS 
group (both in comparison to the performance of the other two groups and in 
relation to their score on digit span tasks) and the same pattern of poor 
performance on the digit span tasks in the DS group, reflects the 
verbal/visuospatial unevenness seen in the cognitive profiles of the two disorders 
(e.g., Wang & Bellugi, 1994). Better spatial than verbal performance on the 
backwards tasks in the DS and TD groups suggests that spatial, rather than verbal, 
presentation appears to have been helpful. Visual prompting is likely to be a more 
helpful support strategy than auditory support in DS (Fidler & Nadel, 2007; also 
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see Laws, 2002 regarding potential visual, rather than verbal, reliance for colour 
memory in DS) and visual prompts are generally known to reduce working 
memory demands in the typical population. For the DS group this spatial strength 
also applies (less strongly) to the forwards tasks. It might be that visual 
prompting only becomes helpful for the TD group on the more difficult backwards 
tasks, while the DS group struggle with verbal presentations regardless of task 
difficulty, so visual support reliably increases performance. Interestingly, the WS 
group showed the opposite pattern, with digit span tasks being easier than block 
span tasks in both directions. Thus, visual prompting may be a less helpful 
support strategy for individuals with WS. 
 
WS performance was worse than that of typical controls for both forwards and 
backwards block span tasks, and DS performance was only worse than that of 
controls on the forwards version of the digit span task. Better WS than DS digit 
span and the reverse pattern for block span was seen for forwards but not 
backwards tasks, suggesting that the requirement to reverse the items in working 
memory rendered syndrome-specific differences undetectable.  
 
The working memory findings in WS and DS are broadly consistent with existing 
literature, with some discrepancies that are likely to be due to differences in 
matching measures (e.g., Sampaio et al., 2008), tasks used (e.g., Carney et al., 
2013) or in scoring methods  (e.g., Costanzo et al., 2013; Menghini et al., 2010). 
For example, in Costanzo et al. (2013)’s study, WS and DS groups were also 
compared on forwards and backwards block and digit memory tasks. Both groups 
were poorer than controls on the block span tests, while only the WS group was 
poorer than controls in the current study; Costanzo and colleagues’ DS group 
were poorer than the WS group for both forwards and backwards digit tasks, with 
worse WS than TD backwards performance. The between-syndrome findings are 
partially consistent with the current findings of poorer DS than WS performance 
to the forwards, but not backwards, test while no significant differences were 
found in the current study on the backwards digit span test. One reason for these 
discrepancies could be that Costanzo and colleagues used a scoring system that 
129 
 
takes the number of correctly repeated sequences into account as well as the 
highest span achieved. 
 
For the WS and TD groups only, better scores on the backwards block span task 
were related to better TOL scores. Whilst trajectories were unsuitable for 
comparison, the combination in the WS group of low ability on this task and 
correlation with TOL performance suggests that visuospatial manipulation of 
items in working memory may be a limiting factor for TOL problem solving. 
Potential reasons for the lack of correlation in the DS group could be a low level of 
variance in DS scores on the task (ranging from 2 to 4), or alternatively a 
difference in problem-solving style: if people with DS are not attempting to 
manipulate items in working memory to help them with the task (e.g., visualising 
where pieces will be placed) then a lack of correlation would be expected. 
However, given the correlation between backwards digit span and TOL score in 
this group, this explanation seems unlikely.  
 
While the relationships between backwards digit span and TOL score should not 
be interpreted too strongly due to their marginally significant nature, they are 
interesting because this was the only measure to demonstrate a relationship with 
the TOL for all three groups. Significant performance differences on this task were 
also not seen between groups. This suggests that something in the requirement to 
reproduce a sequence of digits in reverse may have been inherent in the ability to 
solve TOL problems. The candidates for this could either be reversing items in 
memory or remembering sequences of digits. As forwards digit span, requiring 
the latter without the former, was only related to TOL score in the TD group, the 
most likely candidate seems to be reversing items in memory. One plausible 
interpretation of why reversing items in memory might contribute to TOL 
performance might be scenarios in which items need to be temporarily placed in 
a different order to that which is eventually required in the goal state. 
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The presence of a relationship between working memory (i.e., backwards span) 
measures and TOL performance in TD children partially supports the suspicions 
of Bull et al. (2004) and Kaller et al. (2008), who did not find relationships 
between forwards digit span measures (storage) and TOL performance, and 
suggested that TOL performance may depend more on working memory 
requiring manipulation of items (e.g., backwards tasks) in young children. 
However, in contrast to their findings, in the current study TOL was also related 
to forwards STM measures in the TD group. One reason for this discrepancy could 
be the wider age range of the TD group in the current study, compared to the 4-5 
year olds tested by Bull et al. (2004) and Kaller et al. (2008). If STM storage is 
more important for older children than younger children, this could account for 
the lack of relationship for forwards memory tasks previously found (indeed, 
some evidence for the importance of working memory for TOL performance in 
children aged 7-8 and above was found by Asato et al. (2006) and Lehto et al. 
(2003) while Bull et al. (2004) and Kaller et al. (2008) did not find this association 
for younger children).  
 
In the planning task participants were required to use the visual information 
available to them on the track to help them construct a plan for the sequence of 
items that would need to be delivered. It is therefore likely that the task was at 
least partly dependent on being able to visualise the route around the track, and 
manipulate items in working memory. The planning and backwards block span 
tasks seem to share a component of being able to mentally visualise and 
manipulate visuospatial items. Indeed, Kaller et al. (2004) note that, “as the 
planning process in the ToL relies on working memory involvement … 
confoundations with planning performance are likely” (p. 463). The reliance on 
these two abilities for TOL problem solving in the WS group thus seems intuitive, 
suggesting that the two tasks might be tapping into a similar underlying ability. 
The association between TOL performance and both of these tasks for this group 
suggests that the type of ability that these two tasks tap into is a limiting factor for 
the WS group in problem solving. 
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However, the WS group scored more poorly than controls on the backwards block 
span task, but not on the planning task. Individuals with WS are known to find 
tasks such as mental rotation difficult, while manual rotation is easier (Farran et 
al., 2001). Both backwards block span and planning tasks can be solved using 
mental manipulation, but the planning task also allows some use of a manual 
manipulation strategy. In the backwards block task, items must be immediately 
reproduced in reverse order, while in the planning task there is a phase in which 
the participant is loading items on the van, and it would be possible to use 
gestures in order to help, e.g., pointing to the house that would be needed next. It 
is possible that the WS group used manual manipulation as a compensatory 
strategy, with positive effects on planning task performance. 
 
The question then arises as to whether the relationships between the two 
measures and the TOL were due to the requirement to manipulate, due to a 
requirement to plan that is also present in the backwards block span task or due 
to difficulties with visuospatial skills per se. As backwards digit span was also 
positively related to TOL performance in the WS group, it seems unlikely that TOL 
difficulties are purely related to visuospatial skills. However, because the 
planning and the problem-solving task were both visuospatial, it is not possible to 
fully tease apart planning abilities from manipulating items in working memory. 
Future studies which also include either a verbal measure of planning ability or a 
verbal problem-solving task, would be able to start to tease these abilities apart: if 
planning in one modality was a limiting factor for problem solving in a different 
modality, we would be able to conclude that planning into the future was a 
limiting factor for problem solving in WS. 
2.4.7 Inhibition 
2.4.7.1 Group comparisons 
On the inhibition task, the accuracy data showed that performance was better in 
the Same condition than in the Opposite condition, as expected, reflecting the 
additional demands of the Opposite condition compared to the baseline Same 
condition. The lack of Group effect or Group by Condition interaction indicated 
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that the three matched groups performed at an equivalent level, and responded in 
a similar way for the two conditions. Furthermore, both atypical groups were at 
ceiling for the Same condition (although for the WS group the difference from 
ceiling approached significance), indicating that they were able to complete this 
condition with ease. The difference in proportional accuracy change between 
conditions did not reach significance between groups.  
 
The pattern of results was similar for the RT data: RTs were longer to the 
Opposite condition than to the Same condition, as expected, with no significant 
condition by group interaction or group effect, although after excluding outliers, 
the DS group RTs were longer than those of the WS group. Baseline RTs were also 
longer in the DS group than in the WS group, excluding outliers. The change in RT 
measure exhibited a trend towards a greater proportional increase to the 
Opposite than Same condition in the WS than TD group. For the WS group only, 
accuracy and RT were correlated in the opposite condition of the inhibition task, 
such that better accuracy was related to longer RTs. Put another way, responding 
quickly (impulsively) was related to poorer outcomes.  
Although the WS group scored just as highly as the TD matched group on the 
inhibition task and did not take longer to respond per se, the relative increase in 
RT from the Same to the Opposite condition was marginally greater in the WS 
than TD group. This pattern and the avoidance of impulsive responding for better 
performance are partially consistent with previous findings of difficulties with 
inhibition in WS, reflected either by longer response times to inhibition tasks, e.g., 
to the Opposite world test measuring verbal inhibition (Menghini et al., 2010) and 
to the visuospatial inhibition task of Carney et al. (2013) (although Carney and 
colleagues did not find this effect for the verbal task) or by more errors than 
controls when response times are equivalent, e.g., on Go-NoGo and Stroop tasks 
measuring visuospatial inhibition (Menghini et al., 2010). This suggests the use of 
a more deliberate strategy in the Opposite condition by this group to enable 
success. It is possible that difficulties with inhibition, often found in WS, mean 
that to compensate for this they need to take longer to complete the task in order 
to score correctly. They may need to draw on a verbal strategy in order to do this, 
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which would thus take more time. As mentioned above, the use of verbal 
mediation in WS has been suggested previously (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2003). 
 
For the DS group, responses were slow compared to the WS group, but unlike the 
WS group, this was not related to their accuracy, and might indicate a generally 
slower responding style (cf. Gibson, 1991, cited in Cody & Kamphaus, 1999) 
rather than a particular strategy. 
 
The current study used a nonverbal inhibition task. The finding of equivalent DS 
performance to that of controls is consistent with the findings of other studies 
using nonverbal inhibition measures (Carney et al., 2013; Pennington et al., 
2003), while weaker inhibition in DS has often been found in studies using verbal 
tasks (e.g., Lanfranchi et al., 2010), which reflects the cognitive profile of better 
visuospatial than verbal skills in DS. Indeed, Costanzo et al. (2013) found this 
pattern of impaired verbal but not visuospatial inhibition in the same study. 
However, this pattern is not always manifest: for example Carney et al. (2013) did 
not find DS impairments on the verbal version of their inhibition task, while Rowe 
et al. (2006) did find DS impairments on a motor inhibition task, although 
differences in tasks or matching measures are likely to account for this (e.g., Rowe 
and colleagues compared their DS group to learning-disabled controls). 
2.4.7.2 Relationships between inhibition and TOL Score 
2.4.7.2.1 The TD group 
It was noted by Huizinga et al. (2006) and Miyake et al. (2000) that inhibition is 
likely to be drawn on when solving tower-based tasks when instructions are not 
given regarding which strategy to use (although it should be noted that this is 
with respect to the TOH task). This is because when not given such instructions, 
people tend to use a perceptual strategy (Goel & Grafman, 1995), that is, moving 
towards the perceptual similarity one step at a time, for which inhibition is 
needed in order to avoid making moves that appear to be helpful but are not. As 
such instructions are not given in the current study this would suggest that 
inhibition would be needed, especially in light of previous findings of inhibition 
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demands in TOL tasks for young children (Baughman & Cooper, 2007; Bull et al., 
2004).  
 
The TD participants were able to complete the inhibition task with ease. RTs were 
longer in the Opposite condition than in the Same condition, so there was clearly 
an impact of the requirement to inhibit matching and choose the alternative 
image. TOL scores were related to longer RTs but not to better accuracy on the 
Opposite condition, which is unsurprising as RT is the more sensitive measure. 
However the RT to the Same condition, or the baseline speed of response, was 
also related to TOL score for this group, while the measure designed to index the 
impact of the inhibition condition over the baseline condition, the proportional 
change in RT between the two conditions, was not related to TOL score. Assuming 
that the proportional change measure was successful in indexing this difference, 
this suggests that both the correlation between RT Opposite and TOL score and 
between RT Same and TOL score stem from the response speed rather than from 
the requirement to inhibit. Because the correlation coefficient was greater for the 
Opposite condition than for the Same condition, this also suggests that the 
Opposite condition RT contributes something above and beyond simple response 
speed. It is possible that an additional contribution of extra attentional resources 
or working memory (remembering to press the different picture rather than the 
same one) accounted for the difference between scores on the two conditions, 
(perhaps above the difference due to the requirement to inhibit): rather, TD 
children may have been able to ‘set’ a rule at the start of the Opposite condition 
and remember to follow it (cf. Bishop et al., 2001).  
 
Bishop et al. (2001) measured inhibition in children using the Opposite World 
test from the test of everyday attention for children (TEA-Ch). In this test, 
children are first required to say ‘1’ when shown number 1 and ‘2’ when shown 
number 2. Subsequently, they are asked to produce the reverse response (e.g., ‘1’ 
when shown ‘2’). Although a verbal test, this has clear similarities to the present 
inhibition task. Tower of Hanoi (TOH) performance was unrelated to Opposite 
world test performance in Bishop’s study. Although the TOH and TOL are not 
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equivalent tests (Bull et al., 2004), Bishop suggested that the type of inhibition 
that the Opposite world test taps into is too simple to be compared to the type of 
inhibition required in the TOH: rather than shifting between goals and sub-goals 
on the tower task, children just need to “maintain a response set that involves 
doing the opposite of what is customary” (p. 555) to perform the Opposite world 
test. Indeed, the presence of a correlation between shifting and TOL score for the 
TD group in the current study supports Bishop et al. (2001)’s assertions.  
 
The finding of RT to the Opposite condition, but not the change in RT between 
conditions, being related to TOL score is consistent with that of Bull et al. (2004), 
who found that when controlling for baseline speed of naming items in their 
inhibition task, the correlation between inhibition latency and TOL score lost its 
significance for young TD children (although inhibition was still related as 
problems became more complex). A link between response time, or processing 
speed, and TOL score in the group of typical children might well be expected, in 
light of previous literature: typical development of processing speed sees rapid 
increases throughout childhood and is linked to increases in fluid intelligence, via 
increases in working memory (Fry & Hale, 2000) (developing in a nonlinear 
fashion with respect to CA over the lifespan). Asato et al. (2006) also found some 
evidence of a link between processing speed (time to initiate a visually guided 
saccade) and TOL performance, but only in 4-move problems. Taken together 
with the present outcomes, these findings suggest that response speed is an 
important consideration to take into account.  
2.4.7.2.2 The atypical groups 
On the inhibition task, for the WS group there was an association between better 
TOL scores and: better accuracy to the Opposite condition; smaller drops in 
accuracy from the same to the opposite condition, measured by the proportional 
change in accuracy; and, marginally, longer RTs to the opposite condition, after 
excluding outliers. We also know that, also after excluding outliers, better 
accuracy and longer RTs on the opposite condition were related to one another 
for this group. Thus, it may be that the individuals with WS who were taking more 
time to respond correctly to the inhibition task were also the individuals who 
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obtained better scores on the TOL task. Inhibition may be related to problem 
solving in WS in that by avoiding impulsive responding, individuals are more able 
to consider the appropriate response. As the inhibition task did not appear to 
successfully tap into inhibition abilities in the TD group, it is difficult to say 
whether the WS association is typical or not. 
 
Interestingly, the correlation between slower Opposite RTs and better TOL scores 
for the WS group is in the reverse direction to that of the TD group, for whom 
faster Opposite RTs were associated with better TOL scores. In addition, there 
was a lack of association between RT Same and TOL score in the WS group, while 
this association was present in the TD group. As we have seen in the literature 
discussed above, processing speed is important for TD cognitive abilities, but 
baseline speed of response does not appear to have been important for problem 
solving in the WS group. This potentially reflects atypical cognitive processing in 
the WS group, or could mean that any association between faster processing and 
better scores in this group has been diluted through the potential strategy, 
discussed above, of deliberately slower responding in order to avoid impulsive 
responding and obtain better scores. 
 
For the DS group, the relationship between RT Same and TOL score was not only 
present and in the same direction as in the TD group, with the trajectory analysis 
revealing similar relationships between the measures for both groups, but it was 
the only measure to show a statistically significant association with TOL score for 
this group. This seems to indicate that when many skills need to be combined, e.g., 
in order to solve a problem, speed of information processing was the most 
important factor for success for the DS group. This is consistent with previous 
findings of slow information processing in DS (Gibson, 1991, cited in Cody & 
Kamphaus, 1999). Interestingly, Karmiloff-Smith (1998) suggested that DS may 
reflect a “failure to progressively specialise or modularize as a function of 
development” (p. 391). If this was the case, a relationship between general 
processing speed, rather than other abilities, and higher-level task performance 
could reflect this.  
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Studies of processing speed and working memory in typical children, (all cited in 
Fry & Hale, 2000), have indicated that increases in processing speed with age 
seem to account for much of the age-related increase in articulation rate (Hulme 
et al., 1984) and that processing speed serves to mediate the relationship 
between articulation rate and memory span (Kail, 1992). Moreover, both spatial 
and verbal processing speed predicted both spatial and verbal memory span to a 
similar degree, so this appears to be modality-general (Chuah & Maybery, 1999). 
Thus, it is possible that, in the TD group, the relationship between the RT 
measures and the TOL are interrelated to working memory span: for example, 
faster processing facilitating faster articulation rates (covert rehearsal) and 
allowing higher working memory spans, which facilitates TOL problem solving. In 
DS, the possibility that verbal memory deficits can be attributed to slow 
articulation rates has been refuted, for example by Jarrold, Baddeley, and Hewes 
(2000), who found evidence against a link between memory span and articulation 
rates in DS: verbal STM was impaired in DS compared to both TD children 
younger than 7 (before rehearsal begins to occur developmentally) and to 
individuals with similar articulation rates. However, in the present study, a 
measure of processing speed (RT Same) and memory span (backwards digit 
span) were both correlated with the TOL score in the DS group (backwards digit 
span, marginally so) and were also weakly related to one another. This raises the 
possibility that slow processing speed in DS (seen in the slower DS than WS RTs 
on the inhibition task) is related to difficulties with verbal memory, which both 
impact on TOL score. However this does not explain why forwards digit span was 
unrelated to TOL score in the DS group. It should also be noted that backwards 
digit span (requiring manipulation of items in working memory, as well as verbal 
memory span) was weakly related to TOL score in all three groups. A slow 
processing speed/poor verbal memory account of TOL performance for the DS 
group is therefore unlikely to be the whole story, and is unlikely to be unique to 
DS.  
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The inhibition task is an example of an instance in which identifying and 
removing outliers affected the pattern of results (here, removing participants 
identified as outliers for the RT data brought the group comparison to reach 
significance). In general, dealing with outliers presents its own challenge, in 
which a trade-off comes into play between discarding data points which are 
unrepresentative and may be masking true effects, and including data points 
which there is no reason to suppose are erroneous. Here, the approach taken was 
to present the analyses both before and after the exclusion of outliers in order to 
make both scenarios available to the reader.  
2.4.8 Shifting 
The number of shifts that were made did not differ across the three matched 
groups. This is consistent with the findings of Carney et al. (2013), who compared 
both WS and DS performance to that of TD children. 
 
For the DS group, this is also broadly consistent with the findings of Pennington et 
al. (2003), who found equivalent performance on tasks purported to measure 
pre-frontal cortex (PFC) functioning (but not hippocampal functioning) in a DS 
group compared to a TD group matched on overall MA (recall that neither RCPM 
nor BPVS scores differed between the DS and TD groups here). Unfortunately, 
their study did not include a specific measure of shifting. In those studies that 
have included shifting tasks (Lanfranchi et al., 2010; Rowe et al., 2006), DS groups 
have performed more poorly than their comparison groups. However, it seems 
that differences in task administration and group matching measures could 
account for these discrepancies. This is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the 
first study to specifically compare shifting abilities in a DS group compared to a 
nonverbal ability-matched TD group. 
 
Similarly, impairments in shifting abilities in WS compared to controls was found 
by Menghini et al. (2010) and Rhodes et al. (2010). Again, matching measures and 
tasks differed to the current study. In Menghini et al. (2010)’s study, although 
visuospatial shifting was poorer than that of controls, verbal shifting was not 
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significantly different from that of controls, matched on a nonverbal MA measure. 
It is therefore possible that the participants with WS were able to use a verbal 
strategy to help them with the shifting task in the current study. Rhodes et al. 
(2010) found poorer WS shifting performance compared to a verbal-MA matched 
group, which might be expected as the measure (part of the CANTAB battery) was 
primarily nonverbal. As the study in question used a verbal age-matched group 
and the current study involved a nonverbal age-matched group, and the shifting 
tasks are both presented primarily non-verbally, it might be concluded that the 
WS group’s nonverbal shifting ability should be expected to be in line with 
nonverbal mental age, as found here, but lower than would be expected for verbal 
MA, as found in Rhodes et al.’s study. Further research would be needed to 
detangle the effects of different comparison groups and tasks. 
 
Shifting was related to TOL performance in the TD group, but in neither of the 
atypical groups. Shifting has been found to be related to TOL performance in 
typical children previously (e.g., Bull et al., 2004) so this is in line with 
expectations. Regarding the atypical groups, one possible reason for the lack of 
relationship might stem from the relative differences in success with the task 
across groups. While matched group shifting performance did not differ, only 
20% of participants with WS and 33% of participants with DS were able to make 
1 shift or more in phase 2, while the others either did not pass phase 1 or did not 
make any shifts in phase 2, compared to 68.5% of the entire TD group. The later 
phases require the discovery and adherence to rules, which is also required in the 
WCST (i.e., the adult version) while the DCCS, developed for children, involves 
telling children the rule they now need to follow each time it changes. In the TOL, 
there are no instructions regarding when to shift your attention between 
different aspects of the task (e.g., the overall goal, individual subgoals). Therefore, 
it may be that the type of shifting required on the TOL was better tapped into by 
the later phases of the task. Alternatively, individuals in the atypical groups may 
not be drawing on shifting. 
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2.4.9 Chapter summary 
In summary, different patterns of EF performance and relationships between CA, 
MA and EF measures and the TOL task have been identified across WS, DS and TD 
groups, with the developmental trajectory approach revealing some differences 
as well as similarities in relationships between measures. On the TOL, poorer WS 
but equivalent DS performance was identified compared to a nonverbal MA 
matched TD control group. Many EF and MA measures were related to TOL 
performance for the typical group, as expected. While backwards digit span was 
marginally related to TOL score in all three groups, fewer significant relationships 
were observed for the atypical groups: indeed for the DS group, only RT to the 
Same condition of the inhibition task showed a reliable relationship with TOL 
score, highlighting the importance of processing speed, which was also thought to 
be important for the TD group. There were rather more significant relationships 
for the WS group. As well as a significant association between BPVS and TOL 
score, the inhibition task revealed a potential role of impulsive processing, 
suggested by the slightly elevated impact of the opposite condition on RT and the 
association between speed and accuracy, and between RT and TOL scores. For the 
WS group there were also significant relationships between backwards block 
span and planning task performance and the TOL, suggesting a limiting role of 
visuospatial working memory, and revealing an atypical relationship between 
planning task scores and TOL performance such that when an individual was poor 
at the planning task, this had a stronger adverse effect on TOL proficiency than for 
individuals who were relatively good at planning. Interestingly, Rhodes et al. 
(2010) did not find associations between EF tasks (one of which was a TOL-like 
task) in a WS group, while they did for typical children. Here the WS group did 
show some associations between the TOL and other EF tasks. This may be due to 
differences in tasks used and measurements taken, and warrants further research 
to account for the differences in patterns of association. For the DS group, 
planning task performance was poorer than that of the matched TD group, but 
unrelated to TOL performance, which may have arisen from a low level of 
variance in planning scores for this group, or a reduced reliance on planning 
because it is impaired, which may have led to compensation. RCPM score was the 
strongest predictor of TOL performance in the typical group but was unrelated to 
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TOL scores in both atypical groups, emphasising the atypicality of the patterns of 
relationships in WS and DS groups. 
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CHAPTER 3:  EXPLORING PERFORMANCE ON THE 
TOWER OF LONDON TASK 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, ways of measuring performance on the TOL, beyond the scores 
used in Chapter 2, are presented. Performance on a number of facets of TOL 
performance, and behaviours exhibited during TOL problem solving, is examined 
and discussed, with the aim of using these more sensitive measures to understand 
the processes operating during problem solving in Williams syndrome (WS), 
Down syndrome (DS) and typical development (TD). Each of these measures is 
reviewed in this introduction section. 
3.1.1 Problem types 
One reason for the development of the TOL was to provide a set of problems of 
different levels of difficulty (Shallice, 1982). Therefore, an overall score is likely to 
come from scores on a combination of different difficulty trials. Depending on the 
study’s administration, it may be possible to obtain similar overall scores by 
scoring differently on different types of problems. For example, when measuring 
the number of trials correct, a score of say, four, could arise from correct 
performance on one of each of 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-move problems, or from two 2-
move and two 3-move problems being scored correctly. As the former involves 
the correct solving of more difficult problems it merits more acknowledgement of 
success than the latter. Group performance has been shown to vary according to 
problem type: for example, a WS group was found to make more moves than 
controls on 3-, 4- and 5-move problems, but not on 2-move problems (Rhodes et 
al., 2010). 
 
This matter is further complicated when we consider the concept of difficulty in 
the context of the TOL. As we have already seen, difficulty in this task can 
manifest in a variety of ways, represented by the properties that different 
problems can have (see Section 1.2.2.3). Several authors have emphasised the 
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inadequacy of the minimum number of moves as the sole indicator of task 
difficulty (e.g., Kaller et al., 2004; Berg et al., 2010). 
 
Different processes are also likely to be required to solve problems with different 
properties (e.g., Kaller et al., 2004). For example, solving TOL problems with more 
counterintuitive moves (that is, temporary moves away from the goal state; see 
Section 1.2.2.3.1) demanded greater inhibition abilities in children (Bull et al., 
2004) and were associated with longer preplanning times in adults (Phillips, 
1999). As discussed in Chapter 2, the current problem set included problems that 
were carefully controlled for, or systematically varied, with respect to several 
parameters of TOL problems (see Appendix A). Therefore, there is good reason to 
investigate both relative performance on problems of different types, and the 
relationship between scores on different problem types and EF measures. 
3.1.2 Scoring 
Various ways of scoring the TOL have also been employed in a variety of studies 
(see Section 1.2.2.3.4). Berg and Byrd (2002) recommended using several 
measures of performance simultaneously when administering the TOL task. 
Hughes (2002) noted the value, but scarcity in existing research, of the inclusion 
of observational measures of performance on the TOL task (e.g., rule violations) 
alongside the scoring measures. Some scoring measures beyond measures of 
accuracy are thus addressed in this section and used in the subsequent analysis.  
3.1.2.1 Timing 
Timing measures are widely used in TOL or TOH studies (e.g., Kaller et al., 2004; 
Newman & Pittman, 2007; Spitz, Minsky, & Bessellieu, 1985). Planning time (‘first 
move time’) represents the time elapsing before solving proper occurs, 
sometimes used to represent the time from the presentation of the goal to the end 
of the first move (Berg & Byrd, 2002) and sometimes, to the beginning of the first 
move (e.g., Huizinga et al., 2006). Planning time may change with age: Asato et al. 
(2006) report shorter planning times (‘initial thinking time’) in children than 
adolescents or adults for the most difficult problems, although Culbertson and 
Zillmer (1998) did not find changes in planning time with age from 7 to 12 years.  
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Asato et al. (2006) noted that spending longer on initial thinking time was related 
to solving problems in fewer moves, and the authors point out that this is 
particularly true for children, who spent less time on initial thinking than the 
other groups and made more moves when problems were more difficult.  
 
Planning time has also been found to be affected by different problem 
parameters: for example, it was found to increase in problems with more 
ambiguous goal hierarchies (with flat-ending goals being the most ambiguous, 
and tower-ending the least ambiguous; see Section 1.2.2.3.1); and in the presence 
of non-optimal alternative solutions (Kaller et al., 2004), while for typical adults, 
longer planning times in the context of instructions to plan one’s moves fully did 
not improve TOL solution efficiency (Phillips et al., 2001). Longer planning time 
could either reflect difficulties with putting a plan together, or could reflect 
careful planning ahead (Berg & Byrd, 2002 and references therein). Berg and 
Byrd (2002) also note that combining measures can help to separate out these 
possibilities – e.g., by examining associations between TOL score and planning 
time (cf. Ward & Allport, 1997). 
 
Execution time (variously called, e.g., ‘move time’, ‘subsequent thinking time’) is 
the time elapsing from the end of planning time to the end of the solution. In 
Culbertson and Zillmer (1998)’s study, for children aged 7-12 years planning time 
remained constant, but younger children spent longer than older children on 
execution time. Of course, motor speed differences could account for some 
variations in the time taken to execute moves. Some authors (e.g., Asato et al., 
2006; Rhodes et al., 2010) were able to control for motor speed using a yoked 
control condition as part of the CANTAB battery of tests. Asato et al. (2006) found 
that children spent longer on execution time than adults or adolescents.  
 
Together, planning and execution time combined give the overall time to 
complete a solution. Anderson et al. (1996)’s raw score was produced by 
awarding points based on the total solution time (more points for faster solving), 
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and subtracting the number of failed attempts. Increases in score were found 
between 7 and 9, and 11 and 12 years of age in typical children. Using total 
solution times will of course mask the relative contributions of planning and 
execution time, while combining measures to produce scores can also make 
interpretation difficult (cf. Berg & Byrd, 2002). Fortunately, Anderson and 
colleagues (1996) also analysed constituent measures, e.g., planning time and the 
number of failed attempts. However, this is not always the case: from the studies 
reporting timing measures from the TOL in WS and DS groups, two reported total 
time measures (Costanzo et al., 2013; Menghini et al., 2010) and another assigned 
scores for time-based categories (Rowe et al., 2006). Only one divided total time 
into its constituent planning and execution times (Rhodes et al., 2010), revealing 
longer planning time in a WS and chronological age-matched (CM) group than a 
verbal age-matched (VM) group (who had a lower mean chronological age than 
the other two groups). These outcomes also varied by problem type: the WS 
group took more planning time for 2- and 3-move problems than the other two 
groups did, but not for 4- or 5-move problems (while for these problems, the CM 
group time was longer than the VM group time). Thinking time (once pieces had 
begun being moved) was longer in the WS group than both control groups for 
problems of each number of moves.  
 
Studies comparing a WS group to controls matched on nonverbal ability did not 
find group differences in total times to solution (Costanzo et al., 2013; Menghini 
et al., 2010) while in Costanzo et al. (2013)’s study, longer total solution times 
emerged in their DS group compared to their WS and TD groups. Rowe et al. 
(2006) used a scoring system which awards points based on the time taken to 
solve a problem (similar to that of Anderson et al., 1996 above), and found that DS 
scores were lower (i.e., taking more time) than those of verbal-matched learning 
disabled controls. 
 
Thus, timing measures can further our understanding of the processes operating 
during problem solving, although they will not provide definitive indications of 
such processes. WS and DS groups have previously shown different patterns of 
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response on tower-based tasks with respect to timing, compared to control 
groups. Splitting total time measures into separate planning and execution 
components is likely to provide more information than using total duration alone. 
3.1.2.2 Rule violations (RVs) 
The TOL requires that several rules are followed during the task, e.g., only one 
piece must be moved at a time. Measuring the number of times such rules are 
violated thus forms another way in which TOL performance can be assessed. 
Numbers of RVs were at low levels on the TOH task in children: e.g., 0.358 on 
average for 7-8 year olds and 0.177 for 13-15 year olds (Bishop et al., 2001). The 
mean number of rule violations increased from 0.7 for 35-year-old adults to 3.2 
for 80-year-old adults, for the participants who were able to solve the 5-disc TOH 
(Ronnlund, Lovden, & Nilsson, 2001). While these are greater numbers of rule 
violations for adults than for children, which is unexpected, this could have been 
due to differences in the tasks administered: Bishop administered several trials of 
increasing difficulty with three or four discs, while Rönnlund used one 5-disc TOH 
task. Descriptive rule violation data were not reported for participants who were 
unable to solve the task. However, it was noted that age accounted for around 2% 
more of the variance in rule violations when non-solvers were included in the 
analysis than when they were not. Age, however, lost its significance as a 
predictor when the effect of other variables (gender, block design performance, 
word fluency, recall) was analysed. 
 
Culbertson and Zillmer (1998) found that the number of RVs did not change with 
age for a TD control group, but decreased with age for a group of children with 
ADHD aged 7-12 years, while children with ADHD made more RVs than typical 
controls of the same age range (Culbertson & Zillmer, 1998), and there is further 
evidence of more RVs being made in other clinical populations compared to 
controls, e.g., in frontal lobe dementia (Carlin et al., 2000). However in Riccio, 
Wolfe, Romine, Davis, and Sullivan (2004)’s study, adults with ADHD did not 
differ from control and clinical disorder groups on TOL measures (including RVs) 
and RVs were associated with IQ, perceptual organisation, processing speed and 
matrix reasoning for the groups combined. 
147 
 
Children aged 7 years who were identified as ‘hard to manage’ at age 4 were less 
accurate than controls on a Go-NoGo task measuring inhibition, and made more 
RVs than controls on the SOC task (analogous to the TOL), while SOC scores per se 
did not differ between the groups (Brophy, Taylor, & Hughes, 2002). Baughman 
and Cooper (2007), citing data from Waldau (1999) in which 3-4 year old 
children made significantly more RVs than 5-6 year old children, produced a 
computational model in which increases in inhibition skills with age can account 
for differences seen in the RVs made between the age groups, and suggest that the 
inability to inhibit straightforward (yet incorrect) TOL strategies plays an 
important role in young children’s TOL performance, including the violation of 
rules. 
3.1.2.3 Errors 
Another interesting way of understanding performance on the TOL is to consider 
the type of error that is made. Not much attention has been paid to this in existing 
literature. One exception is Welsh (1991), who examined errors occurring during 
TOH problem solving, which led solvers away from the optimum path for the 
solution, finding that children of all ages (3-12) exhibited the same types of errors 
on each problem. In the current study, participants could fail an item by solving it 
incorrectly, by making more than the maximum number of moves allowed, or by 
choosing to end a trial that they were unable to solve. Differences in error 
patterns are likely to provide clues about the problem-solving processes that 
occur across groups, and the approach taken by the individual.  
3.1.2.4 Further measures of TOL performance 
Some further types of behaviour that are addressed in the current study during 
the TOL task are outlined here: two different types of move and a measure of 
verbalisations made during the task. While most moves simply move a piece from 
one peg to another, Berg and Byrd (2002) identified ‘incomplete moves’, which 
involve picking up a ball and putting it back on the same peg. It may indicate 
“impulsivity or lack of planning” (p. 601) and they note that this type of move 
occurs more often in children than in adults. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this type of move has not been measured in atypical populations.  
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The ‘backup move’ involves moving a piece from peg A to peg B, and returning it 
to peg A on the very next move. This type of move was observed by Klahr (1985) 
on the dog-cat-mouse puzzle (designed to be analogous to TOH puzzles in which 
the order of piece placement to reach the solution was ambiguous) in children 
aged 45-70 months. Klahr noted that while backup moves do not change the net 
state of the puzzle, and are thus not helpful for moving towards the solution, they 
are nevertheless useful when a participant has realised that the first move was 
incorrect and can correct their move. Low levels of backup moves were found 
overall in Klahr’s study.  
 
Private speech, which guides one’s own behaviour, is thought to decline with 
increasing age, as it becomes more covert, and becomes inner speech, which is an 
internalised form (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, cited in Lidstone, Meins, & Fernyhough, 
2010). Winsler and Naglieri (2003) examined verbal problem-solving strategies 
on the Planned Connections subtest of the Cognitive Assessment System (CAS; 
Naglieri & Das, 1997) in children aged 5 to 17 years, and found that private 
speech became increasingly covert with increasing age. Given the relatively good 
verbal skills in WS and suggested verbal mediation in this group (Atkinson et al., 
2003), it was possible that more verbal strategies would be observed in the WS 
group than in other groups. 
3.1.3 Aims 
The aims of this chapter are to explore TOL performance in WS, DS and TD 
groups. First, performance on different types of problems will be compared, and 
EFs correlated with that performance, to examine if and how the EF demands 
change with problem type. We can reasonably expect a greater EF demand for 
more difficult problems as they are likely to require more resources to solve 
them. Second, the WS and DS groups will be compared to the RCPM-matched TD 
group on the behavioural measures that were collected during TOL video coding 
(see Table 2.2). This goes beyond the scope of most TOL studies. Behaviours can 
149 
 
tell us about the ways in which people approach TOL problems, and may give 
clues about why people fail and how problem solving can be supported.  
 
We might expect more verbalisations to be made in a WS group, if verbalisations 
are helpful for performance, particularly with reference to the possibility raised 
in Chapter 2 of a verbal strategy being used in the inhibition and TOL task for this 
group. We would expect longer planning times to be associated with better 
performance, if participants are actively engaging in planning. As the DS group 
were slower in the inhibition task, we would also expect their execution 
time/time per move to be longer than that of the other two groups (i.e., slower 
processing speed). Finally, if incomplete/backup moves do indicate on-line 
planning, we might expect a positive correlation between them and time taken 
per move.  
3.2 Method 
The method for data collection was identical to that included in Chapter 2. Details 
of the participants can be found in Table 2.1.  
3.3 Results 
In Chapter 2, five TOL trials from the entire dataset were excluded (0.47% of 
attempted trials), with the scores replaced with that of the remaining trial of the 
same length (4 moves, 5 moves…) or, in the case of a 2-move trial, with the 
average of the remaining correct 2-move trials. Four of these participants (1 DS, 3 
WS) are part of the matched groups. For those trials, all of the measures (planning 
time, rule violations…) were excluded and replaced in the same way here. Some 
additional trials were excluded for analyses pertaining to individual measures, for 
which details are given in each section. 
3.3.1 TOL scores by problem type 
TOL scores were compared across problem types. The TOL score is the sum of the 
scores for each of the 16 problems. In order to compare TOL performance for 
different problem types across matched groups, the total TOL score was broken 
down into a constituent score for each of the five problem types, half-weighted for 
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2-move problems as before, for each participant, such that the sum of all of these 
equals the TOL score for that participant. The matched group means of these 
scores per problem type was compared in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with 
problem type as the within-subjects factor (2-, 3-, 4-, 5- and 6-moves) and Group 
as the between-subjects factor (WS, DS, matched TD) and are displayed in Figure 
3.1 below.  
 
Figure 3.1: Group means (S.E.) total TOL score by problem type 
 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Problem type (F(4,228) = 72.215, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .559). There was not a significant main effect of Group (F(2,57) = 
2.218, p = .118, partial η2 = .072) and Problem type and Group did not interact 
reliably (F<1). Pairwise comparisons revealed that 2- and 3-move problems (p = 
.294) and 5- and 6-move problems (p = .214) did not differ in their TOL scores, 
while 4-move problems were scored significantly differently from each other 
problem type (p < .001). Thus, 2-3 move problems were classified as ‘easy’, 4-
move problems as ‘medium’ and 5-6 move problems as ‘difficult’. Average scores 
were calculated for easy, medium and difficult problems for subsequent analyses. 
The trials correct score and average number of additional moves to correct 
problems reflected this pattern of performance, both showing better performance 
on easy than medium problems (p < .001 for both), and on medium than hard 
problems (trials correct: p < .001; additional moves: p = .017), with no main effect 
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of Group (trials correct: p = .243; additional moves: p = .115) and no significant 
interaction between Problem type and Group (trials correct: F<1; additional 
moves: p = .183).  
3.3.2 EF correlations by problem type 
Having established three main types of problems, correlations of EF measures 
were then conducted for each group (the entire TD group), for each problem type, 
in order to ascertain whether different EFs are important for solving different 
types of problems. The correlation matrix is displayed in Table 3.1. Significant 
correlations (p ≤ .05) are presented against a green background while marginally 
significant correlations (.05 < p < .10) are presented against a yellow background. 
R values for analyses in which at least one of the variables did not meet the 
assumption of normality (for the TD group, only when N < 30) are underlined, 
and Spearman’s nonparametric equivalent correlations reported in parentheses if 
they produced a different pattern of results. The Ns for each correlation are 
included with the predictor name in Table 3.1 below. 
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CA (months) 
(56, 20, 20) 
-.231 
(.087) 
-.446 
(<.001) 
-.589 
(<.001) 
-.367 
(.111) 
-.288 
(.218) 
-.244 
(.300) 
-.245 
(.298) 
-.146 
(.538) 
-.090 
(.707) 
BPVS raw score 
(56, 20, 20) 
-.168 
(.217) 
-.380 
(.004) 
-.594 
(<.001) 
-.292 
(.211) 
-.179 
(.451) 
-.262 
(.265) 
-.492 
(.027) 
-.404 
(.078) 
-.332 
(.153) 
RCPM raw score 
(56, 20, 20) 
-.272 
(.043) 
-.505 
(<.001) 
-.646 
(<.001) 
-.336 
(.148) 
-.138 
(.562) 
-.034 
(.888) 
-.242 
(.305) 
-.437 
(.054) 
-.091 
(.703) 
Planning score 
(56, 20, 19) 
-.210 
(.120) 
-.343 
(.010) 
-.472 
(<.001) 
-.204 
(.389) 
-.216 
(.360) 
-.231 
(.328) 
-.325 
(.174) 
-.712 
(.001) 
-.672 
(.002) 
Shifts 
(54, 20, 20) 
-.255 
(.063) 
-.337 
(.013) 
-.504 
(<.001) 
-.025 
(.922) 
-.327 
(.185) 
-.258 
(.301) 
-.395 
(.085) 
-.330 
(.156) 
-.144 
(.544) 
Inhibition % 
Opposite 
(56, 20, 20) 
-.130 
(.341) 
-.096 
(.482) 
-.188 
(.166) 
-.367 
(.111) 
-.269 
(.251) 
-.216 
(.360) 
-.459 
(.042) 
-.459 
(.042) 
-.238 
(.313) 
Inhibition: RT 
Same 
(56, 20, 20) 
.195 
(.150) 
.395 
(.003) 
.397 
(.001) 
.430 
(.059) 
.417 
(.067) 
.405 
(.077) 
.147 
(.535) 
-.002 
(.994) 
.158 
(.506) 
Inhibition: RT 
Opposite 
(56, 20, 20) 
.098 
(.470) 
.478 
(<.001) 
.586 
(<.001) 
-.049 
(.836) 
.163 
(.493) 
.191 
(.420) 
-.101 
(.671) 
-.191 
(.419) 
-.093 
(.697) 
Inhibition: RT 
change 
(56, 20, 20) 
-.142 
(.298) 
.048 
(.726) 
.093 
(.497) 
-.436 
(.055) 
-.257 
(.273) 
-.308 
(.187) 
-.272 
(.247) 
-.264 
(.261) 
-.285 
(.224) 
Forwards digit 
span 
(26, 19, 19) 
.030 
(.886) 
-.315 
(.117) 
-.592 
(.001) 
-.204 
(.403) 
-.288 
(.232) 
-.329 
(.169) 
-.426 
(.069) 
-.347 
(.146) 
-.151 
(.536) 
Backwards digit 
span 
(25, 19, 18) 
-.105 
(.617) 
-.171 
(.413) 
-.410 
(.042) 
-.513 
(.025) 
-.427 
(.068) 
-.214 
(.379) 
-.243 
(.331) 
-.590 
(.010) 
-.339 
(.168) 
Forwards block 
span 
(54, 19, 20) 
-.186 
(.178) 
-.310 
(.022) 
-.309 
(.023) 
-.033 
(.893) 
-.042 
(.866) 
-.068 
(.784) 
-.060 
(.801) 
.055 
(.817) 
-.334 
(.150) 
Backwards block 
span 
(50, 17, 18) 
.004 
(.980) 
-.170 
(.239) 
-.439 
(.001) 
-.103 
(.694) 
.157 
(.546) 
-.034 
(.898) 
-.308 
(.214) 
-.503 
(.033) 
-.399 
(.101) 
(.509, .
031) 
Table 3.1: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) of EF measures with TOL score 
for easy, medium and hard problems. Significant correlations are against a green 
background and marginally significant ones against a yellow background. Where data 
for at least one variable was non-normal, the r values are underlined. 
 
Table 3.1 contains 117 separate correlations. A Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons would require a p value cut-off of 0.000427 for effects to be 
considered significant. It should be noted that SPSS does not report p values 
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below .001, merely stating that they have a lower value than .001. Taking this as 
the cut-off criterion, only the nine correlations for TD group with this value 
(Medium: CA, RT Opposite and RCPM; Difficult: CA, BPVS, RCPM, Planning, 
Shifting and RT Opposite) would survive the Bonferroni correction. 
3.3.3 Timing measures 
Timing measures were also compared across the three problem types. Planning 
time (from goal presentation to the first move) and total trial time (from goal 
presentation until the last move) were recorded – see Table 2.2. Measurements 
were taken from the video recordings using a stopwatch, rounded to the nearest 
second (for planning time) or from the software’s timer when playing back the 
videos (for total trial time), which was accurate to the nearest second. The 
execution time was then calculated for each participant by subtracting the 
planning time from the total trial time. Execution time was divided by the number 
of moves made to obtain the time per move. Timing measures were calculated for 
each attempted trial for each participant, and averaged across trials of each 
problem type (easy, medium, difficult), half-weighted for 2-move problems. 
 
Planning time and time per move were excluded for five trials (four from one 
participant with DS and one from one TD participant; both were included in the 
matched groups) due to equipment malfunction or inability to see from the video 
recording when the first move began. On three further trials, timing measures 
were excluded for one trial from a TD participant and two trials from a 
participant with DS who did not make a response to the trial (and thus planning 
time and time per move were not possible to measure). Timing measures were 
also excluded for those participants (2, TD) for whom the trial was incorrectly set 
up, one of whom was part of the matched group. Both timing measures were thus 
excluded from nine trials from the matched group data. 
3.3.3.1 Planning time 
Planning time was additionally excluded for one trial (TD) because the participant 
was distracted during the planning time window. This participant was not in the 
matched group. Planning times recorded as under 1 second were classed as zero, 
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as they were most likely to reflect the time required to press the stopwatch rather 
than any pre-planning exhibited by the participant. This occurred for 23 trials, of 
which 8 were from participants included in the matched groups. This comprised 
2.16% of all attempted trials, and 1.27% of all attempted trials for the matched 
groups. Within the matched groups, the Ns for comparison of the three problem 
types (i.e., those participants who attempted easy, medium and difficult 
problems) were 15 (TD), 14 (DS) and 14 (WS). Group planning time data are 
displayed in Figure 3.2.  
 
           Figure 3.2: Group mean (S.E.) of planning time (seconds) by problem type 
 
A repeated-measures ANOVA on planning time with Group as the between-
subjects variable (WS, DS, matched TD) and Problem type as the within-subjects 
variable (easy, medium, difficult) revealed a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,40) = 3.296, p = .047, partial η2 = .141) with Tukey tests detecting marginally 
longer planning times in the DS than the TD group (p = .057) with no significant 
differences between TD and WS groups (p = .126) or DS and WS groups (p = .926). 
There was also a significant main effect of Problem type (F(1.361,54.443) = 
19.925, p < .001, partial η2 = .332), with significantly shorter planning times for 
easy problems than for both other types (p < .001 for both) and also significantly 
shorter planning times for difficult than medium problems (p = .005). The 
interaction between problem type and group was not significant (p = .286).  
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3.3.3.2 Time per move 
Execution time data (and therefore time per move) were additionally excluded 
(beyond the nine trial exclusions outlined at the beginning of Section 3.3.3) for 
one participant with WS and one participant with DS because of a substantial 
interruption noted during testing. Data for group means are displayed in Figure 
3.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was a significant main effect of problem type (F(2,80) = 16.335, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .290) with significantly longer times per move for medium and 
difficult problems compared to easy problems (p < .001 for both) and no 
significant difference between medium and difficult problems (p = .231). There 
was also a significant main effect of group (F(2,40) = 6.510, p = .004, partial η2 = 
.246) with Tukey tests indicating longer times per move for the DS group than the 
TD group (p = .002) and a lack of significant differences between the WS group 
and either of the other groups (DS: p = .255; TD: p = .134). There was a significant 
interaction between Problem type and Group (F(4,80) = 3.411, p = .013, partial η2 
= .146), which can be explained by the presence of a significant main effect of 
Group for medium problems (F(2,40) = 5.399, p = .008, partial η2 = .213) and 
difficult problems (Welch’s F(2,22.809) = 5.737, p = .010, partial η2 = .239) but not 
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Figure 3.3: Group means (S.E.) of time per move (seconds) by problem type 
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for easy problems (F(2,40) = 1.632, p = .208, partial η2 = .075). The difference 
between DS and TD times per move was significant for medium problems (p = 
.006) and difficult problems (p = .003) with marginally longer times for the DS 
group than the WS group for difficult problems (p = .067). All other pairwise 
differences were non-significant (p > .05). 
3.3.4 TOL behaviours 
This section compared the behaviours that were engaged in while solving the TOL 
problems across the three matched groups, between correctly and incorrectly 
solved problems. This allows insight into what happens when a problem is failed. 
The number of each type of behaviour, per attempted trial, was calculated for 
correct and incorrect trials separately, with 1- and 2-move problems half-
weighted as above.  
3.3.4.1 Rule violations (RVs) 
Where video data were unavailable (the 5 trials for which timing data were 
excluded), for the measures that were noted during testing (rule violations, 
reason for ending a trial) the experimenter-recorded measures were used for 
these participants. RV data were excluded from three trials (one TD, two DS) on 
which no moves were made, for which the participants were included in the 
matched groups. Participant numbers providing data for both correct and 
incorrect trials were 16 (TD), 19 (DS) and 17 (WS). Group data is displayed in 
Figure 3.4. 
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For the RVs to correct and incorrect trials, there was a significant main effect of 
Group (F(2,49) = 3.642, p = .034, partial η2 = .129) with Games-Howell tests 
indicating more RVs in the DS group than in the WS group overall (p = .040) while 
neither atypical group differed significantly from the TD group (DS: p = .258; WS: 
p = .531). More RVs were made to incorrect than to correct trials (F(1,49) = 
43.228, p <.001, partial η2 = .469). The interaction between group and accuracy 
did not reach significance (p = .066). 
3.3.4.2 Backup moves and incomplete moves 
Backup and incomplete move data were unavailable for the three trials on which 
no moves were made, and for the eight trials (four from a participant with DS and 
four from a TD participant) for which either equipment failure or a lack of 
visibility meant that it was not possible to count incomplete/backup moves 
(while other measures were recorded by the experimenter). All of these trials 
were from participants in the matched groups. Thus the Ns were 15 (TD), 19 (DS) 
and 17 (WS). ANOVA was conducted on the backup and incomplete move data 
with group as the between-subjects variable (TD, DS, WS) and accuracy as the 
within-subjects variable (correct, incorrect). More moves of each type were made 
to incorrect than correct trials (backups: F(1,48) = 37.773, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.440; incompletes: F(1,48) = 50.112, p < .001, partial η2 = .511). There was no 
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  Figure 3.4: Group means (S.E.) of rule violations per attempted trial by accuracy 
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significant main effect of group for either measure (backups: F<1; incompletes: 
F(2,48) = 1.218, p = .305, partial η2 = .048) and no significant accuracy by group 
interactions (F<1 for both). 
3.3.4.3 Verbalisations 
Verbalisation data were not available for the four trials from the participant with 
DS for whom the equipment failed, or for the three trials on which no moves were 
made (2 DS, 1 TD). All of these were part of the data for the matched groups. 
Participant numbers providing data for both correct and incorrect trials were 16 
(TD), 19 (DS) and 17 (WS). The weighted average of the number of verbalisations 
(0 or 1) per attempted trial was calculated for each participant for correct and 
incorrect trials, and group means were compared using ANOVA. Again, more 
verbalisations were made for incorrect than correct trials (F(1,49) = 22.966, p 
<.001, partial η2 = .319) while this did not interact with Group (F<1). There was a 
marginally significant main effect of Group (F(2,49) = 3.157, p = .051, partial η2 = 
.114), which was significant using a Kruskall-Wallis nonparametric equivalent 
test (conducted due to non-normal TD and WS data; χ2(2) = 7.859, p = .020), with 
more verbalisations made by the DS group than the TD group (p = .039) and no 
significant differences between the WS group’s number of verbalisations and 
those of the TD group (p = .543) or the DS group (p = .348). Group means are 
displayed in Figure 3.5. 
 
           Figure 3.5: Group means (S.E.) of verbalisations per attempted trial by accuracy 
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3.3.4.4 Error types 
Error types were classified as perceptual errors (PE; when the trial was stated as 
finished but not matching the goal state), too many moves (TMM; when the 
participant made 20 moves or more), or stopped (when the participant chose to 
end the trial because they were unable to solve it; see Table 2.2). In order to 
compare error types across groups, the number of errors of each type, half-
weighted for 2-move problems, was calculated per participant. One participant 
from the WS group was not included in this analysis, because she was unable to 
attempt 2-move problems to the level that might admit finishing a trial and 
making an error, and only has scores for the 1-move trials, of which all were 
scored perfectly. Thus, Ns were 20 (TD), 20 (DS) and 19 (WS). ANOVA across 
matched groups revealed a significant main effect of error type (F(2,112) = 5.918, 
p = .004, partial η2 = .096) with fewer instances of ‘stopped’ error types than each 
other type (PE: p = .011; TMM: p = .001) and no difference between the number of 
PE and TMM errors (p = .525). The main effect of Group approached significance 
(F(2,56) = 3.016, p = .057, partial η2 = .097) (and reached significance using a 
Kruskall Wallis test: χ2(2) = 6.256, p = .044, conducted due to non-normal data for 
stopped errors in all groups, and PEs in DS and TD groups) with Tukey tests 
indicating marginally more errors made by the WS group than the TD group (p = 
.061) (which was significant using the Mann Whitney nonparametric equivalent, p 
= .013) with the DS group making comparable numbers of errors to the other two 
groups (TD: p = .166; WS: p = .869). The interaction between error type and group 
was not significant (p = .197). Descriptive data for error types by group can be 
seen in Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6: Group means (S.E.) of error types. PE = perceptual error, TMM = too         
many moves. 
 
3.3.5 TOL correlation analysis 
In order to investigate the relationships between measures on the TOL, 
correlations were conducted for each group between TOL measures: planning 
time, time per move, TOL score, RVs, incomplete moves, backup moves and 
verbalisations. Correlation analyses include the entire TD group, and the entire 
WS and DS groups, in contrast to the group comparisons for the participants who 
provided data for both correct and incorrect trials or for all problem types, above. 
This makes the values of Ns 56 (TD), 20 (DS) and 20 (WS). For this analysis, the 
weighted planning time; time per move; number of RVs; incomplete moves; 
backup moves and verbalisations per attempted trial were calculated for each 
participant and correlated with one another and with the TOL scores, for each 
group. A correlation matrix for each group is provided below. The TD group’s data 
were treated as normal because the N was above the central limit theorem cut-off 
of 30. For DS and WS groups, all of the measures in Table 3.3/Table 3.4 were 
normally distributed; thus Pearson’s correlations were conducted. Significant 
correlations are presented against a green background, and marginally significant 
correlations against a yellow background. 
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CA 
-.581 -.523 -.417 -.097 -.656 -.224 -.591 .572 .136 
(<.001) (<.001) (.001) (.478) (<.001) (.096) (<.001) (<.001) (.319) 
Rule 
violations 
 
.275 .274 .016 .543 .114 .585 -.573 -.171 
(.040) (.041) (.905) (<.001) (.402) (<.001) (<.001) (.206) 
Incomplete 
moves 
  
.540 -.172 .188 .130 .356 -.258 .181 
(<.001) (.206) (.166) (.339) (.007) (.055) (.182) 
Backup 
moves 
   
-.159 .230 .207 .269 -.177 .230 
(.242) (.089) (.126) (.045) (.192) (.088) 
Planning 
time 
    
.445 .280 .105 -.220 -.420 
(.001) (.036) (.439) (.103) (.001) 
Time per 
move 
     
.247 
(.067) 
.575 
(<.001) 
-.588 
(<.001) 
-.251 
(.062) 
Verbalis-
ations 
      
.091 
(.506) 
-.106 
(.435) 
-.086 
(.527) 
Table 3.2: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between behavioural TOL measures for 
the TD group. Significant correlations are presented against a green background, and 
marginally significant correlations against a yellow background.  
 
The 42 correlations in Table 3.2 would require a p value cut-off of 0.00119 to be 
considered as surviving a Bonferroni correction. This applies to the correlations 
between CA and: rule violations, incomplete moves, backup moves, time per 
move, TOL score and TOL trials correct score; between rule violations and: time 
per move, TOL score and TOL trials correct score; between incomplete moves and 
backup moves; between planning time and: time per move, additional moves to 
correct trials; and between time per move and: TOL score, TOL trials correct 
score. 
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CA 
-.368 -.213 -.119 .434 .128 -.084 -.341 .310 -.042 
(.110) (.366) (.616) (.056) (.590) (.726) (.141) (.183) (.861) 
Rule 
violations 
 
.574 .161 -.078 .092 .171 .212 -.090 .545 
(.008) (.497) (.744) (.700) (.472) (.369) (.705) (.013) 
Incomplete 
moves 
  
.725 -.053 -.177 .100 .105 .033 .624 
(<.001) (.825) (.454) (.675) (.659) (.890) (.003) 
Backup 
moves 
   
-.142 -.357 .015 .151 -.066 .331 
(.551) (.122) (.949) (.525) (.783) (.155) 
Planning 
time 
    
.662 .176 -.175 .118 -.096 
(.001) (.459) (.462) (.621) (.686) 
Time per 
move 
     
.369 
(.110) 
.172 
(.468) 
-.211 
(.373) 
-.150 
(.529) 
Verbalis-
ations 
      
.262 
(.265) 
-.199 
(.401) 
.253 
(.282) 
Table 3.3: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between behavioural TOL measures for 
the DS group. Significant correlations are presented against a green background, and 
marginally significant correlations against a yellow background.  
 
For the DS group, the correlations surviving a Bonferroni correction (p ≤0.00119) 
would be between incomplete moves and backup moves; and between planning 
time and time per move only.  
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CA 
.076 -.288 -.491 .320 .357 .230 -.187 .162 .012 
(.750) (.218) (.028) (.169) (.122) (.329) (.429) (.495) (.959) 
Rule 
violations 
 
.739 .043 .178 .704 -.052 .208 -.148 .501 
(<.001) (.856) (.452) (.001) (.826) (.378) (.533) (.025) 
Incomplete 
moves 
  
.321 .006 .336 -.063 .243 -.207 .259 
(.167) (.980) (.148) (.792) (.302) (.381) (.270) 
Backup 
moves 
   
-.274 -.137 -.171 -.080 .111 .246 
(.243) (.565) (.470) (.739) (.641) (.295) 
Planning 
time 
    
.611 .410 -.397 .391 .170 
(.004) (.073) (.083) (.088) (.473) 
Time per 
move 
     
.086 -.082 .133 .494 
(.718) (.730) (.576) (.027) 
Verbalis-
ations 
      -.201 .168 -.164 
      (.395) (.480) (.490) 
Table 3.4: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between behavioural TOL measures for 
the WS group. Significant correlations are presented against a green background, and 
marginally significant correlations against a yellow background. 
 
For the WS group, only the correlations between rule violations and incomplete 
moves, and between rule violations and time per move, would survive a 
Bonferroni correction at p ≤0.00119. 
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore behaviour on the TOL task in TD, DS and 
WS groups, in order to understand the processes involved in their performance. 
Each element of task performance will be discussed in turn. 
3.4.1 Problem type 
Three problem types were identified within the problem set: easy (2-3 moves), 
medium (4 moves) and difficult (5-6 moves). When examining the problem set 
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used on the TOL task (Appendix A), we can see that while 3-move problems 
require more moves than 2-move problems, by design they possess the same 
search depth and number of counterintuitive moves as 2-move problems. The 
lack of significant difference between the ability to solve the two types of 
problems for the matched groups supports previous assertions that the minimum 
number of moves should not be the only indicator of problem difficulty (Kaller et 
al., 2004; Berg et al., 2010). Indeed, Kaller et al. (2008) noted that the presence or 
otherwise of a counterintuitive move affected the success that 4-year-olds had 
with solving 3-move problems. In encountering the medium problems in the 
present study (of 4 moves), this was the first time that solutions required a search 
depth (and number of counterintuitive moves) greater than zero, and success 
duly declined, although an additional move was also required to reach the 
solution for the 4-move problems compared to the 3-move problems, highlighting 
the often intertwined nature of the parameters concerned. Interestingly, between 
5- and 6-move problems, success rate did not differ, while the minimum number 
of moves, search depth and number of intermediate and counterintuitive moves 
did differ. That is, while the first subgoal in the 6-move problems required 3 
intermediate moves to reach it, the first subgoal in the 5-move problems required 
2 intermediate moves. This difference does not appear to have affected 
performance. However, in order to keep other parameters constant it was 
necessary to select 6-move problems that had 5 detour paths, that is, 5 non-
optimal ways of reaching the solution, while the other problem types had 1 
detour path (and the number of optimal paths was 1 for every problem). Thus it is 
more likely that a correct solution could have been found by chance in the 6-move 
problems than in the 5-move problems. Importantly, without knowledge of the 
properties of each item in the problem set, one would need to draw conclusions 
based entirely on the minimum number of moves to the solution, and an 
understanding of the potential reasons for differences (or lack thereof) in scores 
would not be known. This highlights the importance of providing information 
about the parameters of the problem set that is used to facilitate comparison 
between studies (cf. Berg & Byrd, 2002). 
 
165 
 
Rhodes and colleagues’ (2010) WS group made more moves than at least one 
control group on 3-, 4- and 5-move problems, while extra moves for 2-move 
problems did not differ. In contrast, in the current study there were similar 
patterns of performance for each group with regard to problem type. This could 
be due to differences in the problem set: the CANTAB uses Shallice’s (1982) 
original set of 12 problems, in which one of the 2-move items is flat-ending, while 
the current study uses partial tower-ending problems. Flat-ending trials are more 
difficult than partial tower-ending problems (Spitz et al., 1982), and thus they 
could have elicited more moves from the WS group in Rhodes et al. (2010)’s 
study. 
 
The pattern of correlations between EF and TOL scores for easy, medium and 
difficult problems indicates differences across groups in the way that the strength 
of the association varied for different levels of task difficulty. For the TD group, 
the significance of the association generally increased as problems become more 
difficult: e.g., some EF tasks only showed a significant relationship for the most 
difficult problems (both backwards memory tasks, forwards digit span) while 
others showed relationships for medium and hard problems, but not easy 
problems (forwards block span, RT Same and Opposite, planning and BPVS). Even 
for the RCPM which was significantly related to all problem types, the R value 
increased with each level of task difficulty. This pattern of outcomes supports the 
general concept of EFs becoming more important for tasks which require more 
deliberate, effortful control (Rabbitt, 1997). This fits with the idea that when 
beginning an easy (2- and 3-move) problem it may be that the route to solving the 
problem is apparent from the start, so that deliberate memory, planning or 
shifting capabilities are not needed: then, only when the task becomes a challenge 
do these abilities, tapped by the EF tasks, come into play for problem solving. This 
confirms the earlier-stated expectation that there would be more contribution of 
EF skills to more difficult problems than to easier problems.  
 
This pattern extends to the WS group’s association between TOL scores and both 
backwards block span and planning scores, with non-significant associations with 
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TOL score for easy problems that increased in strength for medium and difficult 
problems. The greater reliance, in general, on backwards visuospatial memory 
and planning abilities in the WS group on more difficult problems is consistent 
with the idea that the more difficult problems require more manipulation of items 
in working memory or visualisation abilities. The reason for this seems clear 
when we consider the problem set. For 2- and 3-move problems, each move is a 
goal move, so the planning ahead/manipulation requirements, while present, are 
quite low. However 4-move problems require one temporary move away from 
the goal state to solve efficiently, while harder problems demand this type of 
ability even more. On some TOL problems (but not 4-move problems here) 
temporary moves require the participant to place a piece temporarily in a 
different piece’s goal state, or temporarily remove a piece from its own goal state, 
which could be difficult for children, being related to Klahr (1985)’s concept of 
‘sensitivity to partial evaluation’. These types of moves are likely to require more 
planning ahead and manipulation of items in memory to solve efficiently (e.g., 
Kaller et al., 2008). The relationship between these skills and TOL performance in 
WS as problems get harder adds to the suggestion in Chapter 2 that these may be 
limiting factors for spatial problem solving in WS (although planning may only be 
a limiting factor at a low level of planning ability).  
 
Interestingly, backwards digit span and RCPM only showed associations 
(marginally for RCPM) to medium difficulty problems in the WS group. The 
relative difficulty of the 4-move problems could account for this: for example, 
reasoning abilities (RCPM) could be used to generate a new strategy for medium 
problems, which could then be adopted (or adapted) for difficult problems, 
without demanding reasoning abilities to generate another new strategy. The 
pattern of the longest planning times to medium difficulty problems, followed by 
a drop in planning times to difficult problems, supports this explanation. 
 
In contrast, for some measures the pattern of associations in the WS group was in 
the reverse direction: the association between BPVS and TOL score decreased in 
strength with increasing TOL difficulty, while accuracy on the inhibition task was 
167 
 
only related to the TOL score for easy and medium problems. Shifting and 
forwards digit span were also marginally related to the TOL for the easy problems 
alone. Similarly, in the DS group, the backwards digit span association was 
stronger in easy than medium problems and unrelated in more difficult problems. 
In fact, the only measure related (albeit marginally) to TOL score for difficult 
problems in this group was RT Same.  
 
It is possible to speculate about the root of the pattern of stronger relationships 
with easier problems in the atypical groups. It may be that easier problems, being 
within a participant’s general level of capability, are readily solvable as long as 
they are attended to. As problems become more difficult, the increasing reliance 
on some EFs in the WS group but decreased reliance on EFs in the DS group may 
reflect a discrepancy in the groups’ problem-solving processes: the WS group may 
have engaged in planning/mental manipulation (which was difficult for them) 
while the DS group may not have engaged in processes measured by the EF tasks 
(potentially, attempting rule violations, addressed later in the section). Indeed, it 
was suggested in Chapter 2 that the DS group were able to compensate for poor 
planning abilities, as they were poorer than the TD group on the planning task but 
just as good on the TOL. Choosing to use an alternative strategy could be an 
attempt to compensate for poor planning abilities (but see Section 3.4.4 below for 
further discussion of rule violations in the DS group). An alternative reason for a 
scarcity of relationships between some EF tasks and difficult TOL problems, 
particularly in the DS group, might be a strategy of moving the pieces at random 
until the correct solution, or a near solution, is chanced upon. 
3.4.2 Error types 
The marginally significant difference in the number of errors made between WS 
and TD groups is consistent with the marginally lower TOL trials correct score in 
the WS group than in the TD group seen in Chapter 2. While most participants 
attempted to complete the trials rather than producing a ‘stopped’ error, there 
were no other differences. Thus, the groups did not significantly differ in their 
reasons for failing a trial.  
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3.4.3 Timing 
3.4.3.1 Problem type and group comparisons 
Planning time was longest for medium problems, and shortest for easy problems, 
with planning time for difficult problems being longer than easy problems and 
shorter than medium problems. As medium problems were the first instance of a 
problem that requires a temporary, and moreover a backwards temporary, move 
in order to solve them, it seems likely that these longer planning times were (at 
least partly) due to this requirement. It is possible that these were the first 
problems for which the solution was not immediately apparent and thus required 
more time to generate the first move. Four-move problems were also the first 
problem type in which the start and goal states consisted of configurations of 
pieces on the same two pegs, perhaps making it less apparent what the first steps 
should be, that is, how to rearrange the pieces between the two pegs (see 
Appendix A). This suggests that a certain amount of planning took place before 
any moves were made. Shorter planning times for difficult than medium problems 
suggest that the greatest demands on preplanning were not for the most difficult 
problems per se, but for the problems that posed the greatest cognitive challenge 
with respect to what has previously been encountered (i.e., medium problems).   
 
The increase in planning times from easy to medium problems is consistent with 
previous research with adults, who displayed longer planning times to problems 
that were more difficult (Unterrainer et al., 2004) and had more indirect (non-
goal) moves (Phillips, 1999). These problem sets, however, being designed for use 
with adults, were more challenging than the set used in the current study, thus 
limiting the value of such comparisons. The decrease in planning times from 
medium to difficult problems here is not consistent with these previous findings. 
It may be that the pattern of longer planning times to harder problems is confined 
to adults; indeed, in Unterrainer et al. (2004)’s study the pattern of longer 
planning times to harder problems was most pronounced for the better planners. 
The discrepancy between the results for adults and for children and individuals 
with neurodevelopmental disorders found here points to the need to avoid 
assuming that patterns of performance seen in adults will extend downwards to 
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children (cf. Karmiloff-Smith, 1997). Alternatively it may be that the relative 
novelty of the 4-move problems increased planning times to such an extent as to 
mask a gradual increase in planning time with task difficulty. 
 
Planning times were marginally longer in the DS group compared to a TD group of 
the same nonverbal ability. This is reminiscent of the slightly longer RTs seen on 
the inhibition task by the DS group in Chapter 2. RT can be understood to include 
both cognitive processing and motor processing. A measure of motor processing 
speed is not available in the current study, and would be a useful inclusion in 
further work.  
 
For the WS group, planning times did not differ significantly from those of RCPM-
matched controls, while in Rhodes et al. (2010)’s study they were longer in a WS 
group and a CA-matched group compared to verbal mental age-matched group, 
who were younger than the other two groups. Planning times were longer in the 
WS group than the other two groups for 2- and 3-move problems, while the CA-
matched group’s were longer than the VMA matched group’s for 4- and 5-move 
problems; the WS group’s planning times were equivalent to those of each control 
group.  
 
Time per move did not differ between the WS and TD groups in the current study. 
Again, seemingly at odds with this, Rhodes et al. (2010) found longer subsequent 
thinking times in their WS group compared to at least one of the control groups, 
for each type of problem. This could be due to administration differences: Rhodes 
and colleagues were able to control for movement time by using a yoked control 
procedure, while the current measure includes movement time as well as 
thinking time. Also, Rhodes and colleagues’ WS group made more moves than at 
least one control group on three out of the four problem types, so it is likely that 
subsequent thinking time was confounded by the number of moves made, while 
in the current study this was controlled for by calculating the time per move. 
Finally, group matching measures were different: poorer performance (if longer 
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times reflect poorer performance) compared to a verbal or CA-matched group, 
but not compared to a nonverbal-matched group, can be expected given the 
uneven cognitive profile in WS (Mervis et al., 2000). Indeed, other studies 
comparing time-based measures on the TOL found equivalent total time scores in 
WS groups compared to nonverbal matched controls (Costanzo et al., 2013; 
Menghini et al., 2010). While any comparisons to the current study cannot be 
wholly accurate because of measurement differences, as in the present study 
neither the planning time, time per move nor number of additional moves (to 
correct trials) differed from that of the control group, these findings seem to be 
consistent with those found previously. 
 
The DS group displayed significantly slower times per move than the TD group 
for medium and difficult problems (and slightly longer times than the WS group 
for difficult problems). The finding of longer TOL times, in general, for 
participants with DS compared to MA controls is consistent with previous studies 
who found longer total solution times in a DS group (Costanzo et al., 2013; Rowe 
et al., 2006) and consistent with the slower processing expected for the DS group. 
Present results extend previous findings because timing measures were split into 
planning time and execution time (per move): as it is the time per move during 
solving for which this difference reached significance and not the planning time, 
this could either imply slower motor processing by the DS group during the task 
(which could not affect planning time as much) or more thinking ‘on-line’ during 
the task in the DS group than the TD group, or both.  
 
Times per move were longer in medium and difficult problems than in easy 
problems. This might reflect a greater amount of on-line planning in problems 
that are more demanding. The difficult problems elicited less planning time, but 
an equivalent length of execution time per move, than the medium problems. This 
seems to add weight to the idea that the planning time increased so dramatically 
from easy to medium problems because of the unexpected configuration of the 
pieces: the difficult problems would have been less likely to have elicited this 
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unexpectedness after encountering the medium problems, and indeed, planning 
times were not as long.  
 
If participants were planning all of their moves prior to beginning a trial, we 
would have seen increasing planning time with problem difficulty, but equivalent 
times per move. This was not the case. This is in line with previous suggestions 
that a perceptual strategy (i.e., planning on-line) is the dominant one when 
participants are not given strategy-specific instructions (Goel & Grafman, 1995), 
but also with suggestions that children do not simply engage in trial and error 
when problem solving (Klahr & Robinson, 1981); rather, they apply “general 
problem-solving methods” (p. 144). 
3.4.3.2 Correlations 
Several correlations were conducted between performance measures on the TOL 
in order to understand performance. To add a note of caution, conducting a large 
number of correlations runs the risk of producing type 1 errors.  It was expected 
that longer planning time would be associated with better TOL performance if 
participants were using that time to plan. In the TD group, longer planning time 
was related to making fewer additional moves to correct trials, suggesting that 
children may indeed have been engaging in useful planning on some of the trials 
(as suggested above). This association was not present in either of the atypical 
groups, indicating that if individuals with WS or DS were actively planning, this 
did not produce more efficient correct solutions. It is equally possible that 
planning time did not reflect active planning for the atypical groups, or that their 
plans were not seen through to fruition, perhaps because of working memory 
difficulties. 
 
However, longer planning times were marginally related to better TOL accuracy 
in the WS group, with no relationship in the DS or TD group. This, tentatively, 
suggests that the avoidance of impulsive responding by taking longer to plan may 
have been beneficial for performance in the WS group. In the TD group, longer 
times per move were also related to poorer TOL accuracy, perhaps representing 
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trials for which they were unsure of the solution and were engaging in a large 
amount of planning on-line (i.e., during solving). There was also a (marginal) 
association for the TD group in the opposite direction: between taking more time 
per move and making fewer additional moves in correct trials. Thus, TD 
participants may be engaging in more on-line planning when problems are 
difficult, but when they were within their capability, the longer move time could 
have improved efficiency. The marginal nature of the latter correlation makes this 
a tentative suggestion. 
 
For the WS group, longer times per move were associated with more additional 
moves to correct trials, that is, poorer efficiency. Thus, for the WS group, taking 
longer to plan was associated with increased success in some form (better 
accuracy), while taking longer to move was associated with reduced success in 
some form (poorer efficiency). Unterrainer et al. (2004) found that, in typical 
adults, shorter execution times and longer planning times were associated with 
better accuracy on the TOL. For the TD group, this was found in relation to 
shorter move times but not for longer planning times. For the DS group, the only 
TOL measure that longer times per move was associated with was longer 
planning time. This relationship was also seen for the other two groups in the 
same direction. It might be that individual participants either have an early 
insight into the strategy to take, making both planning time and time per move 
short, or else have difficulty throughout, taking a slow and deliberate approach to 
both planning and making subsequent moves. Alternatively, it may be that an 
individual’s processing speed dictates the time taken in both planning and solving 
phases, rather than more time taken planning facilitating faster subsequent 
moves (as is implied by Unterrainer et al., 2004’s finding, above, of both increased 
planning time and reduced execution time being related to better TOL 
performance, although they do not report whether or not there is a direct 
association between the two timing measures). As Unterrainer et al. (2004)’s 
findings are with respect to typical adults, processing speed may be the 
overriding factor determining planning and execution times for children and 
individuals with neurodevelopmental disorders, while it may be that the pattern 
of longer planning and short execution time facilitating performance only applies 
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to adults (i.e., better planners). Indeed, in the TD group, the association between 
longer times per move and poorer TOL accuracy (poorer trials correct scores), 
which was suggested above as representing difficult trials, may alternatively be 
due to differences in processing speed with age. As we know that processing 
speed (RT Same) increased with age, and TOL scores also increased with age (see 
Section 2.3.5.1), perhaps the association between longer execution times (i.e., 
slower processing) and poorer TOL scores is produced because the younger TD 
children, being slower processors, also scored more poorly on the TOL.  
 
3.4.4 Rule violations (RVs) 
3.4.4.1 Group comparisons 
There were more RVs made overall on incorrect trials than correct trials. In 
addition, the DS group made more RVs than the WS group. In contrast to the WS 
group, for whom associations between planning and backwards block span scores 
and the TOL score became stronger with increasing problem difficulty, none of 
the EFs displayed this pattern in the DS group. This suggests that when trials 
were difficult (and thus, more likely to be solved incorrectly), rather than 
attempting to engage with the more difficult problems by planning ahead or using 
working memory, the DS group were attempting to move the pieces to the correct 
position by making moves that are illegal in the task.  
 
Berg and Byrd (2002) noted that RVs could occur either because of rule forgetting 
or because of choosing not to follow the rules, and they suggest that deliberately 
not following them may be more likely in typical populations. Dual-task 
processing, that is, performing two tasks simultaneously, is impaired in DS 
(Lanfranchi, Baddeley, Gathercole, & Vianello, 2012) and disproportionately more 
difficult than performing one task in DS than in WS (Kittler, Krinsky-McHale, 
Devenny, & Conners, 2008). In the TOL, one needs to remember the rules of the 
game in addition to moving the pieces in order to solve the problem. It seems 
possible that a higher rate of RVs in the DS group than in the WS group could be 
related to greater difficulties with dual-task processing in DS than in WS. Thus, 
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the greater number of RVs in the DS group could either be due to difficulties with 
the task, or a deliberate strategy.  
3.4.4.2 Correlations 
In the TD group, making more RVs was related to lower levels of accuracy on the 
TOL, while for the atypical groups it was related to making more additional moves 
to correct trials, that is, to less efficient solving. Neither of these outcomes are 
surprising, as we know that more RVs occurred on incorrect than correct trials, 
and that greater numbers of RVs will necessarily increase the numbers of 
additional moves recorded.  
3.4.5 Further measures 
3.4.5.1 Verbalisations 
The presence or absence of a task-relevant verbalisation made by the participant 
during problem solving was recorded for each trial. Self-directed speech includes 
overt (audible) private speech and covert (inaudible) inner speech (cf., e.g., 
Lidstone et al., 2010). Fernyhough and Fradley (2005) found that TOL 
performance was associated with private speech in 5-6 year old TD children, 
although the relationship between private speech and task difficulty is often not 
found to be linear but, rather, more private speech is made to problems that are 
of medium difficulty (e.g., Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005). Fernyhough noted that 
this is consistent with the Vygotskyan idea that when a task is within the zone of 
proximal development, that is, challenging but still within a child’s capability 
level, this is when most private speech occurs. 
 
In the current study, more verbalisations were made to incorrect trials than to 
correct trials overall. However, making more verbalisations was not related to 
TOL success in any of the groups; thus, it does not seem to have facilitated 
performance.  It is unclear which tasks might have been in each participant’s zone 
of proximal development (thus eliciting more private speech), and of course, it is 
not possible to say whether or not inner speech was associated with performance, 
as we are only able to measure audible speech. In fact, if self-directed speech 
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becomes more covert with development, this could explain a lack of association 
between audible self-directed speech and TOL success, as older children would be 
likely to both make fewer verbalisations and to score better on the TOL. This is 
supported to some extent by the marginal negative correlation between age and 
verbalisations for the TD group.  
 
It was expected that more verbalisations would be made by the WS group, as they 
have been previously suggested to use verbal mediation strategies. However, it 
was the DS group who exhibited more verbalisations than the TD group. For the 
TD and WS groups only, increased planning time was related to making more 
verbalisations (marginally so for the WS group). This suggests the occurrence of 
verbal planning for these two groups, but not in the DS group.  
 
Lidstone et al. (2010) found that articulatory suppression (which removes the 
ability to produce self-directed speech) disrupted children’s TOL performance 
when they were required to plan their moves prior to solving, but not when they 
were merely encouraged to think ahead. They suggest a link between planning 
and self-directed speech. As in the present study no demand to plan beforehand 
was made, this could explain the lack of association between verbalisations and 
TOL success. However, perhaps, when planning does happen, it is reflected 
verbally to some extent in the TD and WS groups; hence, the links between 
planning time and verbalisations for these groups. Given the lack of association 
between planning time and verbalisations in the DS group, it may be that the DS 
verbalisations, of which there were more than in the TD group, may have been 
predominantly other types of verbalisation, such as saying out loud what is 
difficult about the task or giving self-encouragement. This is still self-directed, but 
may not be strictly classed as planning. As verbalisations were recorded at a 
binary level for each trial, potential analysis of the exact type of verbalisation or 
the duration of the verbalisation per trial would be a potential avenue for future 
research. 
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3.4.5.2 Incomplete and backup moves 
More incomplete and backup moves were made to incorrect trials than to correct 
trials, and there were no significant group differences for either measure. In the 
TD and DS groups, incomplete and backup moves were correlated with one 
another, which might then reflect on-line planning indicated by both behaviours. 
For the TD group there was a relationship between more incomplete moves and 
poorer TOL accuracy, but this could stem from the extra moves made to ‘too many 
moves’ error trials. Incomplete moves (in DS) and backup moves (marginally, in 
TD) were associated with making more additional moves to correct trials, which 
again is unsurprising. 
 
3.4.6 Remaining correlations between measures 
It was expected that incomplete/backup moves would be associated with greater 
times per move if they reflected on-line planning. Backup moves, and 
verbalisations, were indeed (marginally) related to greater times per move for the 
TD children, but this was not seen for incomplete moves. This could reflect the 
additional time needed to make two moves (a backup) and to make 
verbalisations, rather than reflecting the on-line deliberation associated with this 
type of move.  
 
Greater times per move were also related to making more RVs for the TD and WS 
groups (but not for the DS group) which is as to be expected because RVs will be 
likely to take more time per move as the experimenter must reset the pieces. 
Making more RVs was related to making more incomplete moves for all three 
groups, and backup moves were related to making more incomplete moves for 
the DS group, and more RVs for the TD group. This might reflect challenges 
experienced during the trial that manifest in making fewer straightforward peg-
to-peg moves, and more moves of other types. 
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3.4.7 Correlations with CA 
In the DS group, planning time increased with age, although this did not reach 
significance, while in the WS group, the number of backup moves reduced with 
increasing CA. Although these measures appear to indicate more efficient 
performance with age (presuming that planning time does reflect more planning), 
notably, neither of these measures were related to TOL success for the group 
concerned, and neither atypical groups’ TOL performance increased with age. 
 
With increasing CA, the TD group made fewer errors of all three types, fewer 
backups, fewer incomplete moves, fewer RVs and took less time per move. 
Verbalisations also marginally decreased with increasing age, possibly reflecting 
the age-related shift from private speech to inner speech discussed above. Thus, 
with increasing age, performance became more accurate, with fewer indications 
of on-line deliberation during solving. Of course, it is possible that deliberation 
during solving was still occurring for the older TD children but that it was not 
manifested in these behavioural measures. Indeed, this pattern might reflect 
increases in processing speed with age (correlation between RT Same and CA) 
that mean that on-line planning is achieved without the need for incomplete 
moves and backups, or increased times per move. Planning time did not change 
with CA in the TD sample. This is consistent with the findings of Culbertson and 
Zillmer (1998). 
 
The lack of age-planning time association could either be interpreted as 
representing the same amount of pre-planning and on-line planning as age 
increases but with more efficient-looking ‘in-trial’ performance with increasing 
age-related processing speed, or as planning times that reflect different processes 
for younger and older TD children. As noted above, planning time might reflect 
cognitive difficulty or active planning (Berg & Byrd, 2002). If, for example, 
planning time for younger children reflects cognitive difficulty but for older 
children it reflects bona fide planning, this shift would not be visible in the 
constant relationship between planning time and age. In addition, in the current 
study older children are likely to have attempted more difficult problems than 
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younger children, and planning times were longer for medium and difficult 
problems than easy problems (although longest for medium problems). If all 
participants had completed all the trials, the relationship between planning time 
and age would have been easier to interpret. 
3.4.8 Chapter summary 
In TD children, performance on the TOL became more efficient with age, while 
this was not the case for either of the atypical groups. TD children showed 
associations of greater strength between EFs and TOL problem solving with 
increasing problem difficulty, suggesting that they were engaging more effortful 
executive processes in more difficult trials. Longer planning time was also 
associated with better TOL performance, and more verbalisations. These 
measures combine to form a picture of children being more involved in more 
difficult problems, and increasing their planning time and verbalisations to help 
them to solve problems.  
 
Behaviour looked quite different for the DS group: TOL performance was not 
associated with increasing age; generally greater EF associations were seen for 
easier than more difficult problems; the DS group took slightly longer times per 
move than the TD controls but did not show the same associations between that 
execution time and their TOL performance, suggesting that they were taking 
longer for different reasons. The DS group also engaged in more verbalisations, 
but unlike the TD group, these were not related to increased planning time, again 
potentially indicating the occurrence of different underlying processes.  
 
The WS group appeared to display some typical-looking patterns of performance, 
for example, greater reliance on some EFs with increasing problem difficulty, and 
an association between longer planning times and more verbalisations. In 
contrast, some patterns were atypical, with some EFs showing greater TOL 
associations to easier problems, and with an association between time per move 
and solving efficiency that was in the opposite direction to the (marginal) TD 
association.  
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The combination of greater numbers of RVs in the DS than the WS group, and 
decreased reliance on EFs with increasing problem difficulty in the DS group, 
suggests syndrome-specific differences in problem-solving approach between the 
two atypical groups: the DS group may have been making illegal moves rather 
than engaging in a deliberate way to figure out a difficult problem.  
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CHAPTER 4:  EVERYDAY MEASURES OF EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTIONS AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a parental questionnaire study is reported in which the aim was to 
investigate and understand problem-solving abilities in everyday life in TD, DS 
and WS groups. The purpose of using questionnaires was two-fold: first, to 
understand the relative profiles of everyday problem solving in order to help 
point the way towards interventions for these populations and second, to enable 
assessment of the ecological validity of the experimental EF tasks that were used 
earlier in this thesis, for individuals with WS and DS. 
4.1.1 Problem solving inside and outside the laboratory 
Problem solving has traditionally been studied in a laboratory environment, 
following neuropsychological and computer science background influences, as 
discussed in Chapter 1. Problem solving actually happens, most of the time, not in 
a controlled, artificial testing situation but in the multifaceted, unpredictable and 
complex everyday world. Problem-solving skills are drawn on when, for example, 
catching a bus, tying a shoelace, making a cup of tea, and so on. Problem solving, 
of course, is not only carried out by individuals, but frequently in collaboration 
with others. Social problem solving, e.g., how to resolve conflict with others, is 
another sphere of research that is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
nevertheless just as applicable to everyday life.  
 
Imagine, if you will, that a person with a neurodevelopmental disorder has been 
to visit a university to take part in a research study, along with an accompanying 
parent or carer. During the study they will likely have been shown where to sit, 
given all the materials and equipment they need, been given very specific task 
instructions, their understanding will have been checked, and if they forget along 
the way what they are to do, it is likely that they will readily be reminded. When 
they finish the task, they will be praised, and likely rewarded; the testing session 
is over.  Now imagine that they leave the university campus: what to do next? 
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How to get home? Should they go straight home, or visit the shops first? Does this 
depend on the weather, the time of day, or the season? They are once again 
operating in the multifaceted, unpredictable and complex everyday world. This 
simple juxtaposition of demands on the individual speaks to two related issues in 
the literature with respect to problem solving both in, and out, of the laboratory: 
i) the ecological validity problem, and ii) well- and ill-defined problems in 
problem-solving research. 
 
Both of these issues are discussed in Chapter 1. Briefly, the ecological validity of 
EF tests has been challenged (Burgess et al., 2006): to what extent does what we 
measure on an experimental task represent, or generalise to, what happens in the 
real world? Although some links have been found between EF tests and measures 
of everyday functioning, the utility of asking about EF in everyday life has also 
been recognised (Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998). Ecological 
validity is receiving increasing attention in the area of neuropsychology (Spooner 
& Pachana, 2006), with several researchers investigating the links between EF 
measurements in experimental and everyday settings, often with reference to 
neuropsychological patient groups (Burgess et al., 1998; Chaytor, Schmitter-
Edgecombe, & Burr, 2006; Davies, Field, Andersen, & Pestell, 2011; Odhuba, 
Broek, & Johns, 2005) as well as investigating the predictive value of EF tests for 
everyday life, e.g., the WCST for predicting abilities relevant to working life for 
adults with head injuries (Kibby, Schmitter-Edgecombe, & Long, 1998) and the 
block design test for predicting everyday spatial ability in typical adults (Groth-
Marnat & Teal, 2000). More recent research also highlights the importance of 
investigating EF in real life, because it has been suggested that test performance 
and real-life rating scales do not measure the same underlying construct (Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2013). 
 
The distinction between well-defined and ill-defined problems is also of 
relevance. The TOL can be classified as well defined, because the start, end, means 
of reaching the end, and rules are clearly defined (Kahney, 1986a). Well-defined 
problems form the basis of most problem-solving research studies (Dunbar, 
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1998) while psychology has made little progress in understanding ill-defined 
problems (Pretz et al., 2003) which are much less confined and controlled and, 
almost by definition, more likely to be encountered in everyday life. The goal or 
start state may not be clearly identified; there may be many different factors to 
take into account; there may also be several correct solutions; moreover, the 
problem itself may be difficult to identify, and the operators unclear (Kahney, 
1986a; Pretz et al., 2003). One example of an ill-defined problem is arranging to 
meet a friend: at the outset it is not clear which friend to meet, where to meet, for 
how long, how and when to contact them, and so on. It is perhaps of little wonder 
that more research progress has been made in relation to well-defined than ill-
defined problems. If people are to be supported in daily problem solving, it is 
imperative that efforts are made to investigate ill-defined problem-solving 
processes; particularly the “fuzzy issues surrounding problem recognition, 
definition, and representation” relevant to ill-defined everyday problems (Pretz 
et al., 2003 p.27). 
4.1.2 Everyday life in WS and DS 
We will now consider what is already known about everyday functioning in WS 
and DS. While the following studies do not address problem solving or executive 
functioning per se, they do address adaptive functioning and independence, which 
have a relevance to problem solving. 
4.1.2.1 DS 
In a longitudinal interview study, Carr (2008) reports the most recent outcomes 
regarding everyday life for people with DS, from 15 months old, followed by 
interviews at 4, 11, 21, 30, 35 and 40 years (34 participants remained in the study 
by 40 years of age). Parents of individuals with DS were engaged in semi-
structured interviews at each time point. At age 40, 77% of individuals attended a 
social education centre either full or part time; 36% a further education college, 
part time; and 21% were in part time work (0% in full time education or work). 
Independence measures were collected addressing whether the individual was 
left alone in the house for more than 30 minutes or for more than 60 minutes and 
whether they were allowed out by themselves beyond the home and garden. 
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Independence measures were reported to have remained generally constant from 
age 21 to age 40 (at all the time points in between). At age 40, 69% were not left 
alone in the house for more than 60 minutes (31%, not more than 30 minutes) 
and 53% were not allowed out, beyond the garden, by themselves. Greater 
independence was associated with greater nonverbal IQ (and going out, to a 
lesser extent, with verbal IQ also), and was related to IQ throughout the 
longitudinal study (Carr, 2008). Of the cohort, 11 had become lost, and for some 
this involved incorrect public transport journeys with police returning them 
home.  
 
Carr (2012) reported on the longitudinal study as a whole. In general, tests 
measuring verbal, nonverbal and self-help skills remained constant over 
developmental time, although the onset of dementia was seen in some 
individuals. Nonverbal ability scores increased between ages 11 and 21 and then 
remained level after this. Self-help skills increased from age 11 to age 30, then 
declined somewhat, but not as far as the initial mean at age 11, although these 
seem to have been measured using different scales at age 11 compared to age 21 
and above (from age 21 upwards, the MRC Handicaps, Behaviour and Skills 
schedule (Wing, 1980) is reported to have been used but it is not made explicit 
that this is the measure used for self-help scores). Feeding, washing and toileting 
are reported as the items responsible for a peak at age 30, although insufficient 
detail of the self-help measure used is provided.  
 
Pennington et al. (2003) gave parents of children with DS aged 11-19 years the 
Scales of Independent Behaviour-Revised (SIB-R; Bruininks, Woodcock, 
Weatherman, & Hill, 1996). Participants were matched on MA to controls on the 
school age version of the Differential Abilities Scale (DAS; Elliott, 1990). Raw 
scores indicated that the DS group scored better than MA controls on 
Social/Communication, Personal Living Skills and Community Living Skills, but 
not differently on Motor Skills. Pennington and colleagues note that the difference 
in CA between the MA-matched groups was large (the DS group were 
approximately 10 years older) so they had the opportunity to gain more adaptive 
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behaviour skills over time than their 5-year-old counterparts. However, the DS 
group’s scores were poorer than the level that would be expected for their CA, 
with 79% meeting the criteria for an indication of learning disability. There were 
no score differences between younger and older DS groups. Adaptive behaviour 
was best predicted by age in the DS group, rather than skills attributed to 
hippocampal or prefrontal brain areas. 
4.1.2.2 WS 
For individuals with WS, independence and daily living skills are poor, with 53% 
of a sample of adults aged between 19 and 55 years living at home with their 
parents and a further 39% in residential care (Elison, Stinton, & Howlin, 2010). 
Low numbers were engaged in typical or supported employment (15%), with 
21% undertaking voluntary work, mainly with extra supervision, 53% in some 
form of education or training, and 11% not engaging in this kind of activity. Over 
time, the number of adults living at home dropped significantly (Elison et al., 
2010).  
 
In the cross-sectional cohort there were no significant differences between three 
age groups (19-29, 30-39, 40+ years). As a whole group, in semi-structured 
interviews Elison et al. (2010)’s results of self-care and independence questions 
varied across the group, and did not change across age groups, with 77% of adults 
obtaining the best response (performing self-care tasks with little or no help) and 
59% not needing reminders for self-care, with much smaller percentages 
responding at the opposite end of the scale. Most (59%) could not carry out 
household chores, with 16% reported as able to carry out most household tasks. 
Regarding independent travel, 38% were able to do this at least locally while 49% 
engaged in no independent travel at all. Thirty five percent needed supervision 
for most or all of the time. Social activities were organised at least most of the 
time by 80% of the sample, while 32% and 49% did not understand how to 
manage finances and could not make their own purchases, respectively. In a 
longitudinal study (drawing on data from earlier work by Davies, Howlin, & 
Udwin, 1997; Howlin, Davies, & Udwin, 1998), however, self-help skills from the 
interviews had improved over 11-12 years. Adaptive behaviour in general 
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measured by the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales (VABS) had also improved 
over 12 years, with improvements on component scores for Daily Living Skills 
and Socialization and a reduction in Maladaptive behaviours (Howlin et al., 2010), 
although it is possible that this at least partly reflects a change in the way that 
society views individuals with developmental disorders. Full-scale IQ (FSIQ), 
verbal IQ (VIQ) and performance IQ (PIQ) was correlated with the overall VABS 
score, while Daily Living skills, as well as Communication and Socialization, were 
correlated with FSIQ.  
 
Rhodes et al. (2010) collected both experimental and parental rating data. They 
administered the CANTAB battery of EF tasks as well as non-executive memory 
tasks to a group of adolescents and adults with WS as well as CA- and verbal MA-
matched control groups. Parents of adolescents with WS completed the Connors 
Rating Scale, measuring behaviours associated with ADHD, and the Strengths and 
Difficulties Questionnaire, giving scores for various social and emotional aspects 
of behaviour, e.g., ‘prosocial behaviour’,  and ‘conduct problems’. Abnormal or 
borderline scores were observed in between 54% and 100% of participants on 
the questionnaire scales, and were associated with performance on executive 
(set-shifting, working memory and planning) and non-executive short-term 
memory (STM) tasks. Thus, EF and STM deficits in WS could underlie behavioural 
difficulties in this population. 
 
Thus, improvements in self-help skills are seen with age in both populations, but a 
peak in DS has been identified at age 30 followed by some decline, while in WS 
there is no evidence for this. Data addressing whether individuals are allowed to 
travel independently, or allowed out alone, indicate similar patterns, with around 
half of each sample not allowed to travel by themselves. Independence measures 
from the interview data in the DS group remained constant with age, but they 
increased in the WS group. There is also evidence for adaptive behaviour in 
general being associated with IQ in each of the groups. 
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It is known, therefore, that everyday functioning in WS and DS is poor, and also 
variable across individuals, reinforcing the heterogeneous nature of the 
populations (e.g., Tsao & Kindelberger, 2009). Further investigation of everyday 
functioning and of which cognitive skills might underlie everyday problem 
solving in these groups is clearly warranted. The next section addresses some of 
the ways in which everyday skills can be measured. 
4.1.3 Measuring everyday life skills  
Assessments of everyday life skills manifest at several different levels, ranging 
from measuring abilities experimentally (attention, EF, memory) and assuming 
that these processes will apply in the same way in real life, to rating scales and 
interviews, as described in the section above (e.g., the VABS and SDQ), which ask 
directly about behaviours in a real-world context. Clearly, both approaches have 
different merits but may not serve to inform each other, bringing us back to the 
ecological validity problem: experimental work does not necessarily tell us about 
everyday life, while descriptions of behaviour, although often clustered around 
certain concepts (e.g., hyperactivity/inattention and prosocial behaviour 
measures from the SDQ), may not tell us about underlying psychological 
constructs per se, such as inhibition or shifting (e.g., Burgess et al., 2006). 
 
In the neuropsychological literature, there are two types of research that address 
real life as a response to the ecological validity problem (Spooner & Pachana, 
2006). The first is research in which tasks are developed that attempt to imitate 
real-life situations (e.g., the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test; B. Wilson, 
Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1985) including a cooking task (Frisch, Förstl, Legler, 
Schöpe, & Goebel, 2012). The second is research in which bona fide real-life 
situations are investigated, and the relationship with outcomes on laboratory 
tasks assessed (Burgess et al., 1998; Spooner & Pachana, 2006). The former is 
known as establishing verisimilitude and the latter, as veridicality (Franzen and 
Wilhelm, 1996, cited in Spooner & Pachana, 2006).  
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Veridicality, rather than verisimilitude, is the approach taken in the current study, 
using a questionnaire approach. Parental questionnaires provide an efficient way 
of gaining an understanding of behaviours in a real-life context. As well as 
allowing us to ask directly about the everyday lives of the populations of interest 
to assess the ecological validity of EF tasks, this approach allows us to pursue an 
understanding of individuals’ experiences with the ill-defined problems that 
occur in everyday life; problem solving is examined in its natural environment. 
4.1.4 Behavioral Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) 
One measure that was designed for the assessment of everyday executive 
functioning is the Behavioural Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; 
Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000a).  It takes the form of a questionnaire, 
asking parents directly about their child’s EF. It is argued to be an ecologically 
valid measure with strong veridicality because it measures everyday functioning 
(Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy, & Barton, 2002). The BRIEF was selected for use in the 
current study for several reasons. First, it provides scores on the widely 
recognised components of EF (including Inhibition, Shifting and Working 
Memory) which were measured in the study in Chapter 2 (for a list of scales see 
Section 4.2.4.1). This would allow comparison of experimental and questionnaire 
scores in this sample of participants to assess the conceptual distance between 
the two sets of data. Second, it has been validated and standardised using a large 
sample of TD children of a wide age range (5 to 18 years) indicating broad 
suitability for young children right through to young adults. This was important 
to ensure suitability, as far as possible, for the wide range of ages and abilities to 
be tested: parents of young TD children as well as young adults with intellectual 
disabilities would be completing the questionnaire. The 5 to 18 age range could 
also be expected to capture the mental ages of the atypical samples of adolescents 
and young adults. Third, the BRIEF was designed for assessment of EFs in 
individuals with a variety of medical conditions and disorders. Gioia, Isquith, 
Kenworthy, et al. (2002), the authors of the BRIEF, report data indicating 
different EF profiles on the BRIEF in children with ADHD subtypes, autistic 
spectrum disorders (ASD) and reading disorders as well as traumatic brain injury 
(TBI). Indeed, the professional manual also contains unpublished data for 
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individuals with learning disabilities, making it a very relevant choice for groups 
with WS and DS.  
 
Few studies have used the BRIEF in DS and WS. Lee et al. (2011) present data 
from 26 parents of children with DS aged between 4 and 10 years using the 
Preschool version of the BRIEF. Standardised scores were calculated using 
outcomes from IQ tests (approximating mental age, MA) instead of CA. Elevated, 
i.e., impaired, scores were found for Working Memory and Plan/Organize scales 
relative to norms for TD children with CAs that corresponded to the DS sample’s 
MAs. In contrast, indices measuring inhibitory self-control and flexibility were not 
significantly elevated above estimates of the level expected for the sample’s MA. 
As the authors acknowledge, this study does not include a control comparison 
group (either typical or atypical). A lack of a comparison group with another 
disorder or intellectual impairment will mean that conclusions cannot be drawn 
about the syndrome specificity of the patterns in performance that are observed. 
 
Two studies have employed the BRIEF with a WS group. One used the measure to 
investigate sensory abnormalities in WS, and the other used the BRIEF to 
investigate the relationship between EF and anxiety diagnoses (Woodruff-
Borden, Kistler, Henderson, Crawford, & Mervis, 2010). John and Mervis (2010) 
asked parents of children aged 6 to 10 years with WS to complete several 
questionnaire-based measures, including the BRIEF. On the basis of outcomes 
from the Short Sensory Profile (SSP), children were split into two groups: low and 
high sensory impairment. The ‘high impairment’ group scored more poorly than 
the ‘low impairment’ group on six of the eight scales of the BRIEF: Shift, 
Emotional Control, Initiate, Working memory, Plan/Organize, and Monitor. 
Unfortunately, information about the EF profile for the group that would be 
revealed by comparing scores across the scales was not provided. Woodruff-
Borden et al. (2010) found that within a group of 33 children with WS, children 
with a diagnosis of an anxiety disorder scored more poorly on the Behavioral 
Regulation Index (BRI) than those who did not, with this difference not apparent 
for the Metacognition Index (MI). 
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4.1.5 Problem-Solving Questionnaire (PSQ) 
To complement this commercially available standardised measure examining 
everyday EF, a novel questionnaire was designed with the specific aim of 
investigating everyday problem solving. In everyday life there are many 
opportunities for failing to solve a problem, and the aim of developing this 
questionnaire was to understand them in WS and DS.  
 
The aim in mind when designing the questionnaire was to identify areas of 
strength and weakness in problem solving in different developmentally 
disordered groups, in order to further knowledge of which areas might, in future, 
be ripe for intervention. Strengths are important to consider as well as 
weaknesses and it should not always be assumed that weak areas are the areas to 
support when designing interventions (Karmiloff-Smith & Farran, 2012b). 
4.1.5.1 PSQ Development 
Several sources were consulted while the questionnaire was in its development 
stage. Pretz et al. (2003) note that there are seven stages of problem solving, 
requiring solvers to:  
1) Recognise or identify the problem 
2) Define and represent the problem mentally  
3) Develop a solution strategy 
4) Organise his or her knowledge about the problem  
5) Allocate mental and physical resources for solving the problem  
6) Monitor his or her progress towards the goal  
7) Evaluate the solution for accuracy      (p. 3).  
 
These aspects of problem solving were used as an initial basis for the 
construction of the questions that parents were asked in the PSQ. Behavioural 
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manifestations of these aspects were loosely based on these points, for example, 
points 5 and 6 might manifest as ‘doing steps in the right order’ and ‘staying 
focused on the task’. Efforts were made throughout questionnaire construction to 
describe tangible behaviours that parents can make judgements about, and 
relevant examples were given in each different question to this end, so for getting 
dressed the example given for ‘doing steps in the right order’ is ‘e.g. putting on 
socks before shoes’ while for brushing teeth it is ‘e.g. putting toothpaste on the 
brush before starting to brush’. In this way, attempts were made to identify any 
difficulties with problem solving through the behaviours that might be produced 
if that particular aspect of problem solving were to fail. It is also possible to 
speculate that specific items on the PSQ might relate to some aspects of 
experimental performance more than others: for example, difficulties with 
‘staying focused on the task’ might indicate impairments in inhibition or working 
memory, while ‘doing steps in the right order’ might conceivably draw on 
working memory and planning abilities. However, it should be kept in mind that 
high-level tasks are being reported on in the questionnaires, and given the 
interrelated nature of EFs (e.g., Lehto et al., 2003; Miyake et al., 2000) it is likely 
that several aspects of EF are involved while performing real-life tasks. 
 
Efforts were made to select everyday tasks that would be relevant for as many 
participants as possible. When considering everyday life, it soon became apparent 
that many tasks are completed as a matter of course in our daily lives, such as 
getting dressed and brushing our teeth. This kind of scenario had the advantage 
of being potentially applicable to all of the participants’ lives, but being such a 
routine task, it seemed likely that the different steps in the task would be over 
learned, or automatic. By contrast, problem-solving skills really come into play 
when a task is novel (Rabitt, 1997b, cited in Miyake et al., 2000; Shallice, 1982). 
Therefore, the questionnaire was divided into two sections: four questions asked 
parents about their child’s abilities and behaviour on everyday, or routine, tasks, 
and three asked about tasks that were considered more novel.  
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Generating novel tasks that would be encountered often enough in everyday life 
to allow us to ask large groups of parents reliably about the scenario was a 
challenge. To resolve this, tasks were chosen that, even if they were frequently 
encountered, would nonetheless incorporate an element of unpredictability. The 
novel tasks included were: finding a lost possession; packing a bag; and putting 
items away in a wardrobe. When finding a lost possession, the demands of the 
task would vary greatly depending on the item lost, location it was lost in, and so 
on. Packing a bag for the day would have varying demands in relation to, for 
example, the weather and activities ahead on that particular day. Finally, putting 
items away in a wardrobe/chest of drawers would vary its demands depending 
on how much needed to be put away and how much was already in the cupboard 
to be filled. In contrast, while elements of the routine tasks might also vary it was 
felt that these were more minor variations.   
 
Advice from Beck (personal communication, October 13th, 2011) emphasised the 
importance of how children cope when something goes wrong with the problem 
they are attempting to solve: for example, if they are getting dressed and can’t get 
an item of clothing on, what do they do? This advice was incorporated into the 
questionnaire design such that each question had an additional part: once 
something has gone wrong, which behaviours are children likely to exhibit? This 
gives a valuable window into the kinds of strategies that children use in everyday 
life. It also allows us to investigate how children respond when even a well-
learned everyday task goes wrong, thus introducing a real element of problem 
solving into even the questions about routine tasks. 
 
Presenting questionnaire development ideas to a variety of audiences also greatly 
aided with questionnaire design: a practitioner who interacted with parents of 
individuals with DS through his work noted that parents often report difficulties 
with brushing teeth in this group; parents at a convention for the Williams 
Syndrome Foundation (WSF) gave extremely useful feedback, including noting 
particular difficulties with keeping bedrooms tidy (prompting the inclusion of the 
final question regarding putting items away in a wardrobe/chest of drawers), and 
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a colleague who is also a parent of an individual with WS reviewed the 
questionnaire to ascertain its appropriateness for the group and its capture of 
relevant aspects of problem solving. Finally, further discussion with colleagues 
and consultation of questionnaire design resources ("Guide to the Design of 
Questionnaires", n.d.; "Questionnaire Design", n.d.) and literature (Vaus, 2002) 
contributed to the final design of the questionnaire. A five-point Likert scale was 
employed, as in, for example, the “Problem-Solving Style Questionnaire” 
("Problem-Solving Style Questionnaire (PSSQ)," n.d.) in order to obtain data that 
were quantifiable. Parents were given a choice of five responses for each item, in 
order to give respondents a fine-grained level of answering without 
overwhelming detail, and an odd number of items was chosen to allow 
respondents to choose the middle option if they wished, which does not indicate a 
direction of response. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
4.2.1.1 Demographics 
Data were collected from the parents of 113 individuals in total. One participant 
from the DS group was excluded because the parent noted that the child also had 
a diagnosis of autism, leaving 112 in the data set. There was no risk of dementia in 
the DS group as they were aged under 30 years (cf., Lott & Head, 2001). It should 
be acknowledged that it was the parents who completed the questionnaires about 
their child’s everyday problem solving, and the parents who are therefore the 
respondents in the study. However, as we will be referring to the (sometimes 
adult) son’s or daughter’s ‘performance’ on the questionnaires, they will be 
hereafter referred to as the participants. Demographic information for the 
participants is presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Questionnaire participant demographics  
 
ANOVA revealed that CA was significantly different across the groups (F(2,109) = 
79.047, p <. 001, partial η2 = .592), with the TD group being younger than the 
atypical groups (p < .001 for both) and no significant difference between the ages 
of the WS and DS groups (p = .787). Data regarding the presence or otherwise of 
siblings were available for 16 participants in the DS group and 30 in the WS 
group. Of these, two individuals with DS and four with WS were known to not 
have any siblings. 
 
4.2.1.2 Mental age measures 
Additional data regarding participants’ verbal and nonverbal ability were also 
available for a subset of each group because they had participated in the study in 
Chapter 2. These data are summarised in Table 4.2 below. 
  
Group (N) 
Males: 
Females 
CA Range Mean CA (SD) 
years:months 
years:months 
(months) 
TD (34) 18:16 4:10 - 11:5 8:3 (23.87) 
DS (31) 14:17 10:4 - 23:9 17:4 (47.91) 
WS (47) 24:23 10:7 - 26:6 18:0 (52.03) 
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Table 4.2: Demographics of subsets of questionnaire participants with mental age data4 
 
For these subsets, ANOVAs revealed that performance on BPVS and RCPM 
differed across the three groups. On the BPVS, there was a main effect of Group 
(F(2,52) = 7.346, p = .002, partial η2 = .220). The DS group performed more poorly 
than the WS (p = .006) and TD (p = .020) groups, with no reliable difference 
between WS and TD (p = .637). For the RCPM scores, the main effect of Group 
(F(2,52) = 14.061, p < .001, partial η2 = .351) was driven by reliably better 
performance in TD than DS (p = .002) and in TD than WS groups (p < .001) with 
no significant difference between the two atypical groups (p = .943). Given the 
similar age ranges of the subset with mental age data to the larger set for whom 
questionnaire data are available, it can be tentatively assumed that the subsets 
are representative of the larger groups in terms of their RCPM and BPVS scores. 
 
CA was significantly related to BPVS score in each group (TD: r = .870, p < .001; 
DS: r = .622, p = .018; WS: r = .694, p = .003). CA was significantly related to RCPM 
score in the TD (r = .790, p < .001) and DS groups (r = .717, p = .004) but not in the 
WS group (r = -.198, p = .463). 
                                                        
4
 In order to ensure that the slightly wider age range in the questionnaire group than in the experimental 
group was not affecting outcomes, questionnaire performance was compared in the experimental subsets 
and was found to be consistent with the results pattern for the larger questionnaire groups, seen in Figure 
4.3 (WS < DS < TD). Thus, the pattern of questionnaire performance against the backdrop of the BPVS 
and RCPM scores is supported, and it is unlikely that individuals at the extremes of the questionnaire 
respondents’ age range were unduly affecting the outcomes. 
 
Group (N) 
Males: 
Females 
CA Range 
CA  Mean 
(SD) RCPM Raw 
Score 
BPVS Raw 
Score years: 
months 
years: 
months 
(months) 
TD (25) 11:14 4:10 - 11:5 
8:3 
(24.36) 
26.40 
(6.92) 
108.28 
(22.95) 
DS (14) 8:6 12:2 - 23:9 
18:1 
(45.12) 
18.29 
(6.09) 
82.50 
(28.06) 
WS (16) 8:8 12:2 - 22:10 
17:6 
(39.72) 
17.69 
(3.32) 
115.19 
(24.13) 
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4.2.1.3 Recruitment 
In the case of the TD group, questionnaires were sent out to parents of the 
children who participated in the experimental study via the school office, plus 
some additional parents of children from each age group. Parents of the atypical 
participants were either posted questionnaires to complete and return in a 
Freepost envelope or, in the case of some of the atypical participants, parents 
completed them while their child was the experimental tasks (Chapter 2). On 
occasion one or both questionnaires were completed by telephone, although 
written consent was always obtained. Parents of atypical participants were either 
parents who had previously worked with the research group or were recruited 
anew through the Williams Syndrome Foundation (WSF) or Down Syndrome 
Association (DSA). In the case of WS, parents were only recruited if their child had 
a diagnosis of WS confirmed both phenotypically and by a genetic fluorescence in 
situ hybridisation (FISH) test for the elastin deletion. For both atypical groups, 
efforts were made to ensure that questionnaires were sent to parents in a range 
of geographical areas, with some parents from the London area and some outside 
the London area, in order to sample a range of socio-economic status (SES) 
families. Informed consent was obtained from all respondents. The overwhelming 
majority of respondents were mothers (96) with 10 responses from fathers 
(hence, the respondent group is referred to as ‘parents’) and a small number of 
other respondents, e.g., stepmother or sister (supervised by parents). One mother 
completed the questionnaire together with support workers where her son lived 
at a nearby care home. Most of the sets of questionnaires were completed by the 
same person, but on exception the respondents were different, e.g. for one 
participant their mother completed one questionnaire and their father, the other.  
4.2.2 Materials 
Parents completed two questionnaires: the Behavioral Rating Inventory of 
Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia et al., 2000a) and our novel Problem-Solving 
Questionnaire (PSQ).   
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4.2.3 Procedure 
Parents received an envelope containing both questionnaires, an information 
sheet about the study, and an additional information sheet concerning the BRIEF, 
asking parents to omit any items that they felt were not relevant for their child. 
The BRIEF consists of a list of 86 behavioural descriptions, or items, and for each 
item, parents are asked to select one of three options: whether the behaviour has 
Never, Sometimes or Often been a problem for the child over the last six months. 
On the website ("BRIEF", "BRIEF (Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive 
Function),") the form is reported as taking 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
The PSQ consists of seven questions asking about different problems that their 
child might encounter in everyday life. For the majority of the questionnaire 
parents respond by choosing between several options and circling the relevant 
one. Each question also includes the opportunity for a more open-ended 
response. At the end of the everyday tasks and before the novel problems section 
there is space for parents to describe any strategies that have been helpful for 
their child when performing everyday tasks, and to report whether this strategy 
was taught or self-initiated. There is also space at the end for any further 
comments. The questionnaire is estimated to take approximately 30 minutes to 
complete, depending on the level of detail provided by the parent. 
 
4.2.4 Design  
4.2.4.1 The BRIEF 
The BRIEF provides a score on eight scales of executive functioning: Inhibit, Shift, 
Emotional Control, Initiate, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Organization of 
Materials and Monitor. Combining the first three scales gives a score on a 
Behavioural Regulation Index (BRI) and the latter five, on a Metacognition Index 
(MI). These two indices further combine to give a global score: the Global 
Executive Composite (GEC). The BRIEF is a standardised measure with acceptable 
reliability and validity (for more information, see Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & 
Kenworthy, 2000b). 
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4.2.4.2 The PSQ 
The PSQ was developed for the purpose of this study in order to understand 
problem solving in everyday life. It takes a different approach to the BRIEF in that, 
rather than asking about how often behaviours occur, parents are asked to rate 
how easy their child finds different aspects of several tasks, and then asked to 
imagine that something has gone wrong with the task and asked how likely their 
child might be to produce certain responses. There were also several 
opportunities for parents to provide more open-ended responses.  
4.2.4.2.1 PSQ design 
The PSQ can be found in Appendix D. It consists of seven questions: the first four 
ask about routine tasks and the remaining three, about more novel problems. A 
list of question topics can be found in Table 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3: PSQ question topics 
 
Each of the seven questions follows the same format, with some variations 
between questions, as appropriate. Each question is split into two parts, 
‘approach’ and ‘response’, with various aspects of problem solving addressed in 
each part: see Table 4.4 for a summary of aspects that were addressed in each 
question, along with an abbreviated aspect name that will be used throughout the 
chapter. 
  
Question 
Number 
Routine/Novel Topic 
1 Routine Getting dressed 
2 Routine Brushing teeth 
3 Routine Making a sandwich 
4 Routine Making a telephone call 
5 Novel Finding a lost possession 
6 Novel Packing a bag for the day 
7 Novel 
Putting items away in a 
wardrobe/chest of drawers 
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 Aspect Abbreviation 
Approach 
 Knowing what the goal of the problem is Know 
Routine: Knowing what can be done to 
reach the goal 
Novel: having some ideas about what could 
be done to reach the goal 
What 
Routine: Doing steps in the right order 
Novel: Keeping track of what they are 
doing 
Steps 
Staying focused on the task Focus 
Stopping when a task is finished Stop 
Response 
 Change what they have been doing in 
response to the problem 
Change 
Ask for help Ask 
Become Emotional Emotion 
Lose focus Lose focus 
Stop their efforts through lack of 
perseverance 
Lack 
perseverance 
Table 4.4: Aspects of problem solving shared across questions in the PSQ 
 
While the majority of the items appeared across all the questions and are 
presented here, certain items only appeared in some questions, for example, 
when asking about finding a lost possession, an item was included to assess how 
likely the child is to ‘end their search after a sensible amount of time if the item 
has not been found’. For full details of the contents of each question, see Appendix 
D. 
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At the beginning of each question about routine tasks, parents noted whether 
their child usually does the task independently; with some help or only if 
someone else does it for them; if ‘some help’ was chosen they are asked whether 
the help was in the form of specific instructions, general encouragement or 
physical support. For the Getting Dressed question they also noted whether the 
child chooses the clothes themselves or whether someone else chooses them, as 
this was felt to be a salient potential reason for failing the task. While getting 
dressed and brushing teeth are extremely likely to happen daily, making a 
sandwich and making a telephone call are conceivably less so; therefore at the 
start of these questions parents rated how often their son or daughter attempts 
the task.  
 
Then, the approach section of each question asks about how easy a child would 
find each aspect of a task, and parents are asked to circle a number between 1 
(very easy) and 5 (very difficult). This constitutes a measure of the child’s 
capability with the task. In the response part of the problem, parents are asked 
how likely their child would be to display certain behaviours if something had 
gone wrong with the task, for example when getting dressed, a t-shirt was put on 
backwards. Parents choose between five options again, with 1 representing very 
likely and 5, very unlikely. The next part of each question addresses any other 
behaviour the child might be likely to exhibit, thus giving the parent the 
opportunity to provide any additional information they feel is necessary. Finally 
the parent was asked what the reason was likely to be, if their son or daughter 
were to fail the task.  
4.3 Results 
Results of the PSQ and BRIEF questionnaires will be presented through: the 
comparison of performance across groups on an overall percentage score for each 
questionnaire; an analysis of chronological and mental age measures and how 
they relate to overall performance in each group; and subsequently, a detailed 
analysis of performance on each questionnaire. First, the data handling and 
scoring considerations for the two questionnaires (which are used in Sections 
4.3.3 and 4.3.4) are outlined, in order to illustrate the way in which the overall 
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percentage scores were calculated. For the open-ended parts of the PSQ 
questions, a large number of response areas were left blank. This has not been 
analysed. 
4.3.1 Data handling 
4.3.1.1 BRIEF 
4.3.1.1.1 Scoring 
The BRIEF consists of 86 statements for which parents are asked to judge 
whether the behaviour is Never, Sometimes or Often a problem, scoring one, two 
and three points respectively. Different numbers of items contribute to each of 
the eight scales (in Section 4.2.4). The sum of the points for all the items in a scale 
gives a raw score for the scale. There are also 14 additional items which are 
classified as falling under one of the scales but do not contribute to the raw score 
for any scale. Raw scores can be converted into T scores with a mean of 50 and a 
standard deviation of 10 (see Section 4.3.3.3). One approach to scoring on the 
BRIEF, used particularly when dealing with group data (e.g., as used by Gioia et 
al., 2000a) is to calculate the mean item score (between 1 and 3) for a scale. This 
allows comparison of scales which vary in the number of items that they contain 
(Gioia et al., 2000a p.66). This is therefore the approach adopted in the BRIEF 
analysis section (Section 4.3.3).   
4.3.1.1.2 Missing data 
The BRIEF is designed for administration to children aged between 5 and 18 
years, and includes several questions pertaining to school and homework. As 
many of the participants in the study were older than 18 years and as even the 
younger participants may not be engaging with, for example, homework, in the 
same way as a typical population (e.g., planning for long-term assignments) 
instructions were given to parents on administration to not answer any question 
that they felt was not relevant for their child.  
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of missing items by BRIEF scale and group 
 
Figure 4.1 summarises, for each group, the number of missing items for each scale 
as a percentage of the total number of potential responses for that scale, including 
the additional items that do not contribute towards raw scale scores. 
 
A striking pattern when viewing Figure 4.1 is the high number of missing items in 
the DS and WS groups for the Plan/Organize scale. Out of 14 items, ten were 
related to school life. Only four remained that seem to apply outside school. For 
the reasons discussed in the paragraph above, the link to school life is likely to 
account for the high levels of missing responses for the atypical groups. 
 
To check for syndrome-specific patterns of missing data, the percentage of 
respondents omitting each item was calculated separately for each group. Those 
items with a percentage omitted falling two or more standard deviations above 
the mean were identified. The vast majority of items omitted were in the 
Plan/Organize scale (corresponding to Figure 4.1). Five items met this criterion 
for the WS group and six for the DS group, with an overlap between groups of 
three items. All were related to school life and thus do not reflect syndrome-
specific patterns in response. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 M
is
si
n
g 
Scale 
Percentage of Missing Items by Scale and Group 
TD
DS
WS
202 
 
 
In order to deal with missing data (which were a natural consequence of the 
instructions given to parents to omit irrelevant items) the average of all of the 
responses provided, across all scale items (not including the 14 additional items) 
and across all participants, was used to replace all the missing data points. This 
was judged to be the most conservative approach to dealing with missing data, as 
it minimises the differences in scores across groups, so that any group differences 
that are found would be likely to be robust.  
4.3.1.1.3 Consistency 
Using the BRIEF manual it is possible to calculate an inconsistency score for each 
respondent. This is achieved by calculating the absolute difference in scores 
between ten particular pairs of items with high correlations between the pairs of 
scores (with r values between .64 and .84) in their clinical sample of 852 children. 
The sum of the ten absolute differences gives the inconsistency score, which 
ranges from 0 to 20. Scores less than or equal to 6 are deemed acceptable, 7 to 8 
questionable, and 9 or more classified as inconsistent. Of the current sample, one 
parent in the TD group scored 7, one DS parent scored 8, and three WS parents 
scored 7, while all of the remaining scores fell in the ‘acceptable’ category at 6 or 
below. The average score for each group was calculated and compared using a 
one-way ANOVA, which did not reveal any significant differences across the 
groups (F<1). 
4.3.1.2 PSQ 
4.3.1.2.1 Scoring 
Parents responded to the PSQ by selecting one of five Likert-style options, ranging 
from an answer of 1 representing ‘Very easy’ or ‘Very likely’ while 5 represented 
‘Very difficult’ or ‘Very unlikely’. In the main, answers of 1 scored four points; 
answers of 2, three points; 3, two points; 4, one point; and 5, zero points. Thus, 
being more likely to achieve elements of problem solving was associated with 
better scores, e.g., when asked how likely their son or daughter would be to 
change what they were doing in response to a problem, a response reporting their 
being very likely to do this would achieve the most points (four), with ‘Very 
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unlikely’ scoring the fewest points (zero). However, in the case of three of the 
variables with a negative valence (‘become emotional’, ‘lose focus’ and ‘stop their 
efforts due to a lack of perseverance’) the scores were reversed such that the 
most points were awarded when participants were reported as the least likely to 
display these behaviours. This served to preserve the direction of scoring, so that 
higher scores were always equated with better problem solving. 
4.3.1.2.2 Missing data 
Responses to the PSQ did not follow a uniform pattern in terms of the response 
rate per question. Overall, questions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 were answered by more than 
98% of parents.  Questions 3 and 4, however, saw a much lower response rate, of 
73.21% and 82.14% respectively. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, displaying, for 
each group, the percentage of respondents for each group omitting the whole 
question (reminders of the question topics are included below Figure 4.2). The 
rightmost cluster of bars displays the number of items omitted within whole 
questions that were completed, expressed as a percentage, for the group, of the 
total maximum number of responses. That is:  
 
Total number of items omitted, not constituting omitted whole questions
N (number of respondents in group)  95 (number of items on PSQ)
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Figure 4.2: Percentage of missing responses by question on the PSQ 
 
 
 
Given the large numbers of missing responses to questions 3 and 4, overall 
analysis of the PSQ will include questions 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7 only. As for the BRIEF 
analysis, all missing data points were replaced with the overall mean of all the 
responses, across all groups. 
4.3.1.3 Approaches 
4.3.1.3.1 Selection of an appropriate post hoc comparison procedure 
Given the unequal sample sizes across groups, for between-participants post hoc 
tests, the Games-Howell procedure was selected over Tukey because it is accurate 
for unequal sample sizes (as well as taking account of unequal population 
variances) (Field, 2009). Thus it is reported in the analysis above and throughout 
the chapter. Where data did not meet the assumption of sphericity, the adjusted F 
value and degrees of freedom are reported according to the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction. 
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4.3.1.3.2 Likert-type scales 
Both questionnaires use a Likert-type scale. Grace-Martin (2008) notes that 
researchers disagree on the use of Likert-style data in parametric tests; some 
argue that it is not appropriate because of the ordinal nature of the data. She 
makes several recommendations: a minimum of 5 points used in the scales, 
caution with results that are close to the significance boundary and the use of 
non-parametric equivalent tests where possible. Given these considerations, 
nonparametric tests were used in parallel to parametric tests, and are reported 
alongside them when they show a different pattern of results.  
4.3.2 Percentage score analysis 
4.3.2.1 Calculation 
In order to give an overall indication of reported performance on each 
questionnaire, a percentage score was calculated for the PSQ and the BRIEF 
separately. Given that respondents were instructed to leave out any items that 
they felt were less relevant, it was important not to introduce penalties for 
missing items in the scoring. Therefore, scores were calculated using the 
following formula, for data from all questions (1-7): 
 
Points awarded
Maximum possible points based on the number of responses made
   100   
 
Thus, individual respondents were not penalised for making fewer responses.  
4.3.2.2 Assigning points 
The points awarded for each response for the calculation of percentage scores 
were decided upon in order to achieve consistency between the two 
questionnaires. The scoring on the PSQ, as detailed in Section 4.3.1.2.1, is 
arranged so that the most positive response earned four points and the most 
negative, zero, with three intermediate options earning three, two and one points. 
When completing the BRIEF, parents selected one of three options for each 
statement: whether the behaviour was Never, Sometimes or Often a problem for 
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their child. In the same way as for the PSQ, the best response possible (Never) 
was assigned four points for the percentage score calculation; Sometimes, two 
points; and Often, zero points. Very rarely, parents would circle two adjacent 
answers, e.g., Often and Sometimes, and in these instances the score given 
reflected this, being midway between the score for each circled answer: in this 
case, one point (midway between zero points for Often and two points for 
Sometimes). Higher percentage scores thus equated with better problem solving, 
for both questionnaires. 
4.3.2.3 Group comparisons 
Groups were compared on the overall percentage scores for each questionnaire, 
as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
 
As a reminder, DS and WS groups were approximately matched on nonverbal IQ 
(Raven’s score) while the TD group had a higher nonverbal IQ but was 
significantly younger. A mixed ANOVA on the overall percentage scores on the 
two questionnaires by Group revealed a significant main effect of Questionnaire 
(F(1,107) = 148.793, p < .001, partial η2 = .582), with percentage scores being 
higher for the PSQ than the BRIEF overall. A significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,107) = 47.065, p < .001, partial η2 = .468) indicated higher scores for TD than 
DS groups (p = .001) and for DS than WS (p < .001) using the Games-Howell 
procedure. There was a significant interaction between Questionnaire and Group 
 
Figure 4.3: Overall percentage scores on the BRIEF and PSQ by group 
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(p = .006, partial η2 = .090). One-way ANOVAs revealed main effects of Group for 
each questionnaire (p < .001 for both) with Games-Howell comparisons indicating 
better performance for TD than DS groups (PSQ: p = .016; BRIEF: p < .001), and 
for DS than WS groups (PSQ: p = .002; BRIEF: p  < .001). Equally, paired samples t-
tests indicate significant within-group differences for each questionnaire (p < 
.001 for all). Thus, the interaction appears to be due only to degrees of difference; 
there are greater group differences on the BRIEF than on the PSQ. For each group, 
the two overall percentage scores were significantly correlated with each other 
(TD: r = .552, p = .001; DS: r = .806, p < .001; WS: r = .703, p < .001). 
 
Small numbers of the WS and DS group were known not to have any siblings. To 
assess whether the presence of siblings influenced parental questionnaire ratings, 
the percentage score on each questionnaire was compared between children with 
and without siblings. Because the number of individuals known to be without any 
siblings was so small (two in DS and four in WS) nonparametric tests were used 
in this analysis. For both groups, Mann-Whitney tests indicated no significant 
differences in percentage scores between individuals with and without siblings (p 
> .05 for all). In addition, all the scores for individuals without siblings fell within 
two standard deviations of the mean of the percentage scores of the individuals 
with siblings.  
4.3.2.4 Developmental trajectories 
4.3.2.4.1 CA 
As the trajectories for the typical and atypical groups are non-overlapping, the CA 
trajectories were compared for the WS and DS groups only. CA and percentage 
scores on the BRIEF are presented in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4: Developmental trajectories of BRIEF percentage based on CA 
 
CA was significantly related to BRIEF percentage score in each of these groups 
(but not in the TD group) (DS: r = .504, p = .005; WS: r = .331, p = .025; TD: r = 
.116, p = .515). ANCOVA was conducted on the WS and DS data, with CA as the 
predictor variable, with the CA by BRIEF score interaction term included in the 
model. ANCOVA revealed a significant difference between the groups at the 
lowest level of CA (p = .030) and a significant effect of the covariate, CA (p < .001). 
The gradient of the slopes did not differ significantly (F<1) indicating that the 
relationship between CA and BRIEF score did not differ between the two atypical 
groups. The scatter plot for the PSQ is displayed in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.5: Developmental trajectories of PSQ percentage based on CA 
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Correlations between CA and PSQ percentage score were significant for the 
atypical groups (DS: r = .426, p = .017; WS: r = .334, p = .022) and marginally 
related in the TD group (r = .311, p = .074). ANCOVA on the PSQ data revealed no 
significant differences between the two atypical groups’ scores at the lowest level 
of CA (p = .155). While PSQ scores increased with CA overall (p = .001) the two 
slope gradients did not differ significantly (F<1), indicating that this relationship 
was similar for DS and WS groups. 
 
Finally, for those participants for whom mental age data were available 
(demographics are provided in Table 4.2), the relationships between verbal and 
nonverbal MA and questionnaire scores were examined by comparing the 
developmental trajectories of the BRIEF and PSQ overall percentage scores, using 
BPVS and RCPM scores as predictors.  
4.3.2.4.2 BPVS 
Figure 4.6 displays the scatter plot of the BRIEF and BPVS data. 
 
Figure 4.6: Developmental trajectories of BRIEF percentage based on BPVS score 
 
The correlation between the two measures was significant in WS (r = .526, p = 
.037) but not in the other two groups (TD: r = .127, p = .545; DS: r = .192, p = 
.511). ANCOVA revealed that the BRIEF scores differed across groups at the 
lowest BPVS scores (F(2,49) = 18.975, p < .001, partial η2 = .436), with WS 
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performance being lower than DS performance, which was lower than TD 
performance (p < .05 for all). While BPVS was related to BRIEF score overall 
(F(1,49) = 5.112, p = .028, partial η2 = .094) the difference in the slopes did not 
reach significance (p = .279). The scatter plot for the BPVS and PSQ data is 
displayed in Figure 4.7. 
 
Figure 4.7: Developmental trajectories of PSQ percentage based on BPVS score 
 
There was a significant association between BPVS and PSQ percentage overall 
(F(1,49) = 12.093, p = .001, partial η2 = .198). Correlations between BPVS and PSQ 
scores were significant in the WS group (r = .558, p = .025), marginally significant 
for the TD group (r = .383, p = .059) and non-significant in the DS group (r = .318, 
p = .267). At the lowest levels of BPVS score, the PSQ scores differed across 
groups (F(2,49) = 16.788, p < .001, partial η2 = .407), with post hoc ANOVAs 
revealing lower WS scores than each other group (p < .001 for both) and no 
difference between DS and TD groups (p = .141). Overall, the BPVS slopes did not 
vary significantly (p = .265). Figure 4.8 displays the scatter plot for the RCPM and 
BRIEF. 
 
 
 
y = 0.1718x + 65.649 
R² = 0.1465 
y = 0.1729x + 57.649 
R² = 0.1014 
y = 0.451x - 0.8359 
R² = 0.3118 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 50 100 150
P
SQ
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
BPVS Raw Score 
PSQ % and BPVS by Group 
TD
DS
WS
Linear (TD)
Linear (DS)
Linear (WS)
211 
 
4.3.2.4.3 RCPM 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Developmental trajectories of BRIEF percentage based on RCPM score 
  
The association between RCPM and BRIEF scores overall did not reach 
significance (F(1,49) = 3.557, p = .065, partial η2 = .068) while correlations 
between BRIEF percentage and RCPM score in each group revealed no significant 
correlations for TD and DS groups (TD: r = -.058, p = .781; DS: r = .452, p = .105) 
but a significant negative correlation in WS (R = -.664, p = .005). ANCOVA 
revealed that the groups’ BRIEF scores differed at the lowest level of RCPM ability 
(F(1,49) = 3.557, p = .003, partial η2 = .208) and that there were differences in the 
rate of BRIEF outcome development with RCPM score between groups (F(2,49) = 
7.271, p = .002, partial η2 = .229). Post hoc ANCOVAs revealed, at the lowest levels 
of RCPM score, higher TD than DS and WS BRIEF scores (p = .003 for both) and no 
difference between DS and WS groups’ scores (p = .927). The rate of change of the 
BRIEF score with RCPM ability was different between the WS group and the other 
two groups (DS: p = .001; TD: p = .004) and marginally different between TD and 
DS groups (p = .092). While the TD and DS groups’ trajectories converged, with 
increasingly similar BRIEF scores with increasing RCPM ability, upon examining 
the scatter plot it is clear that the WS trajectory diverged from that of the other 
two groups with increasing RCPM scores. RCPM and PSQ scores are displayed in 
Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9: Developmental trajectories of PSQ percentage based on RCPM score 
 
Overall, the association between RCPM score and PSQ percentage was marginally 
significant (F(1,49) = 3.431, p = .070, partial η2 = .181) while correlations for each 
group indicated a significant relationship for the WS group (r = -.552, p = .027) 
but not for the other two groups (TD: r = .021, p = .919; DS: r = .320, p = .265). 
Overall, the PSQ scores at the lowest level of RCPM ability differed marginally 
across groups (F(2,49) = 2.720, p = .076, partial η2 = .100) with post hoc ANCOVAs 
indicating higher TD than DS scores (p = .027) and higher TD than WS scores (p = 
.041) with no difference between DS and WS scores (p = .879). The slopes differed 
by group (F(2,49) = 5.416, p = .007, partial η2 = .181). Post hoc analysis 
demonstrated that there was no difference in slope between TD and DS 
trajectories (p = .256), while the WS trajectory again differed significantly from 
that of the other two groups (DS: p = .010, TD: p = .005), diverging with increasing 
RCPM score. 
4.3.3 BRIEF analysis 
Two respondents (one from the DS group and one from the WS group) only 
completed the PSQ. Thus the Ns for the BRIEF data were 30 (DS), 46 (WS) and 34 
(TD).  
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4.3.3.1 BRIEF scales 
Figure 4.10 displays the mean item score per group for each scale. 
 
Figure 4.10: Mean item score on the BRIEF scales by group 
 
ANOVA on the mean item scale scores revealed a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,107) = 52.141, p < .001, partial η2 = .494). Post hoc tests revealed better 
performance in the TD group than the DS group (p = .001) and WS group (p < 
.001), with better scores in the DS group than the WS group (p < .001). There was 
a significant main effect of Scale (F(5.31,568.63) = 27.455, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.204). This is explored with reference to the significant interaction between Scale 
and Group (p < .001). One-way ANOVAs indicated that Group effects were 
significant for each scale (p < .001 for all). Post hoc Games-Howell tests indicated 
that for the Shift, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Monitor and Initiate scales, 
the TD group outperformed the DS group and the DS group outperformed the WS 
group (p < .05 for all). For the remaining three scales (Inhibit, Emotional Control 
and Organization of Materials) TDs outperformed the WS group (p < .001 for all) 
and did not differ significantly from the DS group (p > .05 for all). The DS group 
also outperformed the WS group on these three scales (p < .05 for all). In other 
words, participants with DS scored more successfully than participants with WS 
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on every scale. On some scales DS performance was in line with the TD group’s, 
and on other scales it was poorer. Interestingly, Organization of Materials 
appeared to be noticeably poor in the TD group. Repeated measures ANOVAs of 
the effect of scale for each group supported this. Whilst the profile of scale scores 
was broadly similar across groups, the Organization of Materials scale exhibited 
unusual results. In TD it was poorer than each other scale. In WS it was scored 
less successfully than Inhibit, Shift, Initiate and Emotional Control. However, in DS 
it scored better than Inhibit, Working Memory, Plan/Organize and Monitor. 
4.3.3.1.1 Organization of Materials: syndrome specificity 
To compare the atypical group performance only, the mean item scores were 
recalculated, this time replacing missing scores with the average of all the 
responses to the scale items (i.e., the first 72) across the atypical groups. The 
Scale (F(5.22, 385.88) = 22.058, p < .001, partial η2 = .230) and Group effects 
(F(1,74) = 29.298, p < .001, partial η2 = .284) persisted, with better performance 
in DS than WS at each scale (p < .05 for all). The Scale by Group interaction also 
remained significant (p = .048). When removing the Organization of Materials 
scale, the interaction was no longer significant: p = .706. The interaction also 
remained significant with each of the other scales removed (p < .05 for all) with 
the exception of Monitor, without which the interaction term did not reach 
significance (p = .060). Thus, the Organization of Materials scale was the best 
marker of syndrome-specificity, but also showed an unexpected pattern for the 
TD group. 
4.3.3.1.2 Exploring the Organization of Materials scale 
Some further analyses were run in order to further the understanding of this 
pattern of results. First, individual items comprising the Organization of Materials 
scale were examined. There are six items in the scale (without additional items), 
of which four include the word ‘mess’ or derivatives of it, and all items imply that 
a physical space is left in an unordered way by the individual. ANOVA of Group 
(TD, DS, WS) by Item (6 levels) demonstrated a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,107) = 20.209, p < .001, partial η2 = .274), and of Item (F(4.506,482.138) = 
6.885, p < .001, partial η2 = .060), but no significant Group by Item interaction (p = 
.186), so the pattern of results cannot be attributed to any particular item. 
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Second, potential links between the Organization of Materials scale score and 
other background measures were ascertained to illustrate potential factors 
accounting for the unusual results. Correlations between CA and Organization of 
Materials scores were non-significant for each group (p >.05 for all), providing no 
evidence for development of this ability with age. In the BRIEF manual (Gioia et 
al., 2000a) it is noted that “The Organization of Materials scale assesses the 
manner in which children order or organize their world and belongings” (p. 20) 
which would presumably involve nonverbal reasoning. The correlation between 
RCPM and Organization of Materials was marginally significant in WS (r = .483, p 
= .058) and TD (r = .338, p = .099) groups, but not DS (p = .880) although the 
Spearman’s correlation (run due to the use of Likert-style data) did not yield a 
significant correlation in the WS group (r = .419, p = .106).  BPVS was not related 
to this scale score for any group (p > .05 for all). 
 
4.3.3.1.3 Discriminant Functions Analysis (DFA) 
DFA was conducted on the eight mean scale scores to assess whether the groups 
could be differentiated based on their parental BRIEF responses. The analysis 
identified two functions, the first of which explained 84.9% of the variance, 
canonical R2 = .624, and the other, 15.1% of the variance, canonical R2 = .228. 
Both functions together significantly differentiated the groups, L = .290, X2(16) = 
128.224, p < .001, and after removing function 1, function 2 still significantly 
differentiated the groups alone, L = .772, X2(7) = 26.771, p < .001. In terms of 
correlation coefficients between variables and functions, Organization of 
Materials loaded most highly onto function 2, while the remaining seven of the 
variables had their highest loading on function 1. The function loadings, or 
correlation coefficients, are displayed in Table 4.5, in order of the size of the 
correlation. Coefficients in bold are the highest for each scale. 
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Table 4.5: Factor loadings of BRIEF scales for discriminant functions analysis 
 
Function 1 discriminated the TD from the WS and DS groups, while function 2 
discriminated the DS group from the other two groups. This can be seen 
graphically in Figure 4.11 below. 
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TD centroid
DS centroid
WS centroid
 Function 1 Function 2 
Initiate .826 .425 
Plan/Organize .793 .120 
Working Memory .736 .242 
Shift .664 .240 
Monitor .626 .182 
Emotional Control .458 .378 
Inhibit .367 .284 
Organization of 
Materials 
.296 .887 
Figure 4.11: Canonical discriminant function scatterplot. Centroids show group 
means 
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Although Organization of Materials was not the only scale to account for the 
interaction across the three groups in the Scale by Group ANOVA, the outcome 
from the DFA adds weight to the pattern of results obtained from the ANOVA that 
saw Organization of Materials scores accounting for different patterns of 
performance between the atypical groups, particularly when we recall that this 
scale was scored relatively well within the DS group but not for the other two 
groups. 
4.3.3.2 A three-factor approach to the BRIEF 
In the BRIEF manual, the eight scales comprise two indices: the behavioural 
regulation index (BRI) encompassing Inhibit, Shift and Emotional Control, and the 
metacognition index (MI) encompassing Initiate, Working Memory, 
Plan/Organize, Organization of Materials and Monitor. Gioia, Isquith, Retzlaff, and 
Espy (2002) examined the underlying factor structure of the BRIEF in a combined 
clinical sample of 374 children aged between 5 and 18 years. Disorders included 
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Autism Spectrum Disorders 
(ASD), Tourette’s syndrome (TS), seizure disorders, affective disorders and 
learning disabilities. Four different models were assessed for goodness of fit using 
confirmatory factor analysis, and a three-factor model was chosen as the most 
appropriate. The factors were: Metacognition (MI), Behavioural Regulation (BR) 
and Emotional Regulation (ER). In this new structure, the Monitor scale was split 
into Task-Monitor and Self-Monitor, producing nine scales in all. The MI index 
includes Initiate, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, Organization of Materials and 
Task-Monitor; the BR index, Inhibit and Self-Monitor; and the ER index, Shift and 
Emotional Control. This three-factor structure was used in the current study. To 
compare performance across indices, mean item scores were calculated as above. 
Group means can be seen in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12: Group means (S.E.) of scores on three BRIEF indices by group 
 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group (F(2,107) = 45.028, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .457), with post hoc differences significant between all groups (TD and 
DS: p = .001; TD and WS: p < .001; DS and WS: p < .001). There was a reliable main 
effect of Index (F(2,214) = 29.754, p < .001, partial η2 = .218), with statistically 
equivalent ER and BR scores (p = .104) and better scores on these scales 
compared to Metacognition (p < .001 for both). Index and Group did not interact 
significantly (F<1). 
4.3.3.3 ‘Clinical Significance’ 
The BRIEF also gives scores in the form of T scores, standardised around a mean 
of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. The Global Executive Composite (GEC) 
consists of the sum of the BRI and MI indices, and gives an overall indication of 
executive function abilities. Gioia and colleagues (2000a, 2000b) noted that large 
discrepancies between the two indices (BRI and MI) that comprise the GEC would 
cause difficulties for its use as an overall indicator of performance: the 
professional manual (Gioia et al., 2000a) contains instructions not to calculate it 
for individuals with a BRI-MI difference of 13 T score points or more. Although it 
is acknowledged that any composite score of this sort could mask potentially 
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insightful differences in more fine-grained components of a test, GEC T scores for 
the participants in the current study were calculated in order to gather 
information about the proportion of the sample that would meet the criterion of 
‘potential clinical significance’ (a T score of 65 or above). Due to the approach 
taken to missing data (i.e., replacing each missing response with the mean of all 
given responses) the raw scores were not integers, so were rounded to the 
nearest whole number before reading off the T score. Of the TD group, 14.71% 
would be classified as having executive dysfunction of a clinically significant level; 
53.33% of the DS group and 89.13% of the WS group also met this criterion. This 
is consistent with the group-level patterns of performance. Two participants with 
WS obtained a GEC raw score that was higher than the maximum provided in the 
table for looking up T score values, so the highest available raw score was used. 
4.3.4 PSQ analysis 
In the PSQ, parents chose an answer that best matched their child’s behaviour, 
both in relation to how easy they find certain aspects of problem solving and then 
how likely they are to make certain kinds of responses. A copy of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix D, and a summary of questions and 
shared aspects, in  Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. 
4.3.4.1 Reaching the solution 
Each participant was given a score for the ‘reach the solution’ part of the question. 
The group means of these scores are displayed in Figure 4.13. 
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ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Group (F(2,109) = 36.474, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .401). The pattern was similar to that for the BRIEF scores; Games-
Howell post hoc tests indicated higher scores for TD than DS (p = .001) and WS 
groups (p < .001), and higher scores in DS than WS groups (p = .001). There was a 
main effect of Question (F(4,436) = 13.504, p < .001, partial η2 = .110). Multiple 
comparisons did not reveal a significant difference between scores for the two 
routine problems, getting dressed (Q1) and brushing teeth (Q2) (p = .257). Each 
of these had significantly higher scores than each novel question (p < .05 for all). 
Within the novel questions, questions 5 and 6 did not differ from one another (p = 
.155), and question 7 was given a lower score than question 6 (p = .003), and 
marginally lower than question 5 (p = .097). The interaction between Question 
and Group was not significant (F<1). 
 
The data presented for each question thus validate treating routine and novel 
problems differently: problems occurring within routine tasks were solved more 
readily than problems occurring within novel tasks, although interestingly not all 
novel tasks were solved with equal success.  
4.3.4.2 Examining performance across the PSQ  
This section explores the scores on the questionnaire. The approach taken was to 
treat the two halves of the questions separately because they ask about two 
scenarios: ‘approach’ is what happens when a problem exists in everyday life that 
needs to be addressed, and ‘response’ is what happens if something were to go 
wrong with the solving of the problem. Before going on to look at these sections 
separately, the overall scores are addressed briefly.  
 
An ANOVA was conducted with Approach/response and Novelty as the within-
groups variables and Group as the between-subjects variable. There was a main 
effect of Novelty (F(1,109) = 94.752, p < .001, partial η2 = .465) with better scores 
for routine than novel problems, and a main effect of Approach/response 
(F(1,109) = 99.417, p < .001, partial η2 = .477) with better scores for approach 
than for response. These two factors interacted significantly (p = .047). Given that 
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all four differences were significant for follow-up comparisons (p < .001), this 
appears to be due to a larger drop in performance from approach to response for 
routine problems (t = 10.20) than for novel problems (t = 5.97). There was a 
significant main effect of Group (F(2,109) = 31.725, p < .001, partial η2 = .368), 
which will be explored with respect to its significant interactions with other 
factors. There was a significant interaction between Group and Novelty (p = .027). 
Score differences between routine and novel problems (collapsed across 
approach/response) were significant for each group (p < .001 for all) but 
appeared to decline more for the WS group between routine and novel problems 
than for the other two groups. Differences between the TD and DS groups were 
non-significant at each level of novelty (Routine: p = .120; Novel: p = .054, 
although for the Novel scores the nonparametric Mann Whitney test was 
significant, p = .037). The WS group scored more poorly than both other groups at 
both levels of novelty (p < .05 for all). Approach/response also interacted 
significantly with Group (p = .022). For the approach and response scores 
(collapsed across novelty), the WS scores were worse than those of both other 
groups (p < .05 for all) while TD scored better than DS for approach (p = .014) but 
not for response (p = .358). 
4.3.4.2.1 Approach 
Scores for the five questions were entered into a mixed ANOVA, with Group as the 
between-subjects variable (TD, DS, WS) and Question (1,2,5,6,7) and Aspect as the 
within-subjects variables. The five Aspects used in the analysis were Know, What, 
Steps, Focus and Stop (full names are found in Table 4.4). These were the aspects 
that were common to all of the questions. Aspects that did not appear in every 
question are discussed later in the chapter. 
 
There was a significant main effect of Group (F(2,109) = 32.173, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .371) with the WS group scoring more poorly than the DS group (p  = .001) 
and the TD group (p < .001), and the DS group scoring more poorly than the TD 
group (p = .012). There was a significant main effect of Question (F(4,436) = 
33.225, p < .001, partial η2 = .234) and also of Aspect (F(2.84,309.02) = 98.337, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .474). Further interaction terms were significant: Question by 
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Group (F(8,436) = 5.021, p < .001, partial η2 = .084), and Question by Aspect 
(F(9.925,.586) = 16.933, p < .001, partial η2 = .134). All of these terms interacted 
with one another so that the Question by Aspect by Group interaction was 
significant (F(21.926,1194.967) = 2.445, p < .001, partial η2 = .043). The Aspect by 
Group interaction was marginally significant (F(5.670,309.018) = 2.136, p = .053, 
partial η2 = .038). 
 
To examine the Question by Group interaction, first a Question by Group mixed 
ANOVA was carried out. Question approach scores were the average of each 
aspect score per question for each participant. Figure 4.14 displays the group 
means by question. 
 
Figure 4.14: Group means (S.E) of shared aspect scores for approaching a problem by question  
 
There was a significant main effect of Group (F(2,109) = 32.173, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .371) with post hoc tests revealing poorer performance in the WS group than 
both of the other groups (TD: p < .001; DS: p = .001) and poorer performance in 
the DS group than the TD group (p = .012). 
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Within each group, the main effect of Question was significant (TD: 
(F(3.233,106.681) = 9.567, p < .001, partial η2 = .225; DS: F(3.200,96.002) = 
6.999, p < .001, partial η2 = .189; WS: F(3.422,157.429) = 29.670, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .392). Post hoc tests indicated somewhat similar patterns of performance by 
question across groups, with some notable differences. Questions 1 and 2, the 
routine problems, obtained the highest scores in each group. For the WS and TD 
groups, scores for question 7 were lower than each of the other scales (p < .05 for 
all) while for the DS group, question 5 was also scored particularly low, scoring 
marginally lower than question 7 (p = .076) and significantly more poorly than 
the remaining questions (p < .05 for all), potentially indicating particular 
difficulties with finding a lost possession in DS. Thus, the Question by Group 
interaction can be accounted for by relative difficulties with finding a lost 
possession within the DS group. 
 
The 3-way interaction can be explained by the relatively poor performance on 
question 5 (finding a lost possession) for the DS group: post hoc comparisons 
indicated that there were no significant differences between DS and WS scores for 
any aspect of question 5 (although the Focus score was marginally better in the 
DS group, p = .069; using the Mann-Whitney nonparametric equivalent test, this 
difference was significant at p = .021), while the DS group outperformed the WS 
group on at least two aspects in all other questions (Questions 1 and 2: 2 aspects; 
question 6: 4 aspects; question 7: all 5 aspects). The significant interaction 
between Question and Aspect was also examined. Scores can be seen in Figure 
4.15 below. 
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4.3.4.2.2 Aspect scores for each question 
 
Figure 4.15: Means (S.E) of approach aspect scores by question, collapsed across group 
 
As Aspect significantly interacts with Question, the scores across aspects are 
compared for each question separately. ANOVAs indicated a significant main 
effect of Aspect for each question (p < .001 for all). It is clear from Figure 4.15 that 
the Focus scores are consistently low, and this is borne out by the data, with 
significantly lower scores in this aspect than each other aspect in all questions (p 
< .001 for all), with the exception of question 5 in which Steps is as low as Focus 
(p = .882). Stop scores are higher than the other aspects on questions 5, 6 and 7 (p 
< .05 for all). Although it appears from examining Figure 4.15 that the Steps score 
is higher for routine and lower for novel questions, the only question in which 
Steps is higher than other aspects is question 2 (brushing teeth), in which it is 
significantly higher than Know (p = .009) and marginally higher than What (p = 
.071) and Stop (p = .061). In contrast, in question 1 Steps is significantly poorer 
than Know (p = .021), What (p = .035) and Stop (p = .037), while for the novel 
questions Steps is poorer still than Know, What and Stop (p < .001 for all, except 
Know, Q6: p = .009). Therefore, ‘doing steps in the right order’ was particularly 
successful when brushing teeth, and showed a larger drop in performance, 
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relative to other aspects, for the novel problems than for the other routine 
problem.  
 
Finally, there are some aspects which did not appear in every question. 
Recognising the problem was only part of the Approach part of the question for 
novel problems, and questions about using existing knowledge and applying a 
previously learnt strategy were unique to novel problems. These scores were 
averaged across question for each participant and compared across group. For all 
three of the aspects the effect of Group was significant at p < .001, and the same 
post hoc pattern of performance held, mirroring overall group performance: the 
TD group outperformed the DS group (Recognise p = .004; Existing Knowledge p 
= .001; Applying strategy p < .001) and the DS group outperformed the WS group, 
although marginally so for the Recognise aspect, although this is significant for 
the nonparametric analysis (Recognise p = .076, Mann-Whitney p = .023; Existing 
Knowledge p = .016; Applying strategy p = .004). In addition, two questions 
included a unique item, pertinent to that scenario. Question 5 asks about ending 
the search after a sensible amount of time. ANOVA indicated a main effect of 
Group (F(2,109) = 4.159, p = .018, partial η2 = .071). Post hoc tests revealed 
equivalent scores between DS and TD groups (p = .131); equivalent scores  
between DS and WS groups (p = .811); and significantly better performance in the 
TD group compared to the WS group (p = .009). Question 6 asks about children’s 
success with being flexible when packing a bag for the day. ANOVA indicated a 
main effect of Group (F(2,109) = 13.707, p < .001, partial η2 = .201). The TD group 
scored better than the DS group (p = .022) and WS group (p < .001), while there 
was no significant difference between the atypical groups (p = .109), although in a 
Mann Whitney test the DS score was significantly higher than the WS score (p = 
.048). 
4.3.4.2.3 Response 
Response scores for each shared aspect were entered into an Aspect (Change, 
Ask, Become Emotional, Lose Focus and Lack Perseverance) by Question (1, 2, 5, 
6, 7) by Group (TD, DS, WS) ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of Group 
(F(2,109) = 24.334, p < .001, partial η2 = .309), with post hoc tests revealing better 
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performance in the TD than the WS group (p < .001) and better performance in 
the DS than the WS group (p < .001) but no significant difference between TD and 
DS groups (p = .369). 
 
The main effect of Question was significant (F(3.260,355.316) = 21.751, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .166) and did not interact with Group (F(6.520,355.316) = 1.393, p = 
.211, partial η2 = .025). The effect of Aspect was also significant (F(2.717,296.168) 
= 4.727, p = .004, partial η2 = .042), as was the Aspect by Group interaction 
(F(5.434,296.168) = 7.864, p < .001, partial η2 = .126): thus, the main effects of 
Aspect will be explored in relation to Group. Question and Aspect interacted 
significantly (F(10.148,1106.092) = 25.125, p < .001, partial η2 = .187), so the 
main effect of Question will be explored in relation to Aspect. Finally, the 
interaction between Question, Aspect and Group was also significant 
(F(20.295,1106.092) = 2.168, p = .002, partial η2 = .038). 
 
Across questions, the shared aspects were compared across groups using 
repeated-measures ANOVA. Figure 4.16 displays the mean scores by aspect for 
each group. The reach-the-solution score is not part of the current analysis but a 
data point has been added to illustrate the mean score on this measure for each 
group.  
 
Figure 4.16: Group means (S.E) of response aspect scores 
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The Aspect by Group interaction was driven by a lack of Group effect for Asking 
for help (F(2,109) = 1.303, p = .276, partial η2 = .023) while all other aspects 
showed a main effect of Group (Change: F(2,109) = 29.360, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.350; Become Emotional: F(2,109) = 11.223, p < .001, partial η2 = .171; Lose focus: 
F(2,109) = 15.669, p < .001, partial η2 = .223; Lack perseverance: F(2,109) = 
18.959, p < .001, partial η2 = .258). Post hoc tests revealed better scores in TD 
than WS for each of the remaining four aspects (p < .001 for all). For the Change 
score, the TD group scored higher than the DS group (p = .002) and the DS group 
scored higher than the WS group (p = .004). For the remaining three variables 
(Become emotional, Lose focus, Lack perseverance) performance was equivalent 
in the TD and DS groups (p > .05 for all) and better in the DS than the WS group 
(Become emotional: p = .004; Lose focus: p < .001; Lack perseverance: p < .001). 
 
There were also some patterns of note in the within-groups analysis. Repeated-
measures ANOVAs indicated main effects of Aspect for TD (F(2.072,68.373) 
=7.737, p = .001, partial η2 = .190) and WS groups (F(2.396,110.196) =11.574, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .201) but not for the DS group (F(3.242,97.263) = 1.633, p = .183, 
partial η2 = .052) although Friedman’s (nonparametric) ANOVA for the DS group 
was significant (χ2(4) = 11.719, p = .020). While the TD group were more likely to 
change their response than ask for help (p < .001), the atypical groups were both 
more likely to ask for help than to change their response to a problem; this was a 
stronger effect in WS than in DS (DS: p = .070; WS: p < .001). Aspect scores 
displayed by question (collapsed across Group) are displayed in Figure 4.17. 
228 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Means (S.E) of response aspect scores by question, collapsed across group. 
Lackpers = lack perseverance. 
 
It is clear from examining Figure 4.17 that the pattern of scores for the Ask for 
Help variable is different across questions compared to the other aspects. 
ANOVAs reveal that, indeed, Ask for Help scores are lower than scores for all 
other aspects in questions 1 and 2, and higher than scores for all other aspects in 
questions 5, 6 and 7 (p < .05 for all) with the exception of the non-significant 
difference between Ask for help and Become Emotional in question 7 (p = .366).  
Asking for help occurred most often in question 5,  then in questions 6 and 7, and 
least often in questions 1 and 2, with equivalent scores in questions 6 and 7 (p = 
.409), and 1 and 2 (p = .463), and all other question differences significant for this 
aspect (p < .001). Thus, broadly speaking, asking for help occurred more for novel 
than routine problems.  
   
The Aspect by Group interaction was significant for questions 1 and 2 (p < .001 
for both), 6 (p = .001) and 7 (p = .020), but non-significant for question 5 (p = 
.106). Although for the Approach analysis, finding a lost possession (question 5) 
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aspect (i.e., with DS aspect scores being as low as the WS scores for each aspect on 
this question but not the other questions), for the Response part of question 5 this 
was not the case.  
 
Based on observation of the data, the 3-way interaction was explored by 
determining the effect of Group for each aspect for each question. One-way 
ANOVAs point to significant main effects of Group in terms of Change, Emotion, 
Lose focus and Lack perseverance for each question (p < .05 for all), as well as a 
lack of reliable main effects of Group for Asking for Help for questions 1, 5, 6 and 
7 (p > .05 for all). However, there was a significant main effect of group for asking 
for help for question 2, (F(2,109) = 8.628, p < .001, partial η2 = .137) with post hoc 
tests revealing that the TD group were less likely to ask for help when brushing 
teeth than the WS (p = .007) or DS group (p = .001) with no significant differences 
between the atypical groups (p = .357).  
4.3.4.3 Which variables are related to reaching the solution? 
4.3.4.3.1 Approach variables 
In order to assess the relationship between success with different aspects of 
approaching a problem and being able to solve it, correlations were run between 
each of the shared approach aspects and the reaching-the-solution score, for each 
question individually. The pattern of association between success and reaching 
the solution applied in a broadly similar way across the usable questions (1, 2, 5, 
6 and 7) for four of the aspects (Know, What/Ideas, Focus, Stop). Thus, scores 
were collapsed across question for these aspects. The correlations with reaching 
the solution are displayed in Table 4.6.  
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R (p) TD DS WS 
Know .623 (<.001) .738 (<.001) .642 (<.001) 
What .640 (<.001) .714 (<.001) .703 (<.001) 
Steps .749 (<.001) .833 (<.001) .730 (<.001) 
Focus .577 (<.001) .817 (<.001) .778 (<.001) 
Stop .537 (.001) .757 (<.001) .447 (.002) 
Table 4.6: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between PSQ approach aspects 
and reaching the solution by group. Significant correlations are displayed against a 
green background. 
 
For the Steps variable, the significant relationship with reaching the solution only 
held in the WS group for question 2 (r = .388, p = .007) and for the DS group, for 
questions 1 and 2 (Q1: r = .645, p < .001; Q2: r = .683, p < .001), with none of the 
questions giving this relationship in the TD group (p > .05 for all). 
4.3.4.3.2 Response variables 
Correlations were also conducted between reaching the solution and each of the 
other behaviours in the response part of the question, collapsed across questions 
in the same way as for the approach part of the question, because the patterns of 
relationships were again broadly similar for each question. It should be noted that 
the correlations are positive because the scores were reversed for the Become 
Emotional, Lose focus and Lack perseverance scales. 
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R (p) TD DS WS 
Change .575 (<.001) .897 (<.001) .746 (<.001) 
Ask -.107 (.549) .605 (<.001) .133 (.374) 
Become 
Emotional 
.259 (.139) .277 (.131) .449 (.002) 
Lose focus .521 (.002) .436 (.014) .609 (<.001) 
Lack 
perseverance 
.538 (.001) .556 (.001) .613 (<.001) 
Table 4.7: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between PSQ response aspects and 
reaching the solution by group. Significant correlations are displayed against a green 
background. 
 
4.3.4.3.3 Additional variables 
Some aspects do not appear in every question and so the correlations were 
conducted separately. Separate correlations were conducted for the ‘recognise 
that there is a problem’ aspect because it appeared in the approach part of the 
question for novel problems, but the response part for routine problems. Across 
novel problems, recognising the problem was significantly correlated with 
reaching the solution for all groups (TD: r = .541, p = .001; DS: r = .659, p < .001; 
WS: r = .635, p < .001) and the same was true for routine problems (TD: r = .503, p 
= .002; DS: r = .757, p < .001; WS: r = .338, p = .020).  
 
In the approach part of each novel problem, parents are asked about their child’s 
ability to use existing knowledge to help them, and to apply a previously used 
strategy. The mean aspect score across novel questions was correlated with the 
Reach the solution score across novel questions: each correlation was highly 
significant. For using existing knowledge, TD: r = .741, p < .001; DS: .666, p < .001; 
WS: r = .724, p < .001; for applying a previously learnt strategy, TD: r = .573, p < 
.001; DS: r = .725, p < .001; WS r = .679, p < .001. 
 
232 
 
Finally, some aspects only appear in one question. In question 6 (packing a bag 
for the day) parents are asked how easy their child finds it to be flexible when 
packing a bag (approach part of the question). Both TD and WS correlations are 
significant (TD: r = .492, p = .003; WS: r = .555, p < .001) and the DS correlation is 
marginally so (r = .353, p = .051). In question 5 (finding a lost possession) parents 
are asked how likely their child is to end their search after a sensible amount of 
time (response part of the question). In TD and WS, again, this is reliably 
associated with reaching the solution (TD: r = .557, p = .001; WS: r = .451, p = 
.001) but this is non-significant in DS (r = -.009, p = .960).  
4.3.4.3.4 BRIEF scale scores 
Given that reaching the solution has been treated as the main indicator of 
problem-solving success, correlations were run between each BRIEF scale score 
and reaching the solution, collapsed across question for routine and novel 
problems separately, in order to identify any BRIEF scales that were associated 
with success on different types of everyday problems. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients, r, and p values can be seen in Table 4.8. Significant correlations (p ≤ 
.05) are against a green background; the nonparametric Spearman’s correlation 
outcome is also reported where the significance of the result differs from that 
produced by the parametric correlation. Marginally significant correlations (.05 < 
p < .10) have a yellow background. Table 4.8 displays correlations for the eight 
BRIEF scales from the manual. The factor structure used in Section 4.3.3.2 was 
based on nine scales, due to the splitting of the Monitor scale into Task-Monitor 
and Self-Monitor. Thus, correlations for these two new scales are also presented 
in Table 4.9. 
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TD DS WS 
Routine Novel Routine Novel Routine Novel 
R (p) 
Inhibit 
-.092 
(.605) 
-.439 
(.009) 
-.414 
(.023) 
-.316 
(.089) 
-.585 
(.001) 
-.219 
(.145) 
-.431 
(.003) 
Shift 
.037 
(.835) 
.035 
(.845) 
-.494 
(.006) 
-.318 
(.087) 
-.297 
(.045) 
-.268 
(.072) 
-.492 
(.001) 
Emotional 
Control 
.082 
(.645) 
-.070 
(.692) 
-.460 
(.010) 
-.577 
(.001) 
-.256 
(.085) 
-.474 
(.001) 
Working 
Memory 
-.299 
(.086) 
-.303 
(.082) 
-.549 
(.002) 
-.700 
(<.001) 
-.153 
(.312) 
-.581 
(<.001) 
Plan/Organize 
.031 
(.862) 
-.233 
(.185) 
.167 
(.377) 
-.590 
(.001) 
-.232 
(.120) 
-.330 
(.025) 
-.224 
(.135) 
Organization  
of Materials 
-.102 
(.565) 
-.226 
(.199) 
-.292 
(.117) 
-.714 
(<.001) 
-.155 
(.305) 
-.562 
(<.001) 
Initiate 
.003 
(.987) 
-.039 
(.826) 
-.404 
(.027) 
-.428 
(.018) 
-.356 
(.015) 
-.504 
(<.001) 
Monitor 
-.171 
(.334) 
-.319 
(.066) 
-.352 
(.056) 
-.458 
(.011) 
-.142 
(.346) 
-.425 
(.003) 
Table 4.8: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between BRIEF scale scores and 
reaching-the-solution score on the PSQ for routine and novel problems. Significant correlations 
are displayed against a green background, while marginally significant correlations are against 
a yellow background. 
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The 48 correlations in Table 4.8 would require a p value cut-off of 0.001042 in 
order to survive a Bonferroni correction. For routine problems, none of the 
correlations would survive this correction. For novel problems, the surviving 
correlations between reaching the solution on the PSQ and the BRIEF scales for 
the DS group would be for the Inhibit, Emotional Control, Working Memory, 
Plan/Organize and Organization of Materials scales. For the WS group, surviving 
correlations between would be for the Shift, Emotional Control, Working Memory, 
Organization of Materials and Initiate scales. None of the TD group’s correlations 
would survive a Bonferroni correction. 
 
 
 
 
 
TD DS WS 
Routine Novel Routine Novel Routine Novel 
R (p) 
Task-Monitor 
-.131 
(.461) 
-.381 
(.026) 
-.208 
(.271) 
-.345 
(.062) 
-.199 
(.185) 
-.339 
(.021) 
Self-Monitor 
-.135 
(.447) 
-.115 
(.516) 
-.390 
(.033) 
-.442 
(.014) 
-.063 
(.676) 
-.392 
(.007) 
Table 4.9: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between Task-Monitor and Self-
Monitor scales and reaching-the-solution score on the PSQ for routine and novel problems. 
These two scales combined comprise the Monitor scale in Table 4.8. Significant correlations 
are displayed against a green background, while marginally significant correlations are against 
a yellow background. 
 
In Table 4.9, 12 correlations were conducted, requiring a p value cut-off of 
0.004167 to survive a Bonferroni correction; none of the correlations would 
survive this correction. 
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4.3.4.3.5 Chronological age 
Correlations between CA in each group and reaching the solution for routine and 
for novel problems were also conducted. For the TD group, neither correlation 
was significant (Routine: r = .273, p = .118; Novel: r = .261, p = .135) and this lack 
of association was also seen for the WS group (Routine: r = .193, p = .193; Novel: r 
= .101, p = .497). However there was a significant association between CA and 
reaching the solution in novel problems for the DS group (r = .384, p = .033) while 
for routine problems this was not the case (r = .134, p = .472). 
4.4 Discussion 
Parents completed two questionnaires about their children’s everyday EF and 
problem solving: the BRIEF and the PSQ. 
4.4.1 Group performance across questionnaires 
The same performance pattern across the groups was obtained on both 
questionnaires; that is, better performance in the typical than the atypical groups, 
and better performance in the DS group than the WS group (for further discussion 
see Section 4.4.5). This implies that the PSQ, designed for this study, taps into 
everyday functioning in a similar way to the BRIEF, which is a standardised and 
validated measure, thus adding credibility to the PSQ overall score as an 
indication of everyday functioning, even though the questions are posed from a 
different angle to those in the BRIEF.  
The overall scores for each questionnaire indicated that on the BRIEF, the vast 
majority of the WS group presented with performance that would indicate 
potential clinical significance in everyday EF, and approximately half the DS group 
fell into this category, with a much lower percentage in the TD group. These 
outcomes are notable in two senses, the first being that both atypical groups 
demonstrated deficits in everyday functioning, relative not only to their CA but to 
a group of younger children. Given that the mean CA of each atypical group was 
above 17 years, and the mean CA of the TD group was just over 8 years, this 
indicates a substantial impairment in the WS and DS groups’ performance as both 
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groups, on average, performed even more poorly than children around nine years 
younger. The second sense in which the group patterns in results are of note is 
that one disorder (WS) demonstrated reliably poorer performance than the other 
disorder (DS) though the groups’ CA was not significantly different. This 
illustrates, in a simple way, the importance of engaging in research across 
syndromes: rather than simply finding poorer performance than TD children in a 
neurodevelopmental disorder, we can observe levels of ability that are syndrome-
specific.  
 
Significant associations between CA and percentage PSQ (and BRIEF) scores on 
both questionnaires were seen for WS and DS groups in Section 4.3.2.4. This is 
echoed for novel (but not for routine) problems for the DS group regarding 
reaching the solution on the PSQ, being only significantly associated with 
increasing CA for novel problems for the DS group, with TD and WS groups 
showing no association between CA and reaching the solution on either routine or 
novel problems. Thus while it seems that some aspects of everyday problem 
solving were developing with CA for the WS group, these were not impacting their 
ability to actually solve the problem. Furthermore, some discrepancies were seen 
between the presence of correlations between TOL and CA (for the TD group 
only) and the questionnaire percentage scores and CA (for the atypical groups 
only). Without knowing what the relationships would be between these measures 
for the full range of CAs (i.e., from the lowest TD CA to the highest WS/DS CA in all 
the populations) it is difficult to speculate on the reasons for this. However, for 
the WS group only BPVS score was related to CA (Chapter 2), while for the DS 
group there were age-related improvements on a small number of EF/MA 
measures (planning, inhibition accuracy, BPVS and RCPM). Speculatively, if the 
individuals with WS were acquiring general problem-solving skills in everyday 
life which nevertheless did not enable them to solve the real-life problem or 
improve on EF tasks in controlled settings; but the DS group were improving on 
skills more generally, which were impacting their everyday problem-solving 
success and their abilities on some EF tasks, then the current pattern of results 
would be produced. Further research should address these tentative hypotheses. 
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4.4.1.1 Group comparisons 
The WS group had a verbal ability (BPVS score) that was not reliably different 
from that of the TD group, and was better than that of the DS group. Nonetheless, 
WS questionnaire outcomes were significantly worse than those of each of the 
other groups, emphasising the marked uneven nature of the WS cognitive profile, 
as described by, for example Mervis et al. (2000), and the discrepancy between 
verbal scores and problem solving in the WS group. As the WS group did not score 
more poorly than the DS group on either mental age measure and yet still 
performed more poorly on the questionnaire measures, mental age differences 
between the atypical groups did not account for differences in performance. This 
type of conclusion can of course only be made in relation to the particular 
matching measure that is chosen. 
4.4.1.2 BPVS 
BPVS scores were related to both questionnaire scores in the WS group, and only 
marginally to the PSQ in the TD group. The significant relationship between BPVS 
and questionnaire scores in the WS group suggests that increasing verbal ability 
facilitated better problem-solving skills for this group. Trajectory analyses of the 
questionnaire scores in relation to BPVS score revealed that the TD and DS 
groups’ scores did not differ either at the lowest levels of verbal ability, or 
throughout increasing levels of verbal ability (i.e., there was no reliable difference 
in slope between the groups), indicating that the difference in TD and DS group 
means on the PSQ was not present when verbal ability was taken into account. 
The WS group performed more poorly on the PSQ at the lowest levels of BPVS 
score than both of the other groups (driving the overall group difference at the 
intercept) and as the slopes did not differ between any of the pairs of groups, 
indicating that BPVS and PSQ were related in a uniform way across all three 
groups, this points to poorer PSQ performance in the WS group regardless of 
verbal ability. 
4.4.1.3  RCPM 
The trajectory analyses for the TD and DS groups indicated better TD than DS 
questionnaire scores at the lowest RCPM scores. The slopes did not differ, 
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indicating a constant relationship between questionnaire outcomes and 
nonverbal mental age (although for the BRIEF, the interaction was marginal, 
tentatively indicating a dynamic relationship: as nonverbal ability increased, the 
DS scores converged onto the TD trajectory). 
 
The WS group’s slope differed significantly from that of both of the other groups, 
indicating atypical differential relationships between RCPM score and outcomes 
on both questionnaires. At the lowest level of RCPM ability, the WS scores were 
lower than that of TD individuals but not lower than that of DS individuals. 
However, the WS trajectory diverged from both other groups’, with decreasing 
questionnaire outcomes associated with increased RCPM scores. The pattern with 
respect to the WS group was unexpected and seems to suggest that those 
individuals with stronger nonverbal ability are less able to cope with problem 
solving in the real world than those who do worse on the RCPM. It is likely that a 
mediating factor played a role in producing this result (e.g., parent expectations 
or anxiety in WS), but as this pattern was not also observed in relation to BPVS 
scores, it is difficult to identify. 
4.4.1.4  Relationships between questionnaires 
In all of the groups, a greater number of significant correlations between BRIEF 
scale scores and reaching-the-solution scores on the PSQ were seen for novel 
problems than for routine problems, supporting the general consensus that EFs 
are more drawn upon when problems are more novel. More BRIEF scales were 
related to reaching the solution in the atypical groups than in the TD group. This 
might reflect the better scores in the typical group, and therefore the relative ease 
that TD children had in reaching the solution to these problems. The only scales 
related to reaching the solution in this group were Inhibit and Task-Monitor, 
suggesting that success was only dependent on their avoiding distractions and 
keeping focus on the task. In contrast, more EFs may be related to reaching the 
solution in the WS and DS groups if they need to use more effortful resources to 
be able to reach the solution. 
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4.4.2 Performance on the BRIEF: indices and scales 
In the BRIEF manual, Gioia et al. (2000a) note (citing Barkley, 1996, 1997) that 
the type of problem solving delineated on the MI is likely to build on the 
characteristics seen on the BRI: that is, that it is probable that behavioural 
regulation underlies metacognition. Woodruff-Borden et al. (2010) also found 
higher (i.e., poorer) MI than BRI scores in a sample of children with WS, as was 
found here for all of the groups. 
 
While the current approach was to analyse scales in terms of three and not two 
indices, for each group, the behavioural regulation and emotional regulation 
indices were scored better than the metacognition index. Thus, it is possible that 
small difficulties with self-regulation could manifest more strongly as difficulties 
with metacognitive EFs (e.g., planning), in line with Gioia and colleagues’ 
suggestion. However, Lee et al. (2011) suggested the opposite pattern for DS. 
They found worse scores compared to MA for the Emergent Metacognition index, 
but not for the Inhibitory Self-Control or Flexibility indices (the preschool version 
of the BRI), in a group of children with DS. Citing Capone et al. (2006)’s evidence 
for difficulties with rigid behaviours and emotional control later in life, they 
suggest that these behaviour patterns could develop as a downstream effect of 
the early working memory and planning/organisation deficits that they found. 
Lee et al. (2011) added a layer of interpretation to the BRIEF indices of ‘hot’ EFs 
(i.e., more emotion-related) being represented by the Inhibitory Self-Control and 
Flexibility indices (later, BRI) and the ‘cool’ EFs (i.e., more based on cognitive 
processes) being represented by the metacognition index. 
 
It is not possible to determine a direction of causality between hot and cool EF 
development from the current pattern of data. In addition, the finding of better 
self-regulation (ER; BR) than metacognition (MI) scores applied to all groups in 
the current study. However, rigid behaviours in DS (Capone, Goyal, Ares, & 
Lannigan, 2006) could be reflected in the poorer Shift scores in the DS than TD 
group, but equivalent Organization of Materials scores in the DS and TD groups. 
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Interestingly, the discriminant functions analysis (DFA) indicated that it is the 
function on which only the Organization of Materials scale loaded onto that 
differentiated the DS group from the other two groups. Skill at organising one’s 
belongings and not leaving disorganised collections of possessions lying around is 
seen as positive in general everyday life as well as within the paradigm of the 
BRIEF. This is wholly understandable, given that, anecdotally, children are not 
known for readily being tidy, but that this is something that they need to be 
taught (or may choose not to do in order to assert their independence; Karmiloff-
Smith, personal communication, 2013). This could be what is reflected by the 
relatively poor scores in the TD group, compared to all of the other scales. In DS, 
however, it could be that difficulties with shifting (Lanfranchi et al., 2010) and 
flexible behaviour (Capone et al., 2006) lead to a compensatory strategy of 
becoming very rigid with one’s possessions, and liking things to be kept in order. 
This would then produce a score on a measure of everyday life like the BRIEF that 
looks like a strength, and indeed may be experienced as such in everyday life, 
while, in an experimental setting, the underlying difficulties with shifting may be 
tapped into.  
 
If the Organization of Materials scale is something that improves in TD and 
emerges gradually from difficulties with shifting in DS, we might expect to see 
these abilities changing with CA. In fact, CA was not correlated with the 
Organization of Materials scale in any of the groups. One explanation for this 
could be that parent expectations might modulate this: absolute levels of 
performance on the scale could be increasing in line with parent expectations of 
the child, meaning that the rating of the child’s ability would remain constant with 
age. Alternatively if these abilities do develop with age in either of the groups, it 
may be that this had occurred at younger ages than those of the sample, which is 
most likely for the DS group, being older than the TD group. RCPM scores were 
weakly related to this scale in the WS and TD groups only. It is conceivable that 
nonverbal ability might be related to being able to organise objects ordinarily, 
and given that the Organization of Materials scale differentiates the DS group 
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from the other two, that something different is happening in DS: perhaps, that 
rather than being driven by nonverbal ability, something else is pushing the 
development of this skill in DS. However this must remain a tentative suggestion, 
due to the marginal correlations between RCPM and Organization of Materials in 
the WS and TD groups.  
4.4.3 Performance on the PSQ 
4.4.3.1 Reaching the solution 
On the PSQ, the reaching-the-solution scores produced the same group pattern of 
results as did the overall percentage score: the TD group were more likely to 
reach the solution overall than the DS group, and the DS group were more likely 
to reach the solution than the WS group. Reaching the solution was also more 
likely to occur for routine problems than for novel problems, and similar patterns 
of performance across question were found for each group. 
4.4.3.2 Overall PSQ analysis 
Regarding the overall PSQ scores, routine problems were again solved more 
successfully than novel problems, and this was the case for each group. This is in 
line with expectations: routine, overlearned tasks are easier than tasks that are 
unusual and unexpected. It is also in line with previous research and models 
suggesting that greater EF resources will be drawn on when tasks are novel (e.g., 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991b; Stuss, 1992). 
 
There was also an interaction between novelty and group. While the WS group 
scored more poorly than both other groups for routine and for novel problems, 
the DS group only scored more poorly than the TD group for novel problems 
(using the nonparametric test, due to the Likert-type questionnaire data). 
Therefore, the novel problems may have been disproportionately harder than the 
routine problems for the DS group than the TD group.  
 
One phenomenon that might account for the better scores in the DS group than 
the WS group on both questionnaires is described by Vicari et al. (2000, 2001). 
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Compared to MA-matched controls, children with DS did not show deficits in 
procedural learning (implicit memory) tasks (in fact, on the TOL task), while 
children with WS did. Implicit memory is reflected in the ability to learn from 
previous experience with a task, when one is not aware of doing so. If individuals 
with DS are more able to learn from previous task experience than individuals 
with WS, it would follow that they would be in a position to gain an advantage 
over the WS group in tasks that are repeated very often which is available to a 
lesser extent in the WS group. Better scores on everyday skills in general could 
therefore be expected in the DS than WS group, which is reflected in the results of 
the current study. However, more specifically, this might predict more of a DS 
advantage over the WS group for the routine problems on the questionnaire than 
for the novel problems, because routine problems are by definition encountered 
more frequently, and this was not borne out by the data; therefore, there are 
probably additional factors at play.  
 
Approach scores were higher than response scores, indicating that carrying out a 
task is easier before something goes wrong than afterwards. This is intuitive, as 
even the novel problems on the questionnaire were necessarily situations which 
had been previously encountered in order to be able to answer the question. 
Arguably the true problem-solving element of the situation would be called into 
play in the response part of the question, where perhaps more opportunities for 
failure arise. This effect was exaggerated in the TD group, bringing TD scores in 
line with DS scores overall at the response stage, and accounting for the 
interaction between approach/response and group. This could suggest a 
disproportionate drop in competence for TD children when faced with something 
going wrong with a task which is not seen in the other groups, potentially 
reflecting the TD group’s younger age.  
 
The interaction between approach/response and novelty demonstrates a decline 
in performance from approach to response that (while all differences were 
significant) looked larger for routine problems than for novel problems (indeed, 
the routine problems t-test statistic was larger: see Section 4.3.4.2). Responding 
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to something going wrong seems to introduce more difficulty for routine than for 
novel problems, potentially due to the initial good level of performance for the 
relatively easy task of approaching a routine problem. 
4.4.3.3 PSQ: Approach section 
For the approach part of the PSQ, the same group pattern of performance was 
reflected as for reaching the solution: better scores in TD than DS groups, and 
better scores in DS than WS groups. This was broadly mirrored for the aspects 
that did not appear in every question, with the exception of ending one’s search 
after a sensible amount of time (question 5) for which the group difference did 
not reach significance between the DS group and either of the other groups. 
 
Across questions, the Focus aspect was scored consistently poorly, indicating that 
overcoming distractions was the most difficult part of dealing with the tasks in 
everyday life. This is seemingly at odds with the results of the BRIEF, which 
indicate that the Inhibit scale attracted the best score for the WS and DS groups. 
This can be reconciled when the items that comprise the Inhibit score on the 
BRIEF are examined. They appear to be concerned with social aspects of 
inhibition (see Appendix C), while the Focus aspect on the PSQ is concerned with 
successfully ignoring distractions.  
 
Question 5 (finding a lost possession) stood out from the other questions for two 
reasons. First, Steps/Keeptrack was equally as poor as the Focus aspect for this 
question. This is likely to be due to the nature of the finding a lost possession task: 
unlike the other four questions (getting dressed, brushing teeth, packing a bag for 
the day, putting things away in a chest of drawers/wardrobe) this task perhaps is 
the least predictable and has the least amount of structure. Keeping track of the 
task involves remembering where you have already looked and is probably more 
difficult than keeping track when, say, packing a bag, when it is easy to look inside 
the bag to monitor progress, which might serve to support motivation. 
Encouragement from others could also be more easily delivered when it is clear 
that a step has been taken (e.g., an item packed) and the individual can be 
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directed to the next small step. Second, the DS group scored poorly on question 5, 
both scoring similarly to the WS group for each aspect and scoring relatively 
poorly on this task in relation to other tasks. The reasons above might account for 
why this task might be difficult, but do not readily suggest why the DS group 
found this task particularly difficult compared to other tasks whereas the WS 
group did not. One explanation for this might be that procedural, or implicit, 
learning (discussed above) may have facilitated performance in the DS group on 
tasks that have certain structures and cues to their progression, such as packing a 
bag for the day or putting items away in a wardrobe, while implicit learning may 
be less helpful in a situation where, because the item is consistently not found 
until it is found, the steps along the way to solving the problem are less salient. An 
alternative explanation might be rooted in personality profiles: it may be that the 
lack of salient structure of the finding a lost possession task makes it intrinsically 
less motivating during task solving than something on which the steps of progress 
can be monitored. Individuals with WS are known to be strongly motivated by 
social factors, even being labelled as ‘hypersocial’ (Jones et al., 2000). It is 
therefore possible that motivation in this group could be maintained by general 
encouragement from (for example) a parent, while individuals with DS may 
require more tangible motivation such as that which is available from measurable 
progress, meaning that when this is not available, performance would decline. In 
addition, the poor performance when an item is lost might be linked to a liking for 
keeping things tidy, implied by the relatively good Organization of Materials 
BRIEF scale score for the DS group. Perhaps the individuals with DS liked to keep 
things tidy (scoring highly on Organization of Materials) because they found 
losing an item particularly aversive.  
 
For question 7 (putting items away in a chest of drawers/wardrobe), the WS and 
TD groups scored more poorly than for each other question. Poor performance on 
this task is in line with expectations that were set when speaking to parents about 
everyday problem solving in WS. Anecdotally, keeping rooms tidy and in order is 
difficult for individuals with WS. The Organization of Materials score would also 
speak to this type of ability, and this scale was among the poorer scales for the WS 
group. Interestingly, (as referred to in the Introduction) it was suggested to the 
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author by a practitioner that brushing teeth (question 2) causes difficulties for 
individuals with DS. This was not borne out by the data, but this could be because 
it was compared to scenarios which are likely to be more difficult (i.e., the novel 
problems). However, unusual response patterns were observed for question 2 
overall, in which the Steps aspect was stronger than most other aspects, whereas 
for the other questions it was relatively poor. This might be an artefact of the 
design of the questionnaire: brushing one’s teeth is perhaps the most narrow and 
well-practised task of them all, with the least amount of room for deviation from a 
well-practised path, leading to good Steps scores.  
 
4.4.3.4 PSQ: Response section 
For response scores, the WS performance was poorer than that of the other 
groups but the TD and DS performance did not significantly differ, because of the 
more dramatic drop in scores between approach and response for the TD group 
(discussed above). Asking for help was more likely to happen in novel problems 
than in routine problems. This is intuitively appealing, given that novel problems 
are more difficult than routine problems. 
 
When responding to a problem, the TD group was more likely to change their 
response than the DS group, who were more likely to do this than the WS group. 
In contrast, asking for help was equally likely for all three groups, while the 
remaining aspects were scored more poorly in the WS than in the DS or TD 
groups, who did not differ from one another. Notably, when looking at the within-
group patterns of aspect performance, the TD group was more likely to change 
their response than to ask for help, while the other two groups were more likely 
to ask for help than change their response, although this was only marginally 
significant for the DS group. 
 
In a study asking 3-5 year old children with DS and CA- and MA-matched controls 
to perform possible and impossible shape-posting tasks, none of the CA-matched 
group asked for help, while similar proportions of the DS and MA groups did 
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(Pitcairn & Wishart, 1994). In addition, the CA-matched group was able to use an 
alternative strategy of placing the piece where it should go by lifting the lid rather 
than posting it, while lower numbers of DS and MA groups used this strategy. This 
is broadly consistent with the present questionnaire outcomes of both atypical 
groups being more likely to ask for help than to change their response. 
 
The experiences that might lead to a tendency in the atypical groups to ask for 
help rather than changing what they are doing when they encounter a problem 
are worthy of consideration. While there are many factors to take into account 
when considering home and family life, such as parents’ personality and 
education levels (cf. Neitzel & Stright, 2004) parenting style and behaviours have 
been found to differ between parents of typical and atypical children (Blacher, 
Baker, & Kaladjian, 2013; Venuti, de Falco, Esposito, Zaninelli, & Bornstein, 2012). 
De Falco, Venuti, Esposito, and Bornstein (2011) found that parents of children 
with DS asked fewer questions and made more direct statements to their children 
than parents of TD children. Gauvain and Huard (1999) found, in an analysis of 
archival data, that when parenting style was directive when (typical) children 
were aged 9 years, they were less likely to initiate planning discussions in 
adolescence than children with other types of parenting styles (authoritative, 
permissive, uninvolved). Interestingly, Gilmore, Cuskelly, Jobling, and Hayes 
(2009) demonstrated that children with DS were more persistent with individual 
problem solving when their mothers directed their behaviour less and supported 
their independence more on a shared problem-solving task, while this association 
did not hold for MA-matched controls. Also, adults with learning disabilities were 
found to be best able to deal with real-life problem solving when they were least 
dependent on their families (Levine and Langness, 1985, cited in Szepkouski, 
Gauvain, & Carberry, 1994). 
 
In addition, children with DS are perceived as immature because of their facial 
characteristics (Fidler & Hodapp, 1999) and their parents’ speech to them is at a 
higher and more varied pitch than controls (Fidler, 2003). One possibility is that 
children with neurodevelopmental disorders may become more used to receiving 
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help from parents than TD children. This seems intuitively logical in that children 
with developmental impairments may require more (and more directed) help 
from parents. This might render them more likely to ask for help from another 
than to attempt to solve the problem themselves. Szepkouski et al. (1994) found 
that children with learning difficulties asked for more help than TD children did 
on a route planning task around a model supermarket.  
 
Help seeking can be seen as a useful strategy, particularly, perhaps, for an 
individual with a neurodevelopmental disorder, if they are aware that they will be 
unable to do a particular task without external help (Szepkouski et al., 1994). It 
may of course also become a maladaptive behaviour: repeated asking for help 
without attempting to solve the problem would not be a useful strategy in the 
long term. Szepkouski et al. (1994) suggested that such children may have fewer 
opportunities to practise planning skills in their everyday lives because of the 
expectations of others about their low capabilities. While acknowledging that 
asking for help is an adaptive short-term approach, they warn against 
encouraging over-reliance on help seeking in intellectually impaired populations 
as it may further diminish their perceived capabilities. The complex relationship 
between help seeking, learning and parenting in typical development is discussed 
by Puustinen, Lyyra, Metsäpelto, and Pulkkinen (2008). 
 
Finally, response aspects did not interact with Group for question 5 (finding a lost 
possession), while response aspect and group did interact for the other questions. 
This suggests that this task may not reflect any atypicality in (responding to) 
problem-solving performance in WS and DS. In contrast, this problem was the one 
showing relatively poor performance for the DS group in the approach part of the 
problem. Given that it is somewhat qualitatively different from the other tasks as 
discussed above, there may be limited ways of responding to something going 
wrong with this task, which would therefore homogenise the groups’ responses.  
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4.4.4 Aspects associated with reaching the solution 
4.4.4.1  Approach 
For the approach part of the question, all aspects were significantly associated 
with reaching the solution. This could point to the nature of the problem 
operating as a whole: each aspect being needed in order to facilitate success, and 
failure on any one aspect potentially being enough to elicit task failure.  
 
However, upon breaking the correlations down by question it became apparent 
that the Steps/Keeptrack variable was only related to reaching the solution in the 
atypical groups for routine problems (both questions in DS, and only brushing 
teeth in WS) and not for any individual question in the TD group. Another 
explanation might therefore be that routine problems, having more easily defined 
steps, were more likely to determine success or failure if those steps were 
performed in an incorrect order: putting on shoes before socks or using the brush 
without putting toothpaste on it may be more difficult to remedy than looking in 
the same place twice for something that is lost, or putting things away into a 
wardrobe in a disorganised way. However, it is also possible that this might stem 
from the wording of the aspects: the Steps/Keeptrack (and What/Ideas) aspects, 
while based around the same concepts, had different wording for the routine and 
novel tasks to make them appropriate for the tasks to which they were referring. 
Adapting the wording in this way may have affected parents’ responses to this 
aspect differentially. This alternative explanation is difficult to support, however, 
because the What/Ideas aspect did not produce this pattern of response. 
4.4.4.2  Response 
Change, Lack perseverance and Lose focus were significantly related to Reaching 
the solution for all groups, while only the WS group showed a relationship 
between Becoming emotional and Reaching the solution, and only the DS group 
showed this link for Asking for help. In the study by Fidler, Philofsky, et al. (2005), 
introduced in Chapter 1, toddlers with DS were less likely to exhibit nonverbal 
requests for help in relation to objects (e.g., toys) on the Early Social 
Communication Scales (Elliott, 2007) than a group of TD MA-matched controls. 
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The frequency of these requests was also significantly related to more efficient 
reach strategies on an object retrieval task for the DS group. Thus although the 
paradigms in Fidler and colleagues’ study and the present study differ, there is an 
association between problem-solving success and help seeking in DS in both 
studies. Fidler et al. speculate about the direction of causality between poor 
problem solving and low levels of seeking help. Further research would be 
needed to elucidate this link.  
 
The positive association between asking for help and reaching the solution for the 
DS group but not the WS group could lend an explanation to the better scores in 
the DS group than the WS group. Seeking help might serve to bolster the DS 
scores compared to the WS group: as asking for help was not related to reaching 
the solution in WS, this group would not gain the advantage afforded to the DS 
group, thus scoring more poorly. 
 
As all groups were equally likely to ask for help and the DS group were more 
likely to reach the solution than the WS group, the implication is that the DS 
group’s help seeking was more effective than that of the WS group. As being more 
likely to become emotional for the WS group was linked to a lower likelihood of 
reaching the solution, the effectiveness of asking for help in the WS group could 
be mediated by their tendency to become emotional, which might prevent them 
from being receptive to the help that is offered. Indeed, non-clinical anxiety (in 
the typical population) interferes with goal-directed behaviour and attentional 
control (e.g., Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). 
 
The link between becoming emotional and reaching the solution in WS is 
important given the high rates of anxiety found in children and adults with WS 
(Leyfer, Woodruff-Borden, Klein-Tasman, Fricke, & Mervis, 2006; Stinton, Elison, 
& Howlin, 2010), which in children is higher than in the general population 
(Leyfer, Woodruff-Borden, & Mervis, 2009). Individuals with WS are also more 
fearful than other groups with intellectual disabilities (Dykens, 2003). Indeed, 
250 
 
Einfeld, Tonge, Turner, Parmenter, and Smith (1999) found that the WS group’s 
scores on behaviour disturbance as measured by the Developmental Behaviour 
Checklist (DBC: e.g., Einfeld & Tonge, 1995) reflected more behavioural and 
emotional disturbance than that of a DS group. However on the PSQ, all three 
scales comprising the BRI were significantly related to reaching the solution in 
both of the atypical groups. This suggests that while the general control of 
emotions or self may well be linked to problem-solving success for both groups 
(in line with Gioia et al. (2000a)’s suggestion of the metacognitive scales building 
on the abilities measured by the regulation scales), it is avoiding becoming 
emotional about the specific problem being attempted which proves important 
for the WS group’s success. 
 
Although the fears of children with DS were found to be linked to hyperactivity 
and impulsivity (Evans, Canavera, Kleinpeter, Maccubbin, & Taga, 2005), a link 
between the regulation of the self and emotions and EF has been demonstrated in 
WS. Woodruff-Borden et al. (2010) used the BRIEF with parents of 33 children 
with WS in a longitudinal study, alongside the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule (ADIS-P; Silverman & Albano, 1996), used to diagnose anxiety disorders. 
Those children without an anxiety disorder obtained better scores on the 
behavioural regulation index (BRI) than those with a diagnosis, and the scores 
remained stable over time. Rhodes et al. (2010) found that EF tests of planning 
and attentional flexibility were related to emotional problems in WS, as indicated 
by scores on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), and that 54% of 
the sample were classified as showing abnormal levels of impairments on the 
Emotional Symptoms scale. The relationship between becoming emotional and 
reaching the solution in WS is consistent with these findings. 
4.4.5 Exploring and accounting for better DS than WS 
performance 
Measures of adaptive functioning, such as the VABS, assess everyday life skills 
including communication, daily living skills and socialisation. Adaptive 
functioning is known to be poor relative to CA, but good relative to MA, in 
children with DS (Pennington et al., 2003) with deficits in Communication 
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compared to Socialisation or Daily Living Skills in a group of children with DS 
aged between 1 and 11 years (Dykens, Hodapp, & Evans, 2006). In contrast, while 
children with WS also showed poor adaptive functioning on the VABS for their 
age (Greer, Brown, Pai, Choudry, & Klein, 1997), in adults with WS, VABS scores 
were poor even in comparison to their full-scale IQ (and improved with age 
throughout adulthood) (Howlin et al., 2010). Thus, in the mainly teenage and 
young adult age range sampled in the current study, better performance in DS 
than in WS reflects existing patterns in the literature regarding adaptive 
functioning skills. Furthermore, individuals with DS have previously been found 
to score more highly than individuals with WS on another measure of everyday 
functioning: social competence, for example with chores, friends and hobbies 
(Rosner, Hodapp, Fidler, Sagun, & Dykens, 2004). 
 
Sensory modulation (managing one’s sensory inputs effectively) allows an 
individual to select salient aspects of sensory information in the environment to 
attend to (John & Mervis, 2010). Sensory processing abnormalities (for example, 
in auditory filtering) have been found in WS (John & Mervis, 2010) and in DS (e.g., 
Bruni, Cameron, Dua, & Noy, 2010; Wuang & Su, 2011). In Wuang and colleagues’ 
study, sensory processing was also found to be linked to adaptive functioning as 
measured using the VABS, as well as visual organisation ability, in a sample of 206 
children with DS aged 6-13 years. Adaptive functioning on the SIB-R was also 
measured alongside sensory processing in WS by John and Mervis (2010), and the 
children with lesser sensory impairments scored better than those with greater 
sensory impairments on all of the scales: motor skills, social interaction and 
communication, personal living skills and community living skills. EF accounted 
for 46% of the variance between higher and lower sensory-impaired groups (John 
& Mervis, 2010). They argue that difficulties with EF might underlie impairments 
in flexibly controlling attentional resources to the most appropriate or salient 
aspects of the environment. This could serve to disrupt focused, goal-directed 
behaviour or increase the influence of distractions in the WS group, putting them 
at a disadvantage throughout everyday activities.  
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Sensory abnormalities are also found in other disorders (e.g., ADHD, autism, 
Fragile X syndrome; Cascio, 2010) in which EF deficits are also found, although 
these links have not directly been examined (John & Mervis, 2010). For example, 
in one study, adaptive behaviour was related to sensory reactivity, which was 
more severe in groups of young children with autism and fragile X syndrome than 
in typical or mixed etiology disordered controls (Rogers, Hepburn, & Wehner, 
2003).  
 
Thus, the link between sensory processing and adaptive behaviour is present in 
both WS and DS and is unlikely to be unique to these disorders. As adaptive 
functioning relative to MA is stronger in DS than in WS, it seems likely that either 
another factor mediates the relationship between sensory processing and 
adaptive functioning, or that DS individuals do better on adaptive functioning and 
everyday problem solving than WS individuals for another reason. 
 
One candidate for mediation is personality or temperament, which takes us back 
to the link between reaching the solution and becoming emotional on the PSQ in 
WS that was not found in DS. John and Mervis (2010) also measured 
Temperament in WS using the Children’s Behaviour Questionnaire (CBQ; 
Rothbart & Ahadi, 1994). Anger/Frustration, Sadness, Falling 
Reactivity/Soothability, Inhibitory Control and Attentional Focusing were all 
scored in a more negative way for children with greater sensory impairments 
than for those with lower sensory impairments.  
 
Therefore, there appears to be a link in WS between sensory processing and both 
emotional processing and EF (John & Mervis, 2010), and between emotion and EF 
(Rhodes et al., 2010). John and Mervis (2010) discuss the way in which sensory 
modulation difficulties can arise from the interaction between task demands in 
the environment and internal factors such as sensation, emotion and attention, 
with reference to the Ecological Model of Sensory Modulation (EMSM; Miller, 
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Reisman, McIntosh, & Simon, 2001) which could lead to ‘maladaptive behaviours’, 
including anxiety symptoms, difficulties with attention and negative affect.  
 
In Chapter 2, visuospatial working memory, assessed by the backwards block 
span task, was related to TOL problem solving in the WS group. Importantly, 
Shackman et al. (2006) drew a link between anxiety and disrupted visuospatial 
working memory. As individuals with WS are known to suffer with anxiety 
(Stinton & Howlin, 2012), and to demonstrate poor spatial STM (Jarrold et al., 
1998) future research should investigate potential links in the WS population.  
4.4.6 Chapter summary 
In summary, WS and DS groups scored more poorly on measures of EF and 
problem solving in everyday life compared to a TD group who were much 
younger. WS performance was poorer than DS performance, although the two 
atypical samples were of a similar age range. The WS group showed an 
unexpected relationship between RCPM and success on the questionnaires, which 
suggests there was another mediating factor: parental expectations is one 
possibility. The questionnaire scores for the WS group were also far from where 
performance would be expected to be placed on the basis of BPVS ability (even 
though concrete vocabulary is such a strength in WS). EF (BRIEF) scales were 
related more strongly to novel than routine problems on the PSQ. The 
Organization of Materials scale was the strongest marker of syndrome-specificity 
on the BRIEF, with relatively good DS performance marking this group out. 
Becoming emotional was uniquely related to reaching the solution on the PSQ in 
the WS group, indicating potential links between anxiety and problem solving for 
this group, while asking for help was a useful strategy for success in the DS group. 
The TD group was more likely to change their response than ask for help, while 
the opposite occurred for the atypical groups, which may be linked to 
environmental factors associated with growing up with a neurodevelopmental 
disorder. 
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CHAPTER 5:  RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, data were collected for executive functioning (EF) tasks and 
problem solving on the Tower of London (TOL) in individuals with Williams 
syndrome (WS) and Down syndrome (DS) and typically developing (TD) controls. 
Within nine months of this, data were also collected from parents of individuals 
from the same populations on questionnaire measures of EF and problem solving 
(Chapter 4). This provides an opportunity to examine the potential links between 
the two measures in each group.  
 
The representativeness and generalisability of EF tests have been challenged in 
recent years (e.g., Burgess et al., 2006; see chapter 1 for a discussion of the 
ecological validity problem). In addition, previous research has found a general 
lack of association between performance-based tests and rating scales of EF, 
including the BRIEF, in children with clinical diagnoses including attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and Tourette’s syndrome (TS) (Bodnar, 
Prahme, Cutting, Denckla, & Mahone, 2007; Mahone et al., 2002). However, 
previous research has found associations in WS between EF tests and behavioural 
difficulties in everyday life (Rhodes et al., 2010). We also know from Chapter 4 
that BPVS scores were related to both questionnaire scores in the WS group and 
only marginally to the PSQ in the TD group. RCPM was related negatively with 
questionnaire scores in the WS group, with no significant relationships apparent 
in the other groups. In this chapter, the experimental and questionnaire data will 
be correlated to assess whether performance on empirical tasks was related to 
what was measured when parents were asked about everyday life.  
 
5.2 Method 
The method for data collection was described in Chapter 2 for experimental work, 
and Chapter 4 for the questionnaire data. The participants are the subset 
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identified in Section 4.2.1.2 who provided data in both studies. There were 25 TD 
children providing both sets of data, 14 participants with DS and 16 participants 
with WS. 
5.3 Results 
Scores on the TOL and questionnaires were compared across the three groups of 
participants providing both experimental and questionnaire data (this was 
conducted on different groups of participants than in previous chapters, although 
the same questionnaire outcome is noted in footnote 4 on page 194). 
 
Across groups, there was a significant main effect of TOL score (Welch’s 
F(2,25.999) = 9.717, p = .001, partial η2 = .275), with the TD group scoring better 
than the DS group (p = .028) and the WS group (p = .002) with no difference 
between the scores for the atypical groups (p = .565). For the BRIEF percentage 
score, the main effect of Group (F(2,52) = 36.222, p < .001, partial η2 = .582) was 
such that the WS score was poorer than the DS score (p = .002) and TD score (p < 
.001) and the DS score was poorer than the TD score (p = .005). The same pattern 
was seen for the PSQ percentage score (Welch’s F(2,24.949) = 20.488, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .489; WS<DS, p = .007; WS<TD, p < .001; DS<TD, p = .038). Because of 
the group differences, correlations between TOL and questionnaire scores were 
conducted for each group separately. That is, between the TOL score and the 
BRIEF and PSQ percentage scores, as well as the three indices from the 3-factor 
approach to the BRIEF used in Chapter 4 (metacognition; behavioural regulation; 
emotional regulation). None of the correlations were significant for any of the 
groups (p > .05 for all). That is, TOL scores predicted neither everyday EF skills or 
problem solving, as assessed by parental questionnaires. 
 
Correlations were also run between each MA/EF measure and the reaching-the-
solution score for routine and novel problems from the PSQ, with the aim of 
determining if there were any experimental measures that predicted novel (and 
routine) problem-solving success; these are reported in Table 5.1. A set of 
correlations was also run between outcomes of EF tasks and outcomes of 
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questionnaires, for each group. Pairs or groups of measures from the 
experimental and questionnaire domains were selected that would be likely to 
demonstrate an association, if the EF tests and the parental report measures were 
tapping into the same constructs. Correlation analyses for each of these are 
reported in Table 5.2 below. As for previous chapters, significant correlations (p ≤ 
.05) are reported against a green background, while marginally significant 
correlations (.05 < p < .10) are presented against a yellow background. R values 
for variables that did not meet the assumption of normality are underlined, and 
Spearman’s nonparametric equivalent correlations reported in parentheses if 
they produced a different pattern of results. 
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5
 The TD correlations presented here are after exclusion of the two TD participants responding in an 
unusual way to this task (see Section 2.3.5.1). Before exclusion, the correlation for novel problems was 
marginally significant (r = .346, p = .090), while the correlation for routine problems was also non-
significant (r = .108, p = .607). 
6
 Four outliers (2 TD, 1 DS, 1 WS) were identified for RT Same. The significance of the correlations 
was unchanged upon excluding them from the analysis. 
7
 The significance of the correlations was unchanged upon excluding the RT Opposite outliers from the 
analysis. 
 Reach the solution: routine Reach the solution: novel 
 TD DS WS TD DS WS 
 R (p) 
BPVS 
.281 
(.173) 
.167 
(.568) 
.613 
(.012) 
.518 
(.008) 
-.032 
(.913) 
.210 
(.435) 
RCPM 
.180 
(.390) 
.077 
.794) 
-.080 
(.767) 
.230 
(.269) 
.361 
(.204) 
-.511 
(.043) 
TOL 
-.217 
(.298) 
-.435 
(.120) 
-.162 
(.550) 
.096 
(.650) 
.194 
(.506) 
.254 
(.343) 
Planning 
.207 
(.321) 
-.124 
(.672) 
.129 
(.646) 
.312 
(.129) 
.195 
(.504) 
-.271 
(.329) 
Shifting 
.057 
(.796) 
.209 
(.493) 
-.010 
(.971) 
.281 
(.194) 
.160 
(.603) 
.071 
(.794) 
Inhibition: % 
Opposite 
.178 
(.394) 
.192 
(.510) 
-.026 
(.924) 
.412 
(.041) 
(.280, 
.175) 
.332 
(.246) 
-.064 
(.813) 
Inhibition: % 
Change5 
.139 
(.528) 
.220 
(.451) 
.006 
(.982) 
.448 
(.032) 
.203 
(.487) 
-.050 
(.853) 
Inhibition: RT 
Same6 
-.011 
(.960) 
.139 
(.636) 
-.057 
(.834) 
-.065 
(.756) 
.418 
(.137) 
-.048 
(.860) 
Inhibition: RT 
Opposite7 
-.201 
(.335) 
-.126 
(.668) 
-.010 
(.970) 
-.303 
(.142) 
.055 
(.852) 
-.418 
(.107) 
Table continues overleaf 
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Table 5.1: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between MA/EF measures and routine 
and novel reach-the-solution score on the PSQ. Where data for at least one variable were non-
normal, the r values are underlined. Spearman’s correlations are reported if they are different 
in significance from Pearson’s correlations. Significant correlations are displayed against a 
green background, with marginally significant correlations against a yellow background. 
  
                                                        
8
 The significance of the correlations was unchanged upon excluding the RT Change outliers from the 
analysis. 
Table 5.1 
continued 
Reach the solution: routine Reach the solution: novel 
TD DS WS TD DS WS 
R (p) 
Inhibition: RT 
Change8 
-.107 
(.611) 
-.253 
(.383) 
-.018 
(.948) 
-.290 
(.160) 
-.466 
(.093) 
-.516 
(.041) 
Forwards block 
span 
.034 
(.872) 
.073 
(.814) 
-.223 
(.407) 
.104 
(.619) 
.094 
(.761) 
-.044 
(.871) 
Backwards 
block span 
-.049 
(.824) 
-.403 
(.219) 
-.110 
(.709) 
-.056 
(.799) 
-.019 
(.955) 
-.189 
(.517) 
Forwards digit 
span 
.100 
(.770) 
.400 
(.176) 
.263 
(.343) 
.125 
(.713) 
.128 
(.678) 
.281 
(.310) 
Backwards 
digit span 
-.207 
(.541) 
-.236 
(.437) 
-.170 
(.562) 
.309 
(.354) 
-.239 
(.432) 
-.177 
(.545) 
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Table 5.2: Correlations (r, with p value in parentheses) between EF and questionnaire 
measures for TD, DS and WS groups. Where data for at least one variable was non-normal, the 
r values are underlined. Spearman’s correlations are reported if they are different in 
significance from Pearson’s correlations.  Negative correlations indicate an association 
between better performance on both measures. Significant correlations are displayed against 
a green background, with marginally significant correlations against a yellow background. Inh = 
Inhibition.  
 
                                                        
9
 Excluding the two TD participants displaying the most extreme unusual behaviour on this task (see 
Section 2.3.5.1) did not affect the significance of the correlation. 
10
 Four outliers (2 TD, 1 DS, 1 WS), two standard deviations away from the mean, were identified for 
RT Opposite. The significance of the correlations was unchanged upon excluding them from the 
analysis. 
11
 Three outliers (2 TD, 1 DS), two standard deviations away from the mean, were identified for RT 
Change. The significance of the correlations was unchanged upon excluding them from the analysis. 
EF test 
score 
BRIEF 
measure 
N  
(TD, DS, 
WS) 
 
TD DS WS 
R (p) 
Planning Plan/Organize 25, 14, 16 -.093 
(.659) 
.052 
(.859) 
-.081 
(.773) 
Shifting Shift 23, 13, 16 
.353 
(.099) 
.043 
(.889) 
.274 
(.304) 
Inh: % 
Opposite 
Inhibit 25, 14, 16 -.181 
(.386) 
-.491 
(.074) 
-.220 
(.412) 
Inh: % 
Change9 
Inhibit 25, 14, 16 -.302 
(.142) 
-.357, 
(.210) 
-.212 
(.431) 
Inh: RT 
Opposite10 
Inhibit 25, 14, 16 .315 
(.125) 
-.145 
(.620) 
.103 
(.704) 
Inh: RT 
Change11 
Inhibit 25, 14, 16 .322 
(.116) 
-.032 
(.913) 
.190 
(.480) 
Forwards 
block span 
Working 
Memory 
25, 13, 16 -.385 
(.057) 
.021 
(.946) 
-.070 
(.796) 
Backwards 
block span 
Working 
Memory 
23, 11, 14 -.139 
(.526) 
.191 
(.575) 
.140 
(.634) 
Forwards 
digit span 
Working 
Memory 
11, 13, 15 -.436 
(.181) 
-.371 
(.212) 
-.640 
(.010) 
Backwards 
digit span 
Working 
Memory 
11, 13, 14 -.190 
(.576) 
.279 
(.355) 
-.285 
(.323) 
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5.4 Discussion 
The lack of significant correlation between the TOL score and the PSQ percentage 
scores or likelihood of reaching the solution ratings, in any of the groups, 
indicates that performance on the TOL does not reflect parent-reported problem-
solving performance in real-life situations. The ecological validity of the TOL (and 
EF tests more generally) has previously been challenged (e.g., Burgess et al., 2006; 
Goel, Grafman, Tajik, Gana, & Danto, 1997) and this finding adds weight to those 
concerns, and extends them to DS and WS populations. In the neuropsychological 
literature, responses to the ecological validity problem of EF tests have taken two 
general forms: verisimilitude and veridicality (Spooner & Pachana, 2006). 
Verisimilitude is manifested in the development of EF tasks which mirror the 
types of situations that are encountered in everyday life, while the alternative 
approach, veridicality, typically uses rating scales to ask about real-life 
experiences (see Section 4.1.3). The BRIEF is one such measure, designed to give 
an ecologically valid assessment of EFs, as provided by the caregiver.  
 
The TOL score was also unrelated to the overall BRIEF percentage score, 
suggesting a lack of overall correspondence with everyday EFs for this task. This 
is broadly consistent with Toplak et al. (2008) who did not find significant 
associations between the Stockings of Cambridge (SOC; a TOL-like task) and 
parent BRIEF scales (although the Teacher Inhibit scale was significantly related), 
and with Mahone et al. (2002) who also did not find significant TOL associations 
with BRIEF scales (although the reported correlations were after Bonferroni 
correction) in a group combining children with ADHD, TS and controls. Anderson 
et al. (2002) also did not find associations between TOL scores and any of the 
BRIEF scales for a group of 189 children consisting of individuals with early-
treated phenylketonuria, early-treated hydrocephalus, frontal lesions and 
controls, although some correlations were seen for other EF tasks, such as a 
Contingency Naming Test, in which several abilities such as switching and 
response speed are measured (Anderson et al., 2002).  
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In the current study, correlation analyses were also conducted between scores on 
EF tests of planning, shifting, inhibition and working memory and parent-
reported BRIEF scale scores purported to measure the same construct, in TD, DS 
and WS groups. Of these, the only correlation reaching significance was between 
longer forwards digit spans and lower (i.e., better) scores on the Working 
Memory BRIEF scale in the WS group. Forwards block span was also marginally 
related to this scale for the TD group, while none of the memory scores showed 
an association for the DS group. However, there was a weak relationship in the DS 
group between higher (i.e., poorer) Inhibit scale scores and poorer accuracy on 
the opposite condition of the inhibition task. So, working memory abilities for TD 
and WS groups (in different forms) and inhibition abilities for the DS group 
(tentatively) were observable both on more traditional EF tests and on a real-life 
rating scale measure of EF, while other EF tasks (planning and shifting) either 
demonstrated no relationship with BRIEF scale scores or demonstrated a very 
weak negative relationship in the case of the TD group. This scarcity of 
relationship between experimental and real-life measures of purportedly the 
same constructs flags up concerns about the implications that can be drawn about 
everyday life, based on experimental measures for individuals with WS and DS.  
 
Although it is not possible to rule out the possibility that the lack of correlation is 
due to the discrepancy in data collection methods, this outcome is not unique to 
WS and DS. For adolescents with ADHD and controls combined, Toplak et al. 
(2008) did not find significant associations between a test of inhibition and the 
BRIEF parent Inhibit scale, or between a test of shifting and the BRIEF parent 
Shift scale. The working memory BRIEF scale was related to working memory 
tests, but also to other EF tests, and some other scales were also related to tasks 
designed to tap into other aspects of EF. Toplak et al. (2013) has more recently 
published a review article concerning the relationship between EF tests and 
behavioural rating scales, concluding that, in general, the association between the 
two types of measure is low and that the two types of measurement tap into 
different constructs. Anderson and colleagues (2002) suggested that as there is 
not a reliable relationship between EF tests and BRIEF scales, the cognitive and 
behavioural aspects of EF may not be equivalent. This is echoed by Chan, Shum, 
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Toulopoulou, and Chen (2008) who discuss the ecological validity difficulties of 
EF tests in terms of the ‘functionality level’ at which measurements are taken, 
with respect to the classification systems of the World Health Organisation – for 
example, the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health 
(WHO, 2000). They suggest that while an experimental measure might operate at 
the impairment level (e.g., detecting difficulty switching rules on the WCST), it 
may not represent the individual’s functioning at the wider levels of disability 
(e.g., problems completing an everyday task satisfactorily) and handicap (e.g., 
problems with social functions).  
 
The only components of EF that did relate to better outcomes on corresponding 
BRIEF scales in any way were tests of working memory and inhibition, with only 
the former reaching significance, for the WS group. Arguably these are 
fundamental, lower level measures of EF than more complex constructs such as 
planning or shifting: for example, inhibition and working memory are thought to 
underlie shifting abilities in typical children (Davidson et al., 2006; also see 
Mahone et al., 2002). They are also thought to show improvements early in 
development, particularly with respect to inhibition (Best & Miller, 2010). They 
have been argued to be impossible to separate behaviourally, although they have 
been separated at the neurological level (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009). Therefore, 
they might reflect more basic processes that can endure the transition from inside 
to outside the laboratory. Alternatively, difficulties with inhibition (in DS) or 
working memory (in WS and TD) might be easier to observe in everyday life than 
more complex constructs like planning or shifting abilities.  
 
Rhodes et al. (2010) also examined relationships between EF scores and parental 
questionnaires in a WS group, and, in line with the present findings, reported a 
significant correlation between working memory scores and everyday 
functioning. However, they also found several links between other EF test scores 
and everyday problem behaviours, e.g., shifting and the SOC (TOL-like task), 
which was not found here when EF test scores were correlated with 
corresponding BRIEF scales. One reason for the discrepancy in findings is that the 
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questionnaire measured employed by Rhodes and colleagues concerned generally 
social and conduct problems, while the present study’s questionnaire examined 
everyday EFs. One avenue of future research that would be interesting would be 
to examine the links between the BRIEF and more social behaviours as measured 
by, for example, the SDQ.  
 
While we saw above that there was a weak relationship between inhibition scores 
and the Inhibit BRIEF scale in the DS group, when relating EF test scores to 
reaching-the-solution scores on the PSQ for novel and routine problems, this task 
was also the only one to show an (albeit, marginal) relationship in the DS group: 
smaller increases in response time in the opposite condition (RT Change), that is, 
being less affected by task condition, was related to a greater likelihood of 
reaching the solution in novel problems. Indeed, inhibition scores were related to 
reaching the solution in novel problems for all three groups: for the WS group, 
this was in the same way as in the DS group but with a stronger association, while 
for the TD group, a drop in accuracy of a smaller magnitude (making the 
proportional change between conditions less negative) was related to being more 
likely to reach the solution. This suggests that for all three groups, being able to 
resist one response in favour of another response which requires more effort is 
important for real-life problem solving; perhaps, resisting becoming distracted or 
giving up, to enable more task focus, is the main facilitator for solving a problem 
when something goes wrong in everyday life for these populations. Best et al. 
(2009) suggested that inhibition, emerging early in development as it does, 
indicates that “children’s ability to inhibit their prepotent response, and “stop and 
think” may be an essential first step” (p. 6) thus allowing other EFs to come into 
play for problem solving. If this is a fundamental ability, it may also be crucial for 
DS and WS groups. Indeed, although working memory scores were linked to real-
life reports of working memory for the WS and TD groups, they were not linked to 
reaching the solution on the PSQ for any of the groups, potentially reflecting the 
importance of inhibition.  
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Some correlations were also seen between MA measures and questionnaire 
scores. For WS and TD groups, better BPVS scores were related to a greater 
likelihood of reaching a solution although, notably, this held for routine problems 
in the WS group but for novel problems in the TD group. This could possibly 
reflect the use of verbal strategies in the WS group on routine tasks that they 
encounter daily, while for the TD group this could reflect general cognitive 
development, although conversely neither CA (from Chapter 4) or RCPM scores 
were related to reaching the solution in the TD group. In contrast, poorer RCPM 
scores were associated with a greater likelihood of reaching the solution for novel 
problems for the WS group. This is consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 of an 
association between poorer RCPM scores and better outcomes on the PSQ (and 
BRIEF). The same interpretation offered in Chapter 4 could also apply here: 
parents’ expectations for individuals with better RCPM scores could be higher, 
and thus relatively worse reports could be garnered for these individuals, with 
respect to expectations.  
 
Interestingly, the (arguably) most complex tasks (planning, shifting and TOL) 
were the ones that did not show links either with the corresponding real-life 
scales on the BRIEF (with the exception of a very slight trend on the shifting task 
for the TD group, in the opposite direction than would be expected) or with 
reaching the solution on the PSQ. It might be expected that better performance on 
more complex tasks generally in the lab would predict better performance in the 
complex arena of everyday problem solving. However, it appears that for typical 
children and for individuals with DS and WS, even complex laboratory tasks that 
demand the integration of several skills did not approximate the complexities of 
everyday life. This is understandable when we consider that while laboratory 
tasks are complex in their cognitive demands, everyday tasks may be complex in 
different ways: e.g., social demands, multitasking demands, and characteristics 
related to the ill-defined nature of everyday problems (cf., Anderson, 2003). The 
inherent differences between the testing situation and the home or school 
environment (Anderson, 2003) are also very likely to play a role in the lack of 
associations found. One oft-cited quote from Stuss (1987) is that when the 
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experimenter is “becoming the frontal lobes” (p. 174) of the participant, deficits 
may not be exhibited that are nonetheless apparent outside a testing situation.  
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CHAPTER 6:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
6.1 Aims and overview 
The overall aim of this thesis was to investigate problem-solving abilities in 
typical and atypical development. In the literature, previous research has 
revealed that: problem solving is thought to rely on executive functions (EFs) in 
typical development (TD); EF skills have been investigated in Williams syndrome 
(WS) and Down syndrome (DS) in isolation, and are reported to be impaired, 
although the profiles of the two disorders are different; the ecological validity of 
EF tests has been called into question; and the importance of research addressing 
real life has been emphasised, while problem solving itself has been divided into 
well-defined and ill-defined problems. The more specific aims of this thesis were 
therefore to investigate the ways in which EF skills are combined when solving a 
complex problem in WS and in DS, and to explore real-life problem solving for 
these individuals, all in comparison to TD individuals. In practice, these were 
broken down into several constituent aims: first, to compare both EF 
performance and detailed measures of problem-solving performance across TD, 
WS and DS groups; second, to investigate and compare the relative contributions 
of EF skills to complex problem solving; third, to understand and compare 
problem solving in the real world in these three groups; fourth, to consider 
aspects of real-life EFs and how they might relate to real-life problem solving; and 
fifth, to consider the relationship between traditional lab-based testing and 
parental report measures of EF, to further our understanding of the way in which 
EF tests and experiences in the real world stand together or, indeed, stand apart. 
 
In this work, a cross-syndrome comparison approach was employed, as 
advocated by, e.g., Karmiloff-Smith and Farran (2012a). This has allowed an 
understanding, that would not be available in a study with only one disordered 
group and one control group, of what is unique to a particular disorder and what 
is a consequence of having a learning disability.  
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6.2 Discussion of findings  
6.2.1 Summary of findings by chapter 
In Chapter 2, it emerged that the DS group’s Tower of London (TOL) performance 
was at a comparable level to that of much younger TD children matched on 
nonverbal ability, while the WS group’s performance was poorer than the 
matched TD group’s. Each group exhibited unique patterns of both EF task 
performance and associations between EF and TOL tasks, while each atypical 
group showed some typical-looking patterns of performance as well. Notably, the 
reaction time (RT) when matching a picture in the Same condition of the 
inhibition task (before inhibition was required in the Opposite condition) was the 
most salient measure that was related to TOL score for the DS group, while 
planning and visuospatial working memory scores were associated with TOL 
performance in the WS group. While the relationship between RT to the Same 
condition and TOL was typical for the DS group, the relationship between 
planning and TOL performance was atypical for the WS group. Adopting the dual 
approach of comparing group means and analysing developmental trajectories 
across three groups facilitated interpretations that would otherwise have been 
unavailable: for example, the DS group appeared not to rely on planning ability 
for the TOL, while the WS group may have relied upon it more when planning 
levels were poor.  
 
In Chapter 3, detailed TOL performance was examined across the groups, in terms 
of the behaviours produced during problem solving as well as the scores and EF-
TOL correlations by problem type (easy, medium and difficult). Each of these 
methods revealed differences in problem-solving approach across groups. For 
example, the strength of the correlations between EF tasks and TOL score 
generally increased with problem difficulty for the TD and WS groups but not for 
the DS group, and the DS group made more rule violations (RVs) than the WS 
group (but not the TD group). In combination, the latter two findings prompted 
an interpretation of a different approach by the participants with DS compared to 
the other groups: rather than increasingly relying on working memory/planning 
skills as problems became more challenging, the DS group may have turned to the 
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alternative strategy of attempting to reach the solution by breaking the rules of 
the task (see discussion below). 
 
In Chapter 4, parental ratings of EF and problem solving were compared for TD, 
DS and WS groups. Overall, WS parent-reported problem solving was poorer than 
for the DS group, and both atypical groups’ scores were poorer than that of 
another TD group, who were also much younger. Given that language skills in WS 
are typically stronger than in DS, this result suggests that language does not 
provide a robust compensatory route to problem solving. Novel problems were 
more difficult than routine problems on the PSQ, with more BRIEF (EF) scale 
scores related to success on novel than routine problems. While all groups asked 
for help to a comparable level, this was only related to reaching the solution for 
the DS group, while becoming emotional was only related to reaching the solution 
for the WS group. The atypical groups were more likely to ask for help than 
change their response, while the opposite was true for the TD group. The 
Organization of Materials BRIEF scale, which was scored relatively well among 
the BRIEF scales for the DS group, differentiated their performance from that of 
the other two groups. Employing a cross-syndrome approach allowed us to 
determine that this was a characteristic of the DS group rather than a general 
characteristic of having intellectual impairments overall. 
 
In Chapter 5, the relationships between EF test scores from the lab-based 
experimental tasks and real-world PSQ outcomes were assessed, to ascertain the 
extent to which they were tapping into the same constructs. TOL score was 
unrelated to reaching the solution on the PSQ for each group; moreover, most 
experimental measures were unrelated to their counterpart BRIEF scales, at the 
very least, highlighting the different view offered by experimental versus parental 
report measures, but perhaps also adding to questions about the ecological 
validity of traditional EF tests (Burgess et al., 2006), and re-emphasising the 
benefits of also using real-life EF measures (cf. Burgess et al., 1998). The working 
memory scores were related most strongly to their questionnaire-based 
counterpart, although this only reached significance for the forwards digit span 
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task for the WS group: therefore, verbal working memory might reflect real-world 
working memory capabilities in WS. As inhibition test scores (in some form) were 
weakly related to solving novel problems on the PSQ for each group, this was a 
tentative indicator that inhibition was the primary experimental indicator of 
everyday problem-solving success. 
6.2.2 Patterns of findings throughout this thesis 
6.2.2.1 Processing Speed 
Processing speed and response time was an emerging theme from some chapters: 
reflected by RT to the Same condition of the inhibition task, it was the only 
measure to be significantly related to TOL score in the DS group. It seemed to be 
reflected in the relationship between longer planning times and longer times per 
move in all three groups in Chapter 3, and was generally longer in DS, with longer 
move times and RTs in the inhibition task for this group. The possibility raised in 
Chapter 2 of slower processing in DS underlying poorer verbal rehearsal and 
verbal working memory (as both RTs were slow, and backwards digit span was 
related to TOL score in DS) was nevertheless weakened by the finding in Chapter 
3 that backwards digit span was related most strongly to scores for easy 
problems, while RT Same was weakly related in all three problem types. If the 
two skills were related in a functional way for TOL problem solving one would 
expect similar patterns of reliance for similar problem types.  
 
In WS, after excluding outliers, speed was inversely related to accuracy on the 
opposite condition of the inhibition task, and there was a suggestion that taking 
longer to plan was a useful strategy for this group on the TOL as well. Given that 
poorer TOL scores stemmed mainly from fewer correct trials in the WS group, it 
may be that TOL errors stemmed from impulsive responding for this group. 
Indeed, this is echoed by the trajectory analysis of planning and TOL score which 
revealed that there was more reliance on planning ability for TOL performance 
when planning was poor for this group, suggesting that when an individual was 
poor at planning this also hindered their success on the TOL. Speculatively, poor 
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planning and TOL performance could both result from impulsive responding in 
this group. 
 
Impulsiveness has been found to be a characteristic of WS groups in previous 
research (Carney et al., 2013; Menghini et al., 2010), and the WS group was 
slightly (although not significantly) more affected by the Opposite condition of the 
inhibition task than the TD group (greater changes in RT), indicating possible 
weaknesses in inhibition relative to nonverbal ability. 
6.2.2.2 Working memory and inhibition 
While backwards digit span was weakly related to TOL score for all three groups, 
and backwards block span was additionally related in the WS group (with all four 
memory tasks related in the TD group), it seems that working memory in general 
is a good candidate for a component process for TOL success, in some form, for 
each group. The working memory BRIEF scale was also related to reaching the 
solution on the PSQ (although marginally in some cases) for all groups, for both 
routine and novel problems. In addition, working memory was the strongest 
candidate for being represented both in and out of the laboratory, so seems to 
have the strongest ecological validity of all of the tasks. Interestingly, however, 
the working memory EF tests were not related to PSQ problem solving for any of 
the groups so, in terms of contributing to problem solving, did not span the divide 
between well-defined and ill-defined arenas. This could reflect a reduced working 
memory load for the everyday tasks which have been previously encountered. 
 
Inhibition was also (weakly) related to both TOL scores in the WS and DS groups 
but not the TD group. This could be due to the limited success of this particular 
inhibition task to detect inhibition skills in the TD children. As inhibition was the 
score which was (again, weakly) related to PSQ success, this suggests that 
inhibition is a fundamental enabling ability, for more EFs to be used (cf. Best et al., 
2009). Interestingly, the Inhibit scale in the TD group was one of only two scales 
that were significantly related to novel problem-solving scores on the PSQ, 
potentially pointing to its importance for problem solving. In contrast, most of the 
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BRIEF scales were related to the PSQ reaching-the-solution score for the atypical 
groups. The TD group’s lack of reliance on many EF BRIEF scales for PSQ 
problem-solving success in Chapter 4 might reflect relative ease with the PSQ 
tasks: if they are easy, the TD group would only need to be focusing (that is, 
resisting distractions) for success to occur (hence, the relationship between the 
PSQ success and the Inhibit scale). Interestingly, Task-Monitor was the other scale 
significantly related to PSQ success for this group, which would fit with these 
ideas. 
6.2.3 Considerations from a neuroconstructivist perspective 
This thesis was written from a neuroconstructivist standpoint: that is, rather than 
emerging from nature or from nurture, outcomes in an individual will have 
emerged over time through an interaction between processes at many different 
levels of description (genes, brain, behaviour and environment; Karmiloff-Smith, 
1998; 2009). The same scores could be obtained on a test for different reasons in 
different groups (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). This is illustrated by the equivalent TOL 
performance of the DS and TD groups, followed by findings in the DS group of 
different TOL behaviours (longer times per move; more verbalisations), less EF 
reliance, and different patterns of EF reliance with increasing problem difficulty 
than the TD group: the DS group seemed to engage less with EFs with increasing 
task difficulty, rather than more as the TD group did. In the TOL there are 
multiple ways of approaching solving: rather than actively engaging in effortful 
solving (planning ahead, visualising possible moves) success could have been 
achieved by taking a step by step approach towards the goal (i.e., a hill-climbing 
strategy). While it is likely that this strategy was used to some degree by 
members of all the groups, it seems probable that this occurred to a greater 
extent in the DS group than in the other groups. 
 
Furthermore, the DS group exhibited more RVs than the WS group. This was 
interpreted as reflecting either: a different strategy involving choosing to make 
RVs in order to try to solve the task (potentially, compensating for task difficulty 
by breaking rules, or reflecting low motivation), in line with previous reports of 
low motivation during problem solving for individuals with DS (e.g., Fidler, 
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Hepburn, Mankin, & Rogers, 2005); or, difficulty in both solving the task and 
simultaneously remembering to follow the rules (in line with previous findings of 
DS difficulties with dual-task processing; Lanfranchi et al., 2012). The rule 
breaking itself could account for the decreased reliance on EFs with increasing 
difficulty: if participants repeatedly broke the rules and had to stop for the pieces 
to be reset, opportunities to engage with the task (and use EFs) may have been 
limited. Future research would be needed to tease apart these possibilities, for 
example by testing dual-task processing alongside TOL performance and 
assessing potential links between them. 
6.2.3.1 Developmental trajectories 
There is a need to measure outcomes developmentally rather than at single 
points in time (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998, 2009). Considering outcomes using the 
developmental trajectory approach (Thomas et al., 2009) has allowed an 
assessment of the way in which one ability is driven by another, which has 
provided more insight than group comparisons alone would afford. For example, 
planning was related to TOL score in an atypical way in the WS group, and this 
would not have been known had the group means alone been compared.  
 
By taking this developmental stance we can appreciate that some patterns of 
behaviour could reflect compensations over time for areas of weakness. The 
better score on the Organization of Materials scale in DS could have reflected a 
compensatory strategy of keeping things in order over development in DS (see 
Section 4.4.2 for a discussion). Similarly, verbal mediation in the WS group, as a 
long-term compensatory strategy to use relatively good verbal skills to bootstrap 
poor nonverbal skills, could have manifested in their relationship between BPVS 
and both questionnaire and TOL scores, as well as the marginal association 
between verbalisation and planning times. 
 
By employing a range of different approaches and measures and allowing them to 
converge, we were able to see both typical and atypical patterns in individuals 
with neurodevelopmental disorders that may have otherwise not emerged. For 
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example, in Chapter 3, while the reliance on EFs increased in the TD group for 
more difficult problems, the DS group did not exhibit this pattern, and indeed for 
some measures demonstrated decreasing EF reliance with increasing problem 
difficulty. For the WS group, both of these patterns were apparent for different 
EF/MA measures, so the way that EFs were drawn upon with increasing problem 
difficulty looked typical for some measures and atypical for others. 
6.2.3.2 Theoretical implications 
The finding from Chapter 5 that, broadly, little relation emerged between 
experimental and everyday measures of EF indicates that experimental and 
questionnaire EF/problem-solving measures were generally not measuring the 
same constructs. This, on one hand, adds to the body of literature raising 
concerns about the ecological validity of EF tests (Burgess et al., 2006). On the 
other, as the BRIEF was designed as one solution to that ecological validity 
problem, the scarcity of associations perhaps should not be surprising. Indeed 
these findings are in line with several others, described by Toplak et al. (2013), 
leading them to conclude that lab-based and real-life measures of EF are tapping 
into separate entities. The latter, but not the former, require the solver to use 
background or context in their approach and are often scaffolded by caregivers, to 
name just a few of the multitude of aspects that are likely to differ between them. 
In contrast, as mentioned in Chapter 5, a testing situation removes some of the 
demands that are present in everyday life (cf. Stuss, 1987). 
 
The outcomes can also be considered in light of the different approaches to 
cognition reviewed in Chapter 1. Briefly, the symbolic approach assumes that an 
individual interacts with the world using a set of complex rules which could be 
extended to encompass everyday life (Vera & Simon, 1993). In contrast the 
situated action approach maintains that cognition in the real world can only be 
studied in the real world (Greeno & Moore, 1993; Suchman, 1993). As 
performance on well-defined lab-based tasks were currently not found to bear 
much relation to performance on ill-defined everyday tasks, this seems to support 
the situated action approach, in that it is necessary to study real life in its natural 
context in order to understand it. However, it could be argued that the 
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information-processing approach could also adequately describe everyday 
problem solving, if enough were known about performance on the task.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, RT Same was the only measure that was significantly 
related to TOL performance in DS group, which seems consistent with Karmiloff-
Smith (1998)’s suggestion that DS could be a disorder in which the process of 
‘progressive modularisation’, i.e., the development of increasingly specialised 
abilities, does not occur over time, so that only a general measure of processing 
was related to complex task performance. Further research would be required to 
examine this hypothesis, perhaps by examining the comparative interrelatedness 
of different cognitive abilities in DS and TD. 
6.3 Limitations and related considerations 
6.3.1 Experimental work 
Choosing specific aspects of ability (e.g., verbal: BPVS, or nonverbal: RCPM) for 
group matching allows the interpretation of results with respect to one aspect of 
functioning, against the backdrop of uneven cognitive profiles in WS and DS 
(Farran & Jarrold, 2003). RCPM was chosen as the matching measure so that TOL 
performance (also being nonverbal) could predict WS/DS performance for the 
control group’s level of nonverbal ability. Here, however, RCPM and TOL scores 
were unrelated in the atypical groups, which allows for less confidence when 
judging the expected TOL scores based on nonverbal ability (see Section 2.4.3 for 
a discussion). 
 
The decision to use mainly nonverbal tasks could have potentially penalised the 
WS group, as there is evidence that tasks requiring a verbal response are 
completed with more success for this group (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2003; although 
see Carney et al., 2013, who found WS impairments in both modalities for 
inhibition). However, given the opposing profile in DS (e.g., Klein & Mervis, 1999), 
choosing predominantly verbal tasks would produce the same concern in the 
reverse direction. Thus, as the TOL task was nonverbal, the most prudent choice 
275 
 
was the use of nonverbal tasks. It was possible to also include verbal measures of 
working memory to allow a fuller picture in this domain. 
 
Some of the experimental limitations stem from the need to consider the issues 
relevant to designing EF research that is appropriate for children of a large age 
range as well as for individuals with intellectual disabilities. In the TOL task, the 
range of problems selected was appropriate for the participants, as demonstrated 
by a lack of floor or ceiling effects. 
 
One limitation of the threshold procedure that was employed in order to 
minimise fatigue was that not all participants completed the same number of 
trials. If the study were to be repeated, a problem set that was completed by all 
participants would be utilised to yield a richer data set (e.g., for comparisons 
across problem type as in Chapter 3). 
 
The TOL practice items were relatively easy (2-move) problems, to both ensure 
task understanding and facilitate a gradual increase in task difficulty. However, it 
is likely that completing these relatively easy problems did not produce the type 
of challenging situation in which rule violations might be attempted. Thus, in line 
with Berg and Byrd (2002)’s suggestion, future iterations of the TOL could 
include questions about the rules alongside practice items to ensure that the rules 
had been absorbed by the participant. 
 
It is necessary, particularly in studies which include several tasks, to minimise 
testing time so as to maintain motivation. In the planning task, pilot testing 
indicated that the original design of including two trials per delivery length took 
too long to administer. Thus, only one trial of each length (i.e., each number of 
houses to be delivered to) was included in the current study. While the TD group 
obtained a range of scores indicating the task’s sensitivity to individuals of 
different abilities, unfortunately the variation in the number of trials correct was 
minimal for the DS group, with many participants only able to complete the trial 
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of the same length as the practice trial. It is possible that they were less able to 
extend the practice trial strategy to future trials, or alternatively that they failed 
to attend to the additional house on the three house trial. While each house was 
set up in full view of the participant, it is possible that future studies in which the 
number of items to be planned for was emphasised (“look, this time there are 
three houses”) might elicit better performance.  
 
Furthermore, having one trial of each length meant that, on failing an item of one 
length, an opportunity was not available to attempt a trial of that length again: 
rather, the next trial was more challenging. Future iterations of this task should 
potentially include more trials at each level, if time constraints allow. Many 
participants seemed to fail at 3-move trials, either in the first or second phase. 
The need to introduce a new set of rules, e.g., for phase 2, and start from the 
easiest delivery length again (2 houses) meant that it could be argued that the 
first trial of the second phase was not more challenging than the phase 1 trials. 
Some participants seemed to be able to ‘discover the rule’ (anecdotally, some of 
them articulated this rule) in phase 1 of selecting the colours that are needed in 
the anticlockwise order around the board, indicating that the discovery or non-
discovery of this rule might have affected success.  
 
Phases two and three introduced more demanding requirements in order to 
enhance sensitivity and avoid ceiling effects in the TD group. Reflecting the task 
impurity problem (see Section 1.2.3.1), it is likely that the working memory 
demands of this task also increased with the phases: e.g., in phase two, one needs 
to remember to choose the items in the reverse order but also to place milk boxes 
underneath cakes. Of the WS group, 40% of participants successfully completed 
phase one, compared to 60% of the matched TD group. As the block span tasks 
were poorer in the WS than TD group, it is possible that working memory 
difficulties may have hindered the WS group in reaching later phases. This speaks 
to the potential overlap between the block span and planning tasks discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
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Finally, the planning task (unlike the TOL) was designed to require the 
occurrence of planning before execution (delivery). While changes to the order of 
pieces was not allowed during delivery, in future a rule allowing only one 
placement of each piece (i.e., disallowing removing an item once it is placed on 
the van) would increase planning demands further. 
 
In the shifting task, the use of the touchscreen computer was based on an attempt 
to maintain participants’ motivation. In this aspect, the task was largely 
successful: the touchscreen computer was often engaging for participants to use, 
and generally elicited a reliable response. However, the requirement to respond 
by tapping on the screen, combined with the removal of the negative feedback 
sound for incorrect items (following piloting, to support motivation), 
unfortunately meant that it was sometimes difficult for participants to distinguish 
between an incorrect answer and an occasion when they had tapped the screen 
quickly and the computer had not registered the response. Sometimes this led 
them to tap the remaining shape, which was not their original choice. As the 
experimenter was observing and recording the outcome of each trial, this did not 
cause difficulties with later analysis, but it did mean that reaction time was not a 
suitable measure for this task. In addition, participants sometimes found it 
difficult to remember to respond using both hands (which they were asked to do 
to make it equally easy to select either side of the screen). In future, this task 
would need to be administered either in a table-top form or using an alternative 
response method, e.g., a response box. 
 
Developing a shifting task which would be sensitive to a wide range of ability 
levels was a challenge. Adaptations of the WCST for young children, such as the 
DCCS, involve telling participants the rule each time it needs to be followed, while 
the WCST also requires rule discovery and following without input from the 
experimenter (just feedback regarding the correctness of each trial). The present 
task was designed to be maximally sensitive to performance, and thus had an 
easier phase like the DCCS and more difficult phases requiring rule discovery. 
However, one challenge in developmental EF research is ensuring that what is 
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being measured is constant throughout the age range (Best & Miller, 2010). 
Indeed, the DCCS has sometimes been described as an inhibition task (Best & 
Miller, 2010). Shifting is also thought to involve inhibition and working memory 
(Davidson et al., 2006) and it is easy to see, once again, how the working memory 
demands of the task would be likely to increase with each phase.  
 
The aim in developing the inhibition task was to measure the type of inhibition 
necessary for the TOL task: that is, replacing a prepotent response (e.g., simple 
matching of pieces to positions) with an alternative one (e.g., making a 
counterintuitive move). Elements of the design were employed in order to 
minimise the task impurity problem: different sets of images were presented in 
the two conditions, administered before and after the planning task. The intention 
was to reduce shifting (e.g., immediately from matching to non-matching) and 
working memory demands (e.g., to not match the same picture that previously 
needed to be matched). However, the task did not prove particularly successful 
for measuring inhibition in the TD group, and may have been under-challenging. 
Separating the two conditions in time and using different sets of images may have 
‘diluted’ the inhibitory demands. 
 
Similarly, because the pictures that were pressed down for response to the task 
were attached to the keyboard, the task was simple in its requirement because it 
is possible to set a rule for responding, e.g., “press my left hand down when I see 
the grass” and follow that rule during the task. It may be the case that a more 
complex inhibition task would have accounted for a greater amount of variance in 
TOL scores. Future work could increase the demands of the inhibition task by: 
increasing the number of trials of the Same condition (equal numbers of trials 
were presented in each condition) and thus adding to the prepotency of the 
response to be inhibited (cf. Kaller et al., 2008’s suggestion); including additional 
matching and inhibiting blocks; using the same set of images in each condition; 
and not separating the two conditions in time. These changes are likely to 
increase inhibitory demands, but also other EF demands.  
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The backwards block span task was selected to allow equivalent forwards and 
backwards versions of the same task. It should be acknowledged that the 
particular backwards spatial span employed, from the WNV battery, was designed 
for use with children from a minimum of 8 years, while the TD age range was 
from 4 years and above. Anecdotally, young children sometimes needed 
reminding to produce the sequence backwards and not forwards. However, all 
but one of the 4-year-olds were able to reverse a sequence of two blocks on an 
experimental trial, with these reminders. The remaining participant was 
unfortunately not reminded to produce the sequence backwards and so their data 
for this task were excluded.  
 
Presenting the backwards memory tasks immediately after the forwards tasks 
may also have introduced an element of inhibition, or shifting, which may have 
accounted for some of the difficulties on backwards tasks. It was necessary to use 
this order of presentation in the digit span tasks to be in keeping with that of the 
block span tasks, for which the backwards version follows the forwards version in 
the WNV manual. Also, efforts were made to keep the administration procedures 
constant between the verbal and visuospatial working memory tasks, although 
the remaining difference was that for the verbal tasks participants were told how 
many items to expect, while they were not in the block tasks (with the exception 
of when it was necessary to inform participants how to reverse three items). This 
introduced the possibility that block span tasks were more difficult than digit 
span tasks for this reason. However, given that the TD group was better at block 
span than digit span tasks in the backwards conditions, and that the atypical 
groups’ patterns of performance followed expected patterns, these concerns were 
alleviated. 
 
When comparing clinical and typical groups it is useful to control for motor speed 
on the TOL task (Berg & Byrd, 2002). Thus, the longer response times seen for the 
DS group could be due to differences in motor speed because this was not 
controlled for. Also Berg and Byrd (2002) recommended that planning (first 
move) time includes the motor movement of the first piece, because planning still 
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happens during this first move. Therefore, by not including the first move in the 
current measure of planning time, not all of the planning may have been picked 
up. However, they also note that, for example, clinical groups may have longer 
movement time of the pieces than TD controls, which would introduce a 
confound, so this has been partially avoided (although the hand movement to 
make the first move may still have been longer for the atypical groups). 
Additionally, in light of suggestions that on-line planning is likely to occur (cf. Goel 
& Grafman, 1995), strictly splitting solution time into planning and execution time 
may be less achievable than previously imagined. 
6.3.2 Questionnaires 
While the way in which parents rate their child’s behaviour is interesting in itself, 
reliance on subjective parent reports is a limitation of questionnaire-based 
measures in general, when one wishes to compare groups. Parental 
questionnaires provide a direct and efficient way of collecting substantial 
amounts of data, particularly in the context of working with rare 
neurodevelopmental disorders such as WS. They also have the advantage of using 
the knowledge and experience of someone who knows the child in question well. 
The trade-off is the unknown reliability of parent reports. Rating scales of EF are 
thought to be susceptible to difficulties related to differences between observers 
and contexts (Barkley, 2006, cited in Toplak et al., 2013). In the current study, 
4.5% of the sample had an inconsistency score on the BRIEF that was rated as 
‘questionable’ while the others fell into the ‘acceptable’ bracket, and the 
inconsistency score across the groups was not found to differ significantly. This, 
of course, speaks to the internal consistency of each parent’s ratings rather than 
the consistency of ratings between respondents. One way to inform reliability for 
future studies might be to use teacher and parent ratings of the same child; 
indeed, the BRIEF comprises both parent and teacher forms.  
 
The crucial step between the child’s observable behaviour and the questionnaire 
data is the parent completing it. Parents with high and low expectations are likely 
to rate the same behaviour differently. One factor that might mediate 
expectations is whether the parent has already raised a TD child. Although few 
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participants had no siblings, there were no differences on questionnaire scores 
between them and their counterparts with siblings, indicating that any 
differences in parent expectations with respect to siblings were not reflected in 
the questionnaire scores. The role of parent expectations seems to be 
demonstrated in the TD group’s responses. Questionnaire percentage scores were 
related to CA in the WS and DS groups (and reaching the solution to novel 
problems was related to CA in the DS group only), but not in the TD group. Given 
that we might reasonably expect everyday functioning to improve with CA in a TD 
group, and given the age improvements documented in the BRIEF manual, 
perhaps TD performance changes are in line with increasing parent expectations 
with age, producing a constant relationship between them, and therefore no age-
related changes.  
 
The TD group was not matched to the atypical groups in Chapter 4. This is 
because they were recruited to allow the developmental trajectory approach to 
be employed in a similar way to that used in Chapter 2, and so that the 
relationships between experimental data from Chapter 2 and questionnaire data 
could be assessed. However, it does mean that limited conclusions can be drawn 
about the WS and DS groups’ questionnaire performance with respect to controls. 
Nonetheless, controls were much younger than the atypical groups, so the poorer 
performance demonstrates considerable difficulties with everyday life in these 
groups. 
 
The PSQ is a new and innovative measure designed by the author to assess 
different aspects of problem solving in everyday life. While it was developed with 
regard to advice from parents and colleagues (see Section 4.1.5.1), it has not been 
standardised. Partially with this in mind, the BRIEF, a well standardised and 
validated measure, was administered alongside the PSQ. Future improvements to 
the questionnaire could include exclusion of the questions concerning making a 
sandwich and making a telephone call, as these were responded to the least 
frequently and clearly were not relevant to all of the participants. In future, as 
part of questionnaire development, parents could rate how often their child 
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attempts a wide variety of activities, and the most commonly chosen ones could 
be included in the questionnaire. Parents were informed that some tasks were 
routine and some were novel, so it is possible that they expected novel tasks to be 
more difficult, and answered accordingly. Of course, by definition of asking about 
tasks that many people do in everyday life, there will be some element of practice 
or repetition involved in the tasks, and tasks can be expected to draw on EFs to a 
lesser degree with repetition (Rabbitt, 1997). On one hand, this points to the 
usefulness of the response part of the question, which seems to introduce more 
novelty to the problem; on the other, it is a useful point to acknowledge, as it 
leads us to question whether any problem in real life is truly novel. Even in 
experimental tasks, it seems likely that general strategies such as setting up 
subgoals or vocalising one’s behaviour can be utilised in many tasks, and that 
characteristics of problems will be shared, perhaps requiring planning steps 
ahead for success. Any systematic study of this sort will need to ask about oft-
encountered tasks, which necessarily invokes this type of risk. Another approach 
might be to engage in naturalistic observation of individuals going about their 
daily lives and witness their problem solving first hand, although this method 
would attract substantial practical and methodological challenges. Alternatively, 
ecologically valid measures of EF have been developed which could constitute a 
future avenue of research: see discussion below. 
6.4 Overall implications and further work 
EF impairments in WS and DS were revealed in this thesis as well as in previous 
studies. However, EF impairments are by no means unique to WS and DS but, as 
discussed in Chapter 1, exhibited in a range of syndromes (e.g., Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996). Other work (e.g., Kenworthy, Yerys, Anthony, & Wallace, 2008) 
has investigated similar phenomena in autism, both in laboratory and everyday 
settings, and there is the potential to extend the current work to other atypical 
groups, particularly as syndrome-specific patterns have been revealed here.  
 
Procedural (implicit) learning has been found to be less impaired in a DS group 
than a WS group (Vicari et al., 2000, 2001), which may have lent the DS group an 
advantage in the real-world arena. Although this would predict more of a DS 
283 
 
advantage for routine than for novel tasks, which was not found, it seems possible 
that it could also apply to general problem-solving strategies: for example, 
learning that asking for help tends to increase the chances of success. Asking for 
help was related to problem-solving success for the DS group, but not the WS 
group. Conversely, for the WS group, being less likely to become emotional was 
related to better problem-solving success on the PSQ. Interestingly, Toplak et al. 
(2013) suggested that, based on evidence from previous interventions, increasing 
structure in everyday life could be helpful for children with ADHD. Many children 
with WS are known to meet the criteria for ADHD diagnosis (Leyfer et al., 2006), 
so could also potentially benefit from an increase in structure. Further work 
would be required to investigate this: it may be that the unpredictability of 
everyday life could conceivably add to their anxieties, leading to more cognitive 
difficulties. 
 
In the WS group, BPVS score was related to better questionnaire outcomes 
generally, and to reaching the solution on the PSQ for routine, but not novel, 
problems. The implication for parents seems to be that while verbal abilities may 
be an indicator of everyday functioning more generally, and may predict their 
child’s success on well-practised tasks, they may not be a helpful indicator of an 
individual’s novel problem-solving abilities. In addition, as the WS group’s BPVS 
scores were better than the RCPM-matched TD group’s BPVS scores, who 
nonetheless scored better on the TOL than the WS group, it is clear that verbal 
abilities do not index problem solving in a straightforward way. 
 
Some suggestions can be gleaned from the present work in moving towards 
intervention studies, although these should be considered preliminary given the 
infancy of the research area. First, given the poor level of agreement between 
experimental and everyday measures, it does not seem likely that increasing 
performance on laboratory tasks would translate to improvements on real-world 
tasks. Thus, basing interventions on real-world tasks seems like a prudent 
approach (see Semel & Rosner, 2003). Of course, we cannot assume that 
interventions on specific tasks would be generalisable to other tasks (Karmiloff-
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Smith, personal communication, October 2013). Second, having said that, the 
characteristics of the way that the groups approached problem solving might lend 
something to future approaches: for example, in knowing that individuals with DS 
are likely to break the rules when a task is difficult, this could be an important 
indicator to parents or teachers when a child is experiencing difficulty, losing 
motivation or is stuck on a problem. While there are not usually explicit ‘rules of 
the game’ in real life, off-task behaviours could be an indicator of difficulty. 
Indeed, individuals with DS have previously been found to use social behaviours 
as distractors in difficult tasks (Wishart, 1993b). 
 
Third, because becoming emotional was related to problem-solving success in the 
WS group, further research is warranted in investigating the impact of anxiety 
levels on problem-solving success for this group. As anxiety was related to BRIEF 
scale scores (John & Mervis, 2010), it seems plausible that it would also show 
links with the ability to reach a problem’s solution. If so, interventions that target 
reducing anxiety levels during solving could lead to improved outcomes. Fourth, 
as performance on the experimental inhibition task was related to everyday 
problem solving in all groups, becoming distracted could (unsurprisingly) be a 
basic barrier to success, so interventions that either reduce external distractions 
or increase an individual’s ability to disregard them may prove helpful.  
 
Through carrying out this work, other areas of research have presented 
themselves that could have had a role to play in the current outcomes and may 
also be fruitful for further research. One factor is the characteristics of family life 
and parenting styles: as discussed in Chapter 4, there may be reasons related to 
family life for the pattern of responses gathered (i.e., the atypical groups being 
more likely to ask for help than change their response to a problem). It is likely 
that growing up with a disorder would exert an impact on the environment: for 
example, parents of children with learning disabilities respond to situations 
differently (e.g., more cautiously) than parents of a typical child (Karmiloff-Smith, 
2009). Indeed, parenting looks different for parents of children with 
neurodevelopmental disorders (Venuti et al., 2012) and could play a role in the 
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way, for example, that they later seek help, as occurs in the typical population 
(Gauvain & Huard, 1999). Individuals with WS and DS often experience sleep-
related difficulties (Annaz, Hill, Ashworth, Holley, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2011) and 
the potential impact on the current results is unknown. Additionally, the social 
profile associated with the two syndromes may have had an impact on the 
present results and is likely to interact with other factors in a real-world context: 
for example, as the possibility of a role for low task motivation in DS (e.g., Vlachou 
& Ferrell, 2000, cited in Fidler, 2005) in both the elevated levels of RVs 
(compared to the WS group) and poor performance on the ‘finding a lost 
possession’ question on the PSQ in the DS group was noted, collecting parent 
ratings of motivation alongside measures of problem-solving performance may be 
informative. Sensory processing has been found to be atypical in both WS and DS 
groups and related to EF difficulties in WS (John & Mervis, 2010), and seems 
worthy of further investigation with respect to combining EFs to solve problems. 
Finally, attention is known to be atypical in DS and WS, with ‘sticky fixation’ 
(difficulties in disengaging attention, or prolonged gaze) in WS at various stages 
of life (Cornish, Scerif, & Karmiloff-Smith, 2007; Lense, Key, & Dykens, 2011; 
Mervis et al., 2003; Riby & Hancock, 2008), while infants with DS have impaired 
sustained attention in infancy (Brown et al., 2003) but not in childhood (Cornish 
et al., 2007). Breckenridge, Braddick, Anker, Woodhouse, and Atkinson (2012) 
also found that attention profiles in WS and DS are different. Of course, attending 
to the task at hand would be crucial for success, particularly if it is a problem 
which is demanding, so difficulties with attention are likely to impact problem-
solving success. Eye-tracking methods would be an interesting future avenue, and 
are likely to be a good measure of attention on the TOL task (Berg & Byrd, 2002), 
perhaps in measuring looks to the goal state, as in Hoffman et al. (2003)’s study 
using the block design task. 
 
It also seems likely that several of these factors will impact on one another for 
problem-solving success: for example, anxiety is linked to attention in the typical 
population (Eysenck et al., 2007), EF is related to sensory processing and to 
anxiety in WS (John & Mervis, 2010), and while inhibition could be interpreted as 
the ability to ignore distractions, this could just as readily be described as 
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maintaining attention. Ideally, then, future work should take account of several 
factors simultaneously. Problem solving is complex and multifaceted (Berg et al., 
2010) and should be treated as such. 
 
Future work could also set out to capture wider elements of problem solving. 
Some studies have examined insight in tower-based tasks (Fireman, 1996; Luwel, 
Siegler, & Verschaffel, 2008). Ill-defined problems, requiring such additional 
processes as problem recognition and definition, have also been relatively under-
studied (Pretz et al., 2003). This type of approach has been attempted previously 
with respect to problem solving that is understood as alleviating a social conflict 
or troubling scenario: for example in the Purdue Elementary Problem-Solving 
Inventory (Feldhusen, Houtz, & Ringenbach, 1972), children were shown 
cartoons of problem scenarios and asked to go through a series of stages, e.g., 
selecting from a multiple choice what the problem was. Similarly, Channon, 
Charman, Heap, Crawford, and Rios (2001) conducted a study in which people 
with Asperger’s syndrome were shown videos of socially awkward scenarios and 
asked to answer questions, e.g., about the most appropriate solution. 
 
This type of more social approach to problem solving may prove particularly 
helpful for populations such as WS, as individuals are known to experience 
difficulties maintaining social relationships (Stinton & Howlin, 2012). Relatedly, 
problem solving which is carried out collaboratively probably happens frequently 
in everyday life, and so future research should extend the current investigations 
to observing the way that people with neurodevelopmental disorders engage in 
this type of activity, e.g., in parent-child dyads, as in Fagot and Gauvain (1997)’s 
study. This would be an appropriate arena to investigate the impact of 
personality, and parenting style, mentioned above. 
 
As noted earlier, a main finding of this thesis is the general scarcity of association 
between EF and TOL tests and their everyday life, questionnaire counterparts. 
This indicates that tests and questionnaires were generally not measuring the 
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same constructs, in line with Toplak et al. (2013)’s assertions, and extends similar 
findings, for example, in ADHD (Bodnar et al., 2007; Toplak et al., 2008) and 
children with other conditions including brain damage (Anderson et al., 2002) to 
individuals with WS and DS. 
 
Some authors have considered ways of measuring performance that is relevant to 
everyday life in an empirical way. Several tasks have been designed to represent 
real-life demands more faithfully than traditional tests of EF, taking the 
verisimilitude approach to the ecological validity problem (see Section 4.1.3). 
Szepkouski et al. (1994) examined planning performance in learning disabled and 
TD children on a route-planning task set in a model of a supermarket. Another 
example is the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome test 
battery; BADS (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996; Wilson, Evans, 
Emslie, Alderman, & Burgess, 1998). This test includes a variety of tasks designed 
to measure daily executive functioning to aid rehabilitation in neuropsychological 
patients with Dysexecutive syndrome (DES). In the test, individuals are asked to 
judge how long certain everyday activities might take, such as blowing up a 
balloon or visiting the dentist; to switch between responding to the colour of a 
playing card to responding to whether it matched the previous one they saw or 
not; to use several pieces of equipment together to remove a piece of cork from a 
tube; to plan an efficient search strategy; to plan an efficient route around a zoo; 
and to schedule their own activities in a simplified version of the Six Elements 
Test (Shallice & Burgess, 1991a). The BADS was found to possess better 
ecological validity than more standard EF tests (Norris & Tate, 2000). It also 
includes the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX; Burgess, Alderman, Wilson, Evans, 
& Emslie, 1996) which can be used to assess executive difficulties in everyday life, 
and is related to BADS score in brain-damaged (but not schizophrenic) patients 
(Evans, Chua, McKenna, & Wilson, 1997), and in the children’s version of each 
(Emslie, Wilson, Burden, Nimmo-Smith, & Wilson, 2003). Thus, it may be fruitful 
for future work to assess individuals with WS and DS on ecologically valid tasks in 
order to gain an observational set of data of problem solving that is more closely 
related to people’s real lives.  
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However, when Willner, Bailey, Parry, and Dymond (2010) used the BADS-C and 
the Cambridge Executive Functioning Assessment (CEFA) to assess EF in 
individuals with mild to moderate intellectual impairments, they found that the 
BADS-C was less appropriate than the CEFA because there were some floor effects 
associated with it. As the CEFA uses more traditional EF measures, such as the 
TOL and verbal fluency tests, the suitability of the more ecologically valid tasks 
for populations with neurodevelopmental disorders is as yet unknown. Although 
these ecologically valid tasks may measure skills required for everyday living, 
conducting them requires setting up a testing situation. EF requirements may be 
reduced when an individual engages in a traditional testing paradigm (Bernstein 
and Waber, 1990, cited in Gioia, Isquith, Kenworthy, et al., 2002). Tasks that 
establish verisimilitude in this way may be able to avoid some of the ecological 
validity concerns associated with traditional tests of EF, but they, and indeed any 
experimental measure, must by definition provide the participant with a task, 
some rules or restrictions, and a goal, within a distinct paradigm. It is therefore 
also important to understand individuals’ functioning when they are not given a 
set of instructions in this way; to gather measurements of actual real-life 
experiences, e.g., through questionnaire studies. 
 
6.5 Final thoughts 
This is the first time that the way in which EFs relate to complex problem solving 
has been compared in Williams syndrome, Down syndrome and typical 
development. Differences were revealed, not only in the pattern of EF 
impairments between TD, DS and WS groups matched for nonverbal ability, but in 
the extent to which different aspects of EF were relied upon for TOL problem 
solving and the behavioural characteristics exhibited across the groups. 
Combining several methods and considering outcomes developmentally has led 
to interpretations that would not otherwise have emerged. The DS and TD groups 
may have achieved equivalent TOL scores through different cognitive processes. 
The DS and WS groups approached the task differently, with greater numbers of 
RVs in the DS group and less reliance on EFs with increasing task difficulty in this 
group, potentially indicating lower levels of task engagement with increasing 
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difficulty in the DS group, and failure due to visuospatial working memory 
difficulties in the WS group. Real-life measures of EF and problem solving also 
revealed syndrome-specific findings: the BRIEF Organization of Materials scale 
differentiated DS from WS and TD groups, while the atypical groups’ problem-
solving success was related to different responses to a problem occurring, with 
help seeking emerging as important for DS, and avoiding becoming emotional for 
WS. In line with previous findings, a discrepancy between empirical and everyday 
measures of EF was revealed: the need to consider the real world when assessing 
EF has been extended for the first time to WS and DS. The importance of using a 
range of measures, both experimentally and in relation to real life, to understand 
performance has been emphasised. Future work should examine collaborative 
and ecologically valid measures of EF and problem solving for these populations, 
and explore the potential link between anxiety and problem-solving success in 
WS. 
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Appendix A 
Tower of London Problem Set 
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  L C R L C R         
1 (D)  wr b r wb  13-14 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
1 (P1)  br w w br  46-54 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
2 (P2) br  w r bw  22-24 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
1 r wb     wb r 14-66 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
1 b rw     rw b 34-26 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
1 w br     br w 54-46 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
1 b wr     wr b 44-56 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
2   wb r rw b   66-63 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
2   rw b rb w   26-33 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
2   br w wb r   46-43 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
2   bw r br w   36-23 PT 0 0 0 1 0 
3 br w     rb w 23-16 PT 0 0 0 1 1 detour 
3 wb r     bw r 43-36 PT 0 0 0 1 1 detour 
4 rw b   b wr   63-44 PT 1 1 1 1 1 detour 
4 br w   w rb   23-64 PT 1 1 1 1 1 detour 
5 wr b   bw r   13-53 PT 2 2 1 1 1 detour 
5 rb w   wr b   33-13 PT 2 2 1 1 1 detour 
6   wb r b rw   66-34 PT 3 3 2 1 5 detours 
6   wr b r bw   56-24 PT 3 3 2 1 5 detours 
 
 Table A-1: Tower of London problem set. Letters denote the position of the pieces such that , 
for example, rw = red placed on top of white. PT = partial tower (goal state). L, C and R refer to 
the peg position: L = left, C = centre, R = right. D = demonstration trial, P1 = first practice trial, 
P2 = second practice trial. 
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Appendix B 
Chapter 2: Developmental trajectories with significant relationships in one group only 
Variables that were only significantly related to the TOL score in one group were analysed using the developmental trajectory approach, and 
are summarised in Table B-1 below. No trajectory analyses were conducted for chronological age (CA) due to the lack of overlap between the 
TD group and the atypical group scores, and the lack of relationship between CA and TOL score in the atypical groups. Trajectory analysis was 
not conducted for the forwards block and digit span measures due to non-normal data which were not improved by transformations. Details 
of correlations between measures and TOL score can be found in Table 2.5. See figures B-1 to B-6 below for scatter plots of these data. 
Variable 
N (TD, DS, 
WS) 
Group effect Covariate effect 
Group by 
Covariate 
interaction 
Post hoc 
ANCOVA 
RCPM 56, 20, 20 
F(2,90) = 1.986, p = .143, 
partial η2 = .042 
F(1,90) = 8.887, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .090 
p = .643 N/A 
Inhibition % 
Opposite12 
56, 20, 20 
F(2,90) = 2.418, p = .095, 
partial η2 = .051 
F(1,90) = 9.411, p = .003, 
partial η2 = .095 
F<1 
TD < WS 
DS = TD,WS 
Shifts 54, 18, 20 
F(2,86) = 3.514, p = .034, 
partial η2 = .076 
F(1,86) = 9.004, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .095 
F<1 
TD < WS 
DS = WS,TD 
                                                        
12
 Upon excluding data from one participant in the WS group with a low score on accuracy in the Opposite condition, the correlation in this group loses significance  
(r = -.340, p = .155), leaving none of the three groups with a significant correlation between accuracy in the opposite condition and TOL score. ANCOVA without this participant’s 
data no longer indicates a Group effect (F(2,89) = 2.024, p = .138, partial η2 = .044). 
Table continued overleaf 
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Table B-1 continued 
Variable 
N (TD, DS, 
WS) 
Group effect Covariate effect 
Group by 
Covariate 
interaction 
Post hoc 
ANCOVA 
Inhibition: RT 
Change 
56, 20, 20 
F(2,90) = 10.373, p < .001,  
partial η2 = .187 
F(1,90) = 3.517, p = .064,  
partial η2 = .038 
p = .286 TD < DS,WS 
Table B- 1: Outcomes of developmental trajectory ANCOVAs for significant TOL associations for one group only. In the post hoc ANCOVA column, note that ‘<’ 
indicates lower scores on the TOL, i.e., better performance. 
y = -2.7882x + 116.02 
R² = 0.4331 
y = -1.5161x + 114.07 
R² = 0.0343 
y = -3.7386x + 162.91 
R² = 0.0773 
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Figure B- 1: Scatter plot of RCPM and TOL score by group Figure B- 2: Scatter plot of shifts made and TOL score by group 
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Figure B- 3: Scatter plot of inhibition accuracy (Opposite) and TOL 
score by group 
Figure B -4: Scatter plot of inhibition RT proportional change and 
TOL score by group 
Figure B- 5: Scatter plot of forwards block span and TOL score by 
group 
Figure B- 6: Scatter plot of forwards digit span and TOL score by 
group 
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Appendix C 
BRIEF Example Items 
Item 28: Gets caught up in details and misses the big picture (Plan/Organize) 
Item 55: Has trouble putting the brakes on his/her actions (Inhibit) 
Item 68: Leaves a trail of belongings wherever he/she goes (Organization of Materials) 
 
Reproduced by special permission of the Publisher, Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc., 16204 North Florida Avenue, Lutz, Florida 33549, 
from the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function by Gerard A. Gioia, Peter K. Isquith, Steven C. Guy and Lauren Kenworthy, Copyright 
1996, 1998, 2000 by PAR, Inc. Further reproduction is prohibited without permission from PAR, Inc. 
 
Figure A-1:  
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Appendix D 
The Problem-Solving Questionnaire 
In this section, the PSQ questions are displayed (with adjusted margins and 
spacing for inclusion in this thesis). 
Part A: Everyday Tasks (1): Getting dressed 
 
1a. Please indicate whether you son or daughter usually gets dressed independently (1) with some help 
(2) or only if someone else dresses them (3) by circling the relevant number below: 
 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3  
 
1b. If you circled with some help (2) above, please indicate whether help is in the form of: (please tick 
as many as apply) 
 
Specific instructions (e.g., “now you need to…”),        
General encouragement (e.g., “well done, keep going, nearly there…”)  
Physical support (e.g. someone holding objects still or doing part(s) of the task for them)  
1c. Who usually selects the clothes to be worn by your son or daughter? (please tick one only) 
 
They select the clothes themselves   Someone else selects clothes for them  
 
1d. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or 
daughter finds each aspect of the task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very 
difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (being fully dressed) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what can be done to reach the goal (putting clothes on) 1 
 
2 3 4 5 
iii. Doing steps in the right order (e.g. putting on socks before shoes) 1 
 
2 3 4 5 
iv. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 1 
 
2 3 4 5 
v. Stopping when a task is finished (e.g. stopping looking for clothes 
in the wardrobe when fully dressed) 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Finishing off the task (e.g. closing the wardrobe door) 1 
 
2 3 4 5 
1e. If something goes wrong (for example a t shirt is put on 
backwards), please indicate how likely your son or daughter  
is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) 
by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
Very Unlikely Very Likely 
Very 
Difficult Very Easy 
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i. Recognise that there is a problem (e.g. t shirt is on backwards) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem 
(e.g. try to turn the t shirt round) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Become emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Reach the solution 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
Everyday Tasks (2): Brushing Teeth 
 
2a. Please indicate whether your son or daughter usually brushes their teeth independently (1) with 
some help (2) or only if someone else brushes them (3) by circling the relevant number below: 
 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3  
 
2b. If you circled with some help (2) above, please indicate whether help is in the form of: (please tick 
as many as apply) 
 
Specific instructions (e.g., “now you need to…”),        
General encouragement (e.g., “well done, keep going, nearly there…”)  
Physical support (e.g. someone holding objects still or doing part(s) of the task for them)  
 
2c. For each statement below, please indicate how easy 
your son or daughter finds each aspect of the task, from 
1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant 
number in each case. 
 
     
i. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (having clean teeth) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what can be done to reach the goal (brushing teeth) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Doing steps in the right order (e.g. putting toothpaste on the brush 
before starting to brush) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Easy Very 
Difficult 
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v. Stopping when a task is finished (e.g. teeth are clean) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Finishing off the task (e.g. putting the toothbrush and toothpaste 
away after brushing) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2d. If something goes wrong (for example toothpaste is forgotten), please indicate how likely your son  
or daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by circling the relevant  
number in each case. 
 
 
    
i. Recognise that there is a problem (e.g. toothpaste has been 
forgotten) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem (e.g. 
attempt to add toothpaste) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Become emotional  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Reach the solution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Everyday Tasks (3): Making a sandwich 
 
3a. Please indicate how often your son or daughter on average attempts to make a sandwich: every day 
or more often (1), a few times a week (2), a few times a month (3), a few times a year (4), or never (5), 
by circling the relevant number below: 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3 4 5 
 
3b. Now please indicate whether you son or daughter usually makes a sandwich independently (1) with 
some help (2) or only has a sandwich if someone else makes it for them (3) by circling the relevant 
number below: 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3  
 
3c. If you circled with some help (2) above, please indicate whether help is in the form of: (please tick as 
many as apply) 
 
Specific instructions (e.g., “now you need to…”),        
Very Likely Very 
Unlikely 
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General encouragement (e.g., “well done, keep going, nearly there…”)  
Physical support (e.g. someone holding objects still or doing part(s) of the task for them)  
             
3d. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or daughter finds each aspect of the  
task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (making the sandwich) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what can be done to reach the goal (putting the filling on 
the bread; cutting the sandwich) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Doing steps in the right order (e.g. starting with bread, then filling, 
then more bread) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Stopping when a task is finished (e.g. when the sandwich is made) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Finishing off the task (e.g. putting the ingredients and plate away 
afterwards) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3e. If something goes wrong (for example the filling is forgotten), please indicate how likely your son or 
daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by circling the relevant 
number in each case. 
 
 
 
    
i. Recognise that there is a problem (e.g. no filling is in the sandwich) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem (e.g. 
take the top piece of bread away and add a filling) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Become emotional 1 2 3 4 5 
v. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Reach the solution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
Very Likely 
Very Easy 
Very 
Difficult 
Very 
Unlikely 
315 
 
viii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
 
 
Everyday Tasks (4): Making a telephone call 
 
4a. Please indicate how often your son or daughter on average attempts to make a telephone call: every 
day or more often (1), a few times a week (2), a few times a month (3), a few times a year (4), or never 
(5), by circling the relevant number below: 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3 4 5 
 
4b. Now please indicate whether you son or daughter usually makes phone calls independently (1) with 
some help (2) or only if someone else calls for them (3) by circling the relevant number below: 
(please circle one only)       1 2 3  
 
4c. If you circled with some help (2) above, please indicate whether help is in the form of: (please tick as 
many as apply) 
 
Specific instructions (e.g., “now you need to…”),        
General encouragement (e.g., “well done, keep going, nearly there…”)  
Physical support (e.g. someone holding objects still or doing part(s) of the task for them)  
4d. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or daughter finds each aspect of the  
task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (for example making a 
call to ask someone a question) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what can be done to reach the goal (dialling, speaking) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Doing steps in the right order (e.g. waiting for the dial tone 
before dialling) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Stopping when a task is finished (e.g. hanging up when call is 
complete) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4e. If something goes wrong (for example the wrong number is dialled), please indicate how likely your  
son or daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by circling the  
relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Recognise that there is a problem (e.g. call placed to the wrong 
number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem 
(e.g. try a different number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
Very 
Difficult 
Very Easy 
Very 
Unlikely 
Very Likely 
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iii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Become emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Reach the solution 1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
 
 
 
Everyday Tasks: Strategies 
Finally, if there are any strategies that you or your son or daughter uses to help with everyday tasks, 
we would really like to know about them. As an example, a favourite rhyme or set of pictures might  
help them remember what needs to be done in a task. The following table can be used to write down  
the strategies. Please also let us know whether these are strategies that were initiated by your  
son or daughter or whether they have been taught to use them. Don’t feel that you are expected to  
fill in the whole table: the space is only there if you would like to use it! Thank you.  
 
 
 
 Task Strategy 
           Was the strategy taught 
          or self-initiated? 
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Part B: Novel Problems (1): Finding a lost possession 
 
Sometimes we encounter a problem in everyday life that is unexpected or is not something we 
routinely do every day. The next few questions give some examples of some potentially novel problems 
that might still be within the realm of everyday life. The first is finding a lost possession. Please imagine 
that your son or daughter has mislaid an everyday item such as a set of keys, wallet or favourite book or 
toy (depending on their age).  
 
5a. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or daughter would find each aspect of 
the task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Recognising that there is a problem (item is lost) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (finding the item) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Having some ideas about what could be done to reach the goal 
(e.g. searching or asking someone) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Keeping track of what they are doing (e.g. avoiding revisiting 
places they have already searched in) 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Use their existing knowledge to help them (e.g. looking for a 
book on a bookshelf or a wallet in a coat pocket) 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Applying a strategy they have previously learnt in another 
situation 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Stopping when a task is finished (item is found) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5b. If something goes wrong (for example searching in one location is fruitless), please indicate how 
likely your son or daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by 
circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
 
    
i. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem 
(e.g. searching somewhere else or in a different way) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Become emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. End their search after a sensible amount of time if the item has 
not been found 
1 2 3 4 5 
Very Easy 
Very  
Unlikely 
Very Likely 
Very  
Difficult 
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vi. End their search through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Reach the solution (find the item) 1 2 3 4 5 
 
viii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
 
 
 
5c. If your son or daughter fails to find the item, what do you think the reason for this is most likely to 
be? 
 
 
 
 
 
Novel Problems (2): Packing a bag for the day 
 
What might need to be packed in a bag each day varies depending on what is planned for that day, the 
weather, and so on. This question is about how your son or daughter tends to respond to these 
changing demands. 
 
6a. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or daughter would find each aspect of 
the task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Recognising that there is a problem (bag is not yet packed) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (having a bag packed with 
everything they will need) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Having some ideas about what could be done to reach the goal (e.g. 
collecting items to pack) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Keeping track of what they are doing (e.g. not searching for items 
they have already packed) 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Being flexible in what they choose to pack, depending on what is 
needed, e.g. only choosing what they will need that day 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Use their existing knowledge to help them (e.g. packing an 
umbrella if it is raining) 
1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Applying a strategy they have previously learnt in another 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
ix. Stopping when the task is finished (bag is packed) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
Very  
Difficult 
Very Easy 
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6b. If something goes wrong (for example an item has been squashed in the bag), please indicate how 
likely your son or daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by 
circling the relevant number in each case. 
     
i. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem (e.g. 
repacking the bag) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Become emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Lose focus  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Reach the solution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
vii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
 
 
6c. If your son or daughter fails to pack the bag with what they will need, what do you think the 
reason for this is most likely to be? 
 
 
Novel Problems (3): Putting items away in a wardrobe/chest of drawers 
 
Please consider times when your son or daughter may need to put items into a wardrobe or chest of 
drawers, for example when tidying their room.   
 
7a. For each statement below, please indicate how easy your son or daughter would find each aspect of 
the task, from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult) by circling the relevant number in each case. 
 
     
i. Recognising that there is a problem (room is messy; hard to find 
things) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Knowing what the goal of the problem is (that things are put away) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Having some ideas about what could be done to reach the goal (e.g. 
putting things inside the chest of drawers) 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Keeping track of what they are doing (e.g. picking things up from 
one part of the room at a time) 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Staying focused on the task (successfully ignoring distractions) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Use their existing knowledge to help them (e.g. putting things in the 1 2 3 4 5 
Very 
Unlikely 
Very Likely 
Very 
Difficult 
Very Easy 
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correct drawer, e.g. all the t shirts or games together) 
vii. Applying a strategy they have previously learnt in another 
situation 
1 2 3 4 5 
viii. Stopping when a task is finished (items are put away successfully) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7b. If something goes wrong (for example a drawer will not close), please indicate how likely your son 
or daughter is to do the following things, from 1 (very likely) to 5 (very unlikely) by circling the relevant 
number in each case. 
 
     
i. Change what they have been doing in response to the problem (e.g. 
unpacking and repacking the drawer) 
1 2 3 4 5 
ii. Ask for help 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iii. Become emotional 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
iv. Lose focus 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
v. Stop their efforts through lack of perseverance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vi. Reach the solution 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
vii. Are they likely to do something else? (please explain here) 
 
 
7c. If your son or daughter fails to put the items away, what do you think the reason for this is most 
likely to be? 
 
 
 
Very  
Unlikely 
Very Likely 
